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Abbreviations and Glossary 
 
 
Abbreviations 
 
BCDR - Banco Central de la República Dominicana (Central Bank of the Dominican 
Republic) 
 
CAC - Consorcio Azucarero Central   (Central Sugar Consortium) 
 
CAEI - Consorcio Azucarero de Empresas Industriales (Industrial Sugar Consortium) 
 
CR - Central Romana Corporation Ltd. 
 
CEA - Consejo Estatal Del Azúcar (State Sugar Council) 
 
CEACR - Commission of Experts on the Application of Conventions and 
Recommendations 
 
CESFRONT - Cuerpo Especializado en Seguridad Fronteriza Terrestre (Specialized 
Body on Land Border Security) 
 
CDL - Centro de Derechos Laborales (Center for Labor Rights) 
 
CNSS - Consejo Nacional de Seguridad Social (National Social Security Council) 
 
CNUS - Confederación Nacional de Unidad Sindical (National Confederation of Unions) 
 
CNM - Consejo Nacional de Migración (National Migration Council) 
 
DR-CAFTA - Dominican Republic – Central America Free Trade Agreement 
 
DUDH - Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
 
EAP - (Economically Active Population) 
 
EU - European Union 
 
FECARE - Federación de Colonos de Azucareros de la Región Este (Federation of 
Sugar Colonos of the Eastern Region) 
 
FEDOCA - Federación Dominicana de Colonos Azucareros (Dominican Federation of 
Sugar Colonos) 
 
FLACSO - Facultad Latinoamericana de Sciencias Sociales (Latin American Faculty of 
Social Sciences) 
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GARR - Groupe d'Appui Aux Rapatriés Et Réfugiés (Support Group for Returnees and 
Refugees) 
 
G.O. - Gaceta Oficial (Official Gazette) 
 
HRW - Human Rights Watch 
 
IACHR- Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos (Interamerican Court of Human 
Rights) 
 
IDSS - Instituto Dominicano de Seguros Sociales (Dominican Institute of Social 
Security) 
 
ILO - International Labor Organization 
 
INAZUCAR - Instituto Azucarero Dominicano (Dominican Sugar Institute) 
 
IOM - International Organization for Migration 
 
NCHR - National Coalition for Haitian Rights 
 
ODH - Oficina de Desarrollo Humano (Office of Human Development) 
 
PIDCP - Pacto de Internacional Derechos Civiles y Políticos (Pact of International Civil 
and Political Rights) 
 
UN - United Nations 
 
UNDP - United Nations Development Program 
 
USDA - US Department of Agriculture 
 
USDOL - US Department of Labor 
 
 
Glossary 
 
Ajusteros: The ajusteros are administrators who coordinate the harvest in the bateyes 
and their job is to supply the ingenio with sugarcane, as well as to pay workers‘ salaries. 
 
Anba fil: Creole term meaning "under the wire," used to refer to undocumented migrants 
who arrive in the Dominican Republic "illegally"  
 
Barracón: Worker housing in bateyes in which picadores tend to live. 
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Batey: The settlements and/or communities that developed around the sugar industry. 
 
Bodegas: Sites for storage and sale of food (used synonymously with colmado). 
 
Braceros: The Labor Code defines braceros as wage workers who work exclusively in 
the field (art. 145 CT). However, historically the term was used to refer to temporary 
workers recruited to work as cane cutters. The term continues to be used today to refer 
to workers engaged in cutting cane. 
 
Buscones: Human smugglers who work on the Dominican-Haitian border and 
sometimes work as labor brokers. 
 
Capataz: A person who supervises a group of workers. 
 
Carreteros: Workers responsible for transporting cut cane in carts. 
 
Cédula: Personal identity document. 
 
Colmado: Small shops selling food and supplies (in the bateyes, these are the main 
food retailers). 
 
Colonos: Sugarcane producers who grow and harvest sugar cane for sale to mills. 
 
Collective agreement: Legal agreement between a company union and the company 
regarding wages and working conditions, beyond those established by law. 
 
Cultivadores: Workers responsible for planting sugarcane. 
 
Downtime: Period in which no sugarcane is harvested and the workload is dramatically 
reduced. During this time, workers are generally engaged in maintenance of the 
plantations (sugarcane cultivation, weeding, etc.). 
 
Field Workers: According to the Labor Code field workers are "regular workers of 
agricultural, agro-industrial, livestock and forestry businesses, except those who 
exercise their industrial or commercial activities.‖ 
 
Forced Labor: ―All work or service which is exacted from any person under the menace 
of any penalty and for which the said person has not offered himself voluntarily‖ (Art. 2, 
ILO Convention No. 29).  
 
Hectárea: Unit of measurement equivalent to 2.47 acres. 
 
Ingenio: Industrial area where sugarcane is processed for the production of sugar. The 
term is also used to designate the industrial complex's plantations and bateyes. 
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Kongó: Term originally used to designate Haitians brought to the Dominican Republic 
through bilateral contracts. Now used to refer to recent Haitian migrants who do not 
speak any Spanish. 
 
Mayordomo: A supervisor of braceros. 
 
Metric ton: 1,000 kilograms or 2,205 pounds. 
 
Picador: Synonymous with bracero or cane cutter. 
 
Tarea: Unit of measurement equivalent to 0.15 acres. 
 
Temporary Workers: According to Migration Law No. 285-04, temporary workers are 
non-resident workers who are hired to "provide services for a specific period and under 
contract, either individually or as part of a group [...] (art. 36.5)." Traditionally, the term 
"temporary" was used to designate braceros brought under intergovernmental 
agreements who were repatriated at the end of the harvest. 
 
Vale: Promissory note traditionally used as payment in the sugar industry and other 
agricultural plantations and used to buy food or other items. 
 
Zafra: Sugarcane harvest (usually occurs between December and June in the 
Dominican Republic). 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Verité carried out research on the presence of indicators of forced labor in the 
production of goods in seven countries from 2009 through 2011. Research was carried 
out on the production of shrimp in Bangladesh; Brazil-nuts, cattle, corn, and peanuts in 
Bolivia; sugar in the Dominican Republic; coffee in Guatemala; fish in Indonesia; rubber 
in Liberia; and tuna in the Philippines. The following report is based on research on the 
presence of indicators of forced labor in the Dominican sugar sector. This research was 
not intended to determine the existence or scale of forced labor in the countries and 
sectors under study, but rather to identify the presence of indicators of forced labor and 
factors that increased workers‘ vulnerability to labor exploitation. 
 
 
Objectives 
 
The primary objectives of the project were to: 
 obtain background information on the Dominican Republic (place, people, 
product, policies, and programs); 
 create a methodology to study the presence of indicators of forced labor in the 
Dominican sugar sector; 
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 identify and document indicators of forced labor among workers in the sugar 
sector of the Dominican Republic; 
 document the broader working and living conditions that sugar sector workers 
experience; and 
 determine the risk factors for vulnerability to forced labor and other forms of 
exploitation in the sugar sector. 
 
 
Context 
 
In order to gain an understanding of the social, economic, labor market, and cultural 
context of the Dominican Republic, background research was carried out through 
comprehensive literature and legal reviews and expert consultations. The Dominican 
Republic is a country with a relatively high level of economic growth, which has failed to 
reach a large portion of the population due to a high rate of underemployment and 
informal sector employment. The Dominican Republic has a large number of Haitian 
migrants and residents of Haitian descent, most of whom are undocumented, working in 
the construction, tourism, and agricultural sectors, especially sugar.  
 
 
Research Methodology and Limitations 
 
The Research Center for Feminist Action (CIPAF, a Dominican Republic-based non-
governmental organization (NGO), carried out the study.  CIPAF specializes in 
research, education and public policy advocacy related to issues of gender and equality, 
including issues of employment. CIPAF‘s Executive Director supervised the overall 
research process; a methodology consultant assisted in the development of the 
research strategy and instruments; and field research teams carried out the research in 
the provinces. Field research teams included the research coordinator and two or three 
additional researchers of Haitian origin. CIPAF provided its research material and 
analysis to Verité, which throughout the project provided research consultation, review, 
and oversight. Verité analyzed the research and drafted this report.   
 
The research design used a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods.  The 
quantitative study used non-probability sampling.  This portion of the research was not 
meant to be statistically representative at the national or sectoral level, but rather to 
ensure coverage and interview more workers in order to triangulate information with the 
qualitative findings. Therefore, the quantitative findings from this study are biased by the 
use of nonprobability sampling and it is possible that some operational bateyes were not 
identified.  
 
Field work was carried out in two phases during the 2008-2009 and 2009-2010 harvests 
(between December and June) on the plantations and bateyes where sugarcane was 
still harvested in the eight provinces of San Pedro de Macorís, El Seybo, Hato Mayor, 
La Romana, La Altagracia, San Cristóbal, Independencia, and Bahoruco. The first 
phase, the Preparatory Phase, qualitative research included rapid appraisals, expert 
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consultations, and worker interviews on 42 bateyes. At the conclusion of this phase, 
researchers determined that while a sampling frame of all farms did not exist, a non-
representative quantitative survey to access more workers would be possible. During 
the second phase, a questionnaire was designed and administered to 740 workers, 
which was complemented by focus groups and in-depth interviews. During the rapid 
appraisal phase, workers were asked about their current experiences, whereas during 
the survey, workers were asked about their experiences during the previous harvest. 
 
 
Main Findings 
 
Verité investigated the presence of indicators of forced labor using International Labor 
Organization (ILO) guidance titled,  ―Identifying Forced Labor in Practice‖, which was 
published by the Special Action Program on Forced Labor in a 2005 report, A Global 
Alliance Against Forced Labour: Global Report under the Follow-Up to the ILO 
Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work. Research detected 
evidence of the presence of the following indicators of lack of consent: physical 
confinement in the work location, psychological compulsion (i.e. an order to work with a 
credible threat of penalty for non-compliance), induced indebtedness, deception or false 
promises about terms of work, withholding and non-payment of wages, and retention of 
identity documents. Research detected evidence of the presence of the following 
indicators of menace of penalty (the actual presence or threat of): physical violence 
against workers, deportation, dismissal from current employment, exclusion from future 
employment, and deprivation of food and shelter. Other issues of concern detected 
during research included working hours in excess of legal limits, a lack of days off, 
subminimum wages, the continued use of the voucher system, illegal deductions, a lack 
of benefits, poor health services, discrimination, poor living conditions, and child labor. 
Research found that workers employed by the Consejo Estatal Del Azúcar (State Sugar 
Council or CEA) under the ―quota system‖ and recently-arrived workers (kongos) were 
more vulnerable to labor exploitation. 
 
 
Background & Setting 
 
The following chapter will provide background information on the Dominican Republic 
through an analysis of the ―5 P‘s‖ (Place, People, Product, Policies, and Programs). 
Information covers the economy and labor market of the Dominican Republic (place), 
Haitian migration to the Dominican Republic (people), the sugar supply chain and recent 
allegations of forced labor in the sugar sector (product), and government efforts to 
combat labor violations (policies and programs).  
 
 
Place 
 
The Dominican Republic shares with Haiti the 77, 914 square kilometers comprising the 
island of Hispaniola. The Dominican Republic is comprised of slightly over 10 million 
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inhabitants, of which 69 percent are urban and 31 percent are rural (CIA World 
Factbook, 2010). 
 
In economic terms, the Dominican Republic is one of the Latin American and Caribbean 
countries that has registered the highest growth in recent decades, with an average 
annual growth rate of 5.9 percent between 1991 and 2006 (CEPAL, 2008). The main 
economic sectors in the country are tourism, remittances, telecommunications and 
export processing zones (OXFAM, 2010). 
 
Unfortunately, the country has failed to translate this economic growth into job creation 
and improvements to the quality of life and social welfare for the majority of its 
population through an equitable distribution of wealth (ODH / PNUD, 2008). It is for this 
reason that 47.8 percent of the population earn incomes below the amount needed to 
purchase a ―basic basket‖ (canasta basica) of goods and services,1 and 34.6 percent of 
people live on less than two dollars per day (SISDOM, 2010). Not surprisingly, the 
Dominican Republic ranks below average among Latin American and Caribbean 
countries in terms of the Human Development Index, ranking 88 of 169 countries in the 
world (UNDP, 2010). 
 
The Dominican labor market is characterized by underemployment and a high level of 
employment in the informal sector. In the first quarter of 2010, the unemployment rate 
was 14.4 percent of the economically active population (EAP). If this figure is broken 
down by gender, there is evidence that women are the hardest hit, with 21.9 percent of 
economically active women unemployed, compared with 9.7 percent of men. Women 
also comprised only 32.8 percent of the EAP in 2010 (Central Bank, 2010). Women, 
along with youth, particularly the less-educated, face the greatest disadvantages in 
terms of job opportunities (ECLAC, 2008). In addition, more than half of workers were 
employed in the informal sector,2 and therefore were not guaranteed a minimum wage 
or access to other employment-related rights, such as social security.3 
 
 
People 
 
Haitian migrants were first brought into the Dominican Republic to work in the sugar 
sector in 1919 (see Appendix 1: History of Haitian Migration to the Dominican Sugar 
Sector) Haitian migrants comprise the vast majority of workers in the Dominican sugar 
industry. Researchers did not come across any fieldworker of Dominican descent 
among the population of sugarcane harvesters.  
 
Migratory movements have played a vital part in the history of the Dominican Republic. 
However, it was not until the twentieth century that a large number of Haitians began to 
migrate into the Dominican sugar industry (Baez, Lozano, 2008). In the early 1920‘s, 
Haitian migrants began to be recruited by the Dominican Government to work in the 
sugar industry. According to the 1920 census, there were 28,258 Haitians in the 
country. Fifteen years later, in 1935, the official figure was 52,657, but the real number 
was reportedly much higher (Plant, 1987). This migration could be characterized as 
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"temporary seasonal migration," based on an agreement arranged by the dictatorial 
governments of both countries through "often coercive mechanisms which sent the cane 
cutter straight into the workplace" (Silié, et al. al. 2002). 
 
Individual immigration began to prevail with the decreased production of the Dominican 
sugar industry and the dying out of government-regulated recruitment in 1986. These 
changes, in turn, led to the generalized use of Haitian labor in other agricultural sectors 
(such as coffee and rice), construction, urban informal employment, and, more recently, 
tourism (Moseley-Williams, 2005). Construction and agriculture are the sectors 
employing the largest numbers of migrant workers (see Table 1 below), but the informal 
sector is gaining more importance. Data from a survey on Haitian migrants to the 
Dominican Republic carried out by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) 
and the Latin American Faculty of Social Sciences (FLACSO) illustrates this fact 
(IOM/FLACSO 2004).  
 
Table 1: Distribution of Haitian Migrants by Economic 
Sector 
Economic Sector Men 
(percent) 
Women 
(percent) 
Total 
(percent) 
Sugar 17.5 0.8 15.4 
Agriculture (outside of 
sugar)  
26.5 18.6 25.6 
Construction 42.6 4.6 38.6 
Industry 2.7 0.7 2.5 
Commerce 3.8 49.9 8.7 
Services 6.1 24.5 8.0 
Source: Báez; Lozano (2008: 200) –Data from IOM/FLACSO 
survey, 2004. 
 
A consensus on the number of Haitian migrants in the country has never been reached, 
but most estimates range between 500,000 and 1 million.4 However, these figures do 
not usually make the distinction between Haitian migrants and Dominicans of Haitian 
descent. These estimates also lack a solid statistical base. An IOM-FLACSO survey 
from 2004 can be considered the most reliable estimate, which found that in 2002, there 
were 315,000 Haitian migrants and 195,000 Dominican-born descendants of Haitians in 
the Dominican Republic. 
 
It is rare to have such a high rate of immigration into a country with such a high level of 
unemployment and underemployment. Sociologist Frank Evertsz Baez (1986) called 
this contradiction the "great paradox" that was explained by the "intense exploitation" 
and "subhuman living conditions" that the Haitian workers had to endure that were 
―below the socially accepted minimum in the Dominican Republic."  Thus, the absence 
of Dominicans in cane cutting was due to the fact that they had been "historically and 
structurally" excluded from the sugarcane sector and supplanted with Haitian workers 
who had less bargaining power and could be subjected to extreme forms of exploitation 
(Baez, 1986: 121-2).  
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The vast majority of Haitian migrants to the Dominican Republic are undocumented. 
Despite the adoption of the Migration Act in 2004 (see Appendix 2: Legal Framework) 
and a number of initiatives to combat human smuggling, illegal immigration continues to 
predominate. In 2009, according to the Director General of Immigration, only 11,000 
Haitian migrants were residing legally in the Dominican Republic.5 This shows the 
prevalence of amba-fils (Haitian workers who arrived illegally in the Dominican 
Republic). 
 
Buscones (called passeurs in Haiti) (Cuello, 1997:67), are human smugglers, who in 
some instances work as labor brokers (Ferguson, 2006). After the end of the inter-
governmental recruitment system in 1986, Haitian buscones formed connections with 
the Haitian military and Dominican border agents, both of which became complicit with 
the Haitian buscones in turning recruited Haitian workers over to Dominican buscones 
who brought the workers to ingenios in buses (Wooding and Moseley-Williams 
2004:41). Despite the significant reduction of the workforce in the sugar sector, the 
buscón is still a key figure in illegal immigration, facilitating the supply of migrant labor to 
the various economic sectors that demand it. The buscones continue to be involved in 
smuggling and recruitment, but do not always bring Haitian braceros directly to 
Dominican sugar cane plantations. 
 
Many human rights organizations have expressed concern over the level of human 
smuggling in the Dominican Republic. In 2009, the Support Group for Repatriates and 
Refugees (GARR) put the number of Haitians smuggled into the Dominican Republic in 
2008 at about 38,000.6 A 2008 Solidarity Center survey found that 94 percent of Haitian 
workers in the construction sector were undocumented and that 82 percent reported 
that authorities demanded the payment of bribes to let them enter the country. 
According to Solidarity Center, this implies that the smuggling of undocumented 
immigrants is made possible by the complicity of corrupt authorities.7 The prevalence of 
human smuggling places Haitian migrants in a situation of vulnerability to trafficking, 
labor exploitation, mass deportations, and other human rights violations.  
 
The earthquake of January 12, 2010 devastated Haiti and resulted in an initial increase 
in migration to the Dominican Republic. According to the Director General of Migration, 
after the earthquake, there was a 15 percent increase in Haitian migration to the 
Dominican Republic, representing 200,000 new immigrants, of whom 57,000 had 
entered legally.8 However, this does not correspond to any published statistics and has 
been questioned by various entities. An evaluation of Directorate General of 
Immigration records on inflows and outflows at official border posts between January-
April 2010 indicates that although there was an initial increase in immigration, it 
gradually stabilized over a period of months.9 During the days following the disaster, the 
Dominican government issued an executive order allowing Haitian migrants that were 
living in the Dominican Republic at the time of the earthquake to go to Haiti and then 
return to the Dominican Republic. However, according to sociologist Frank Báez 
Evertsz, overly-complicated requirements included in these measures prompted the 
majority of migrants to use illegal crossing routes to go back to Haiti and to return to the 
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Dominican Republic.  
 
An IOM-FLACSO survey published in 2004 found that 15.7 percent of all Haitian 
migrants in the Dominican Republic were employed in the sugar industry. According to 
the results of this survey, about 300,000 Haitian migrants resided in the country, which 
would suggest that there were approximately 40,000 Haitian workers in the sugar 
sector. However, at the time that the survey was carried out many of the privatized 
state-owned mills which are now abandoned were still active. This figure of 40,000 
Haitian workers exceeds recent INAZUCAR estimates of 30,000 jobs generated by the 
sugar sector, including 10,000 braceros employed in the sector (INAZUCAR, 2009). 
Undoubtedly, there has been a reduction in the amount of labor required for harvesting 
due to both the declining sugar industry (especially in the public sector) and higher 
levels of mechanization. Still, it is difficult to arrive at exact figures because not all the 
ingenios provide data on the number of workers employed and the tenant farmers 
provide no clear estimates. 
 
 
Product 
 
Sugar has played an important role in the history of the Dominican Republic, and 
although the industry is in decline, it continues to play an important role in the economy 
and social structure of the country (see Appendix 3: History of the Sugar Sector). The 
following section details the sugar production process and supply chain, as well as 
recent reports of forced labor in the sugar sector. 
 
Sugar Production and Supply Chain 
 
Sugar production entails a long process from germination of the seed to marketing of 
sugar (refined or raw) and its derivatives in domestic and international markets. 
Summarized below are the general stages of the sugar supply chain (including the 
production process). 
 
Cane Cultivation and Maturation 
 
The first step is the preparation of the land where sugarcane is planted, including 
weeding. Next, the cane is planted by farmers and the maturation process takes place 
for 12 to 14 months (INAZUCAR, 2008). Sugar cultivation is not done annually, but 
rather every five to seven years. This step may include the application of fertilizers or 
herbicides and irrigation (USDA, 2010). 
 
Harvest 
 
The harvest, known as the zafra, usually takes place from December to June or July. 
The cutting is done in three ways: manually, through the work of braceros or picadores; 
the manual harvesting of sugarcane with the assistance of mechanical lifts, which 
facilitate transportation of sugarcane and increase worker productivity; and by using 
  P a g e  | 14 
mechanized harvesters and loaders to cut and lift the cane, without the use of braceros. 
According to official data, mechanical production takes place in 60 percent of cases, 
while the remaining 40 percent is done manually, although this data varies by ingenio 
(INAZUCAR, 2009). 
 
In manual harvesting, teams of picadores cut the cane at locations designated by a 
capataz or foreman. Each team is composed of four to ten workers. The cane is then 
placed in wagons, either by the workers or by mechanical lifts.10 
 
Weighing and Transport 
 
Traditionally, sugarcane was transported in carts driven by oxen or tractors, weighed 
and then transferred to wagons (by vagoneros) or trucks that brought it to the ingenios, 
where it was weighed again. However, increasingly, sugarcane is now only weighed at 
the ingenios. 
 
Sorting and Cleaning 
 
Once at the ingenio, the milling and production of sugar begins. The cane is deposited 
in cane patios, in which the cane is separated by quality, purity, and level of fiber. Sugar 
cane cannot be stored for long periods,11 so the ingenios immediately start the washing 
process for mechanically harvested cane. Cane that is harvested manually is clean and 
free of debris. 
 
Processing 
 
The processing of sugarcane for the production of sugar is an industrial process that 
includes cutting, crushing, and grinding of the cane; the purification of the extract; and 
the evaporation, crystallization, and spinning of sugar. It starts with the process of 
chopping, in which the stems are cut to give them the uniform size required to extract 
the juice from the cane. This is followed by crushing and grinding, resulting in chips that 
go to the mills, which separate the ―juice‖ from the cane fiber with shredders. The juice 
is extracted through an industrial process using metal clubs and knives.12 Next, the juice 
is weighed on scales and the purification and mechanical and chemical evaporation 
process begins. This is followed by the crystallization and centrifugation processes. This 
produces the honey used in the production of alcohols, as well as yellow-brown mass 
called raw or unrefined sugar. 
 
Refinement 
 
For refined or white sugar, the sugar crystals are cleaned with water and dried to avoid 
formation of lumps. It is then taken to chillers to reduce its temperature. In the 
Dominican Republic, the refinement process is only carried out by the Central Romana 
sugar mill. 
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Packing 
 
Sugar is packaged according to market demands in bags or sacks. 
 
Domestic Sales 
 
Traditionally there were two main distribution channels nationally: large industrial 
companies (such as Pepsi Cola, Refrescos Nacionales, Coca Cola, Cervecería 
Nacional Dominicana, etc.) and wholesalers (and in some cases retailers) who buy 
directly from sugar mills. The wholesalers act as intermediaries that distribute to 
retailers. More recently, some of the ingenios have stopped selling directly to 
wholesalers and use intermediate companies, which sell the sugar at wholesale prices. 
 
Export 
 
The exportation of sugar is carried out in accordance with export quotas for sugar and 
molasses. Export permits are issued by INAZUCAR (including Certificates of Eligibility 
and loading permits). Raw and refined sugar is exported to companies in the United 
States (the main market) and to a lesser extent to other countries, including European 
Union countries. 
 
Geography of Production  
 
Sugar production is currently concentrated in two regions, the Eastern Region (covering 
five provinces: La Altagracia, La Romana, San Pedro de Macoris and Hato Mayor 
Seybo) and the Southwest Region (comprising three provinces: Independencia, 
Barahona, and Bahoruco). Some sugar production is also carried out in the province of 
San Cristobal, west of Santo Domingo.  
 
The Eastern Region accounts for 90 percent of sugar production, which is concentrated 
in three ingenios and one distillery: Ingenio Central Romana, Ingenio Cristóbal Colón, 
Ingenio Porvenir, and a distillery which began operating in 2010. In the three 
southwestern provinces, located in the border region, only Ingenio Barahona, a state-
owned ingenio operated by a private company, was operating in 2011. The plantations 
in San Cristobal are owned by Consorcio Azucarero de Empresas Industriales 
(Industrial Sugar Consortium or CAEI).  
 
The Bateyes 
 
Sugar plantations are comprised of ingenio and bateyes. Batey is a Taíno term13 that 
has been used in the West Indies to designate "industrial sugar complexes and all of 
their housing." Bateyes may be classified as either ―central‖ or ―agricultural‖ bateyes. 
Central bateyes house the ingenios. Agricultural bateyes, meanwhile, house the 
workers in the vicinity of the central bateyes (Yanguela Tejada, 2001). 
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The Dominican Republic has more than 500 bateyes, of which 220 are owned by the 
State Sugar Council (Consejo Estatal de Azúcar [CEA]) and the rest are owned by 
private companies. In 2002, approximately 250,000 people resided in the bateyes 
(Ferguson, 2006). However, today the vast majority of these communities are not linked 
to the sugar industry, especially in the case of the CEA, due to the collapse of state-run 
sugar production. 
 
Dominican Sugar Supply Chain 
 
 
Source: INAZUCAR (2009). 
 
SUGAR 
COMPANIES 
COLONOS 
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Sugar Producers 
 
In the Dominican Republic there are two types of sugar producers: sugar companies, 
which have both large plantations and mills, and independent producers called colonos 
that harvest sugarcane for sale to the ingenios. During the 2009-2010 sugar harvest, 
four companies operated ingenios: Ingenio Central Romana (owned by Central Romana 
Corporation Ltd. [CR]), Ingenio Cristóbal Colón (owned by CAEI), Ingenio Barahona 
(owned by the CEA, but administered by Consorcio Azucarero Central or Central Sugar 
Consortium [CAC]), and Ingenio Porvenir (owned and administered by the CEA).14 Each 
year the Executive branch of the Dominican government authorizes the amount of sugar 
production for each of the sugar companies. For a detailed description of sugar 
producers see Appendix 4: Sugar Producers. 
 
Table 2: Sugar Companies in the Dominican Republic 
Sugar 
Company 
Ingenio 
Administered 
2009-2010 
Location Year 
Founded 
Daily 
Milling 
Capacity 
Sugar 
Production 
2009-2010 
CAC Barahona Barahona 
Province 
1922 5,000 MT 68,276 MT 
CAEI Cristóbal Colón San Pedro 
de Macorís 
 
1859 8,000 MT 69,765 MT 
CEA Porvenir San Pedro 
de Macorís 
1879 2,500 MT 10,106 MT 
CR Central 
Romana 
La Romana 1912 20,000 MT 366,757 
MT 
 
The Sugar Colonato  
 
Colonos are independent producers who sell their harvested sugarcane to the ingenios 
(Central Romana, CAEI, and Ingenio Porvenir). At present, colonos produce 28 percent 
of total sugarcane processed in the Dominican Republic (INAZUCAR, 2009) and 
operate mainly in the Eastern Region (in the provinces of San Pedro de Macoris, El 
Seibo, Hato Mayor, La Romana, and La Altagracia). 
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Map of Principal Ingenios in the Dominican Republic (2011) 
 
 
 
Recent Reports on Forced Labor in the Dominican Sugar Sector (2000-present) 
 
There have been many reports on forced labor in the Dominican sugar sector (see 
Appendix 5: History of Reports on Forced Labor in the Sugar Sector), including a series 
of reports and documentaries since 2000. These reports generally indicate that there 
have not been drastic improvements in working conditions or systems to protect Haitian 
braceros, and many of the past abuses continue to be reported. 
 
The 2001 ILO report "Stopping Forced Labor" focused on modern manifestations of 
forced labor, as well as ways to combat them. Among the issues covered in the report 
was forced labor in the Dominican sugar sector. The report stated that the Dominican 
sugar industry was one of the most coercive working environments in the world. This 
study outlined recruitment and hiring systems, as well as working conditions of sugar 
braceros at the end of the twentieth century. It also noted the actions that the Dominican 
government had taken in response to the ILO‘s previous reports. 
 
The only exhaustive study on the hiring mechanisms and working conditions of braceros 
carried out in the 21st Century is ―Tras las Huellas de los Braceros.‖ This study was 
carried out in 2002 by Plataforma Vida. The study was based on a survey of 815 of the 
1,200 workers contracted by Ingenio Barahona for the 2001 harvest. The report 
indicated that in May and September 2002, thousands of braceros were trafficked 
through Puerto Escondido, Independencia Province by buscones and military personnel 
and brought to sugar plantations, for which the buscones were paid USD 10 (DOP 391) 
per person. Plataforma Vida published the names of buscones working as labor 
brokers. The report also indicated that guards (―vigilantes‖) were in charge of waking up 
workers and prohibited them from leaving after they finished work for the day. In 
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addition, the report criticized the low wages paid to braceros, the lack of days off, shifts 
of between 15 and 17 hours, and a lack of medical services, potable water, electricity, 
and bathrooms (Ferguson, 2006). 
 
In 2002, the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) issued a report 
"Internationally Recognized Core Labor Standards in the Dominican Republic" for the 
World Trade Organization‘s General Council Review of Trade Policies of the Dominican 
Republic. The ICFTU reported on a number of labor violations in the Dominican 
Republic, including in the sugar sector. The report stated that, ―Haitian workers on sugar 
plantations often work under conditions tantamount to slavery, as they have no legal 
protection in the country, and are completely at the mercy of their employer. There are 
numerous reports of clothes and belongings being locked away, or wages withheld, in 
order that workers cannot leave. They are in continual fear of deportation or violence at 
the hands of the authorities, and face deplorable working and living conditions without 
any recourse.‖ 
 
The 2004 report, ―Sugar Cane Slavery: Bateyes in the Dominican Republic,‖ by Barbara 
Bernier, focused on the system of forced recruitment carried out by the CEA. The report 
was based on visits to bateyes, but not on an exhaustive survey of workers. The report 
stated, ―There is always a shortage of workers during the harvest season and the State 
Sugar Council known as the CEA uses a system of employment that violates every 
applicable international law regarding the use of forced labor.‖ The report alleged that 
Haitians were sold to Dominican soldiers and deceived into working on sugarcane 
plantations in the Dominican Republic. The report also indicated that Haitian recruits 
were kept in barracks before being sent to plantations, that their belongings were 
confiscated, and that they were kept under surveillance by armed soldiers. Bernier also 
reported on workers‘ low wages, payment in vouchers, and poor living conditions.  
 
In 2006 Christian Aid published a report, ―On the Margins: Discrimination against 
Haitian migrants and their descendants in the Dominican Republic.‖ This report focused 
on the discrimination of Haitians and Dominicans of Haitian descent. However, it did 
refer to forced labor on sugar plantations, stating that, ―living and working conditions on 
these estates were appalling, with forced labour and fraudulent remuneration practices 
continuing right up into the 1990s and, in some cases, to the present day.‖ Also in 2006, 
James Ferguson published an academic report, ―The Haitian Migrant Minority in the 
Dominican Republic.‖ The report referred to the persistence of ―voluntary and 
involuntary‖ migration of Haitian workers to the Dominican sugar sector and to 
continued allegations that braceros were victims of forced labor.  
 
The U.S. Department of State‘s 2010 Trafficking in Persons Report indicated that the 
Dominican Republic was ―a source, transit, and destination country for men, women, 
and children subjected to trafficking in persons, specifically forced prostitution and 
forced labor.‖ It further indicated that, ―While the Ministry of Labor [of the Dominican 
Republic] reported that sugar plantations no longer use child labor, the sugar industry 
has been cited as vulnerable for possible use of forced labor.‖ The U.S. Department of 
State in 2010 gave the Dominican Republic the worst score of Tier 3 (down from Tier 2 
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in 2009) for its failure to combat trafficking in persons and criticized its weak efforts to 
prevent and prosecute cases of human trafficking.  In 2011, the country was upgraded 
to the Tier 2 Watch List as a result of its increased efforts to identify victims, but the 
country still had not prosecuted any human trafficking cases.  
 
There have also been a number of documentary movies, press articles,15 and art 
exhibits on forced labor in the Dominican sugar sector. Documentaries include ―Big 
Sugar,‖ by Brian McKenna; ―Batey Cero,‖ by Gérard Maximin; ―Azúcar Negro,‖ by 
Michel Régnier; Sugar Hell, by Adriano Zecca; ―The Price of Sugar,‖ by Bill Hane; and 
―Sugar Babies,‖ by Amy Serrano. These last two documentaries, released in 2007, 
focus on child labor in sugar production in the Dominican Republic, the poor living 
conditions on the bateyes, and the trafficking of workers by the sugar companies. ―The 
Price of Sugar,‖ which has drawn the most attention, focuses on the working and living 
conditions on CAEI bateyes (owned by Grupo Vicini). Esclaves au Paradis (Slaves in 
Paradise), an exhibit sponsored by Amnesty International and presented in France and 
Canada in 2007, included photographs, discussions, and audiovisual presentations on 
the forced labor of Haitian braceros in the Dominican sugar sector.16  
 
 
Policies and Programs 
 
The Dominican government has reacted strongly to a number of reports and complaints 
on forced labor in the sugar sector and exploitation of migrants. In the 1980s and 1990s, 
the government roundly rejected allegations of forced labor, including those coming 
from the ILO. The government took dramatic steps in reaction to complaints about the 
treatment of Haitian migrants, including an Americas Watch complaint brought before 
the U.S. House of Representatives. In June 1991, the Dominican government issued 
Decree No. 233-91, which demanded the repatriation of all undocumented Haitian 
migrants under the age of 16 or over the age of 60. As a result of this Decree, 30,000 
Haitians were expelled from the Dominican Republic, in violation of the American 
Convention on Human Rights, Article 22 of which prohibits the collective expulsion of 
foreigners. This caused a large number of complaints, which led to an Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights visit to the country and the publication of a report 
demanding that the Dominican Republic permanently suspend the ―collective 
expulsions‖ and indemnify deported Haitian workers for lost wages and benefits. The 
Commission also demanded the derogation of ―all legislative or administrative measures 
that tend to undermine the rights of foreigners or Dominicans of Haitian origin‖ (CIDH, 
1999).  
 
The practice of mass deportations without respect for Haitian migrants‘ rights continued 
through the 1990‘s despite the 1999 ratification of the Bilateral Protocol in the Expulsion 
of Haitians (Protocol Bilateral sobre la Expulsión de Haitianos) by the Dominican 
government, which guaranteed Haitian migrants certain rights, such as the right not to 
be separated from their families. This mechanism, denominated ―regulated mass 
deportations‖ (―deportaciones masivas reguladoras‖) by Wilfredo Lozano and Frank 
Báez E., continued to be used to deport undocumented Haitian migrants.  It was 
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condemned as a violation of Haitian migrants‘ rights, as well as a reflection of the 
Dominican government‘s lack of political will to establish immigration reforms that 
provide for the demands of Haitian migrant labor as well as the elimination of trafficking 
of undocumented immigrants (Wilfredo Lozano and Frank Báez E. 2008b: 248 y ss.).  
 
Dominican law and policy restrict the legal status and rights of individuals of Haitian 
descent. For example, according to the U.S. Department of State, provisions of the 
2004 Migration Law deny identity documents to individuals of Haitian descent who were 
born in the Dominican Republic. In addition, the 2010 Constitution denies Dominican 
citizenship to the children of individuals who are in the Dominican Republic illegally.17 
For more information see Appendix 2: Legal Framework.  
 
The Dominican government has not recognized the existence of forced labor in any 
economic sector in the DR, including sugar.18 For this reason, there are no plans or 
programs designed to explicitly combat forced labor. However, the government carries 
out labor inspections in the sector that directly and indirectly target the problem of 
forced labor. 
 
The Executive branch is the main entity responsible for enforcing the prohibition of 
forced and compulsory labor through various government agencies, especially the 
Ministry of Labor and the Directorate General of Immigration, given the immigration 
status of most sugar braceros. 
 
In recent years, the Ministry of Labor has maintained efforts to increase labor 
inspections in the agricultural sector, including on sugar plantations. These inspections 
cover both field and industrial work and are carried out throughout the sugar production 
chain. They are usually coordinated by provincial representatives of the Ministry of 
Labor and carried out in two stages: during land preparation/planting and the harvest, 
during which there are a greater number of workers (CIPAF, 2009). 
 
In 2008, the ILO recognized the Dominican Republic‘s efforts at "permanent inspection 
in the sugar sector," but suggested that the government include "qualitative information 
to assess the effectiveness of the results" of the inspections (ILO, 2008). In 2010, the 
ILO reported that permanent inspection had been achieved in the sugar sector, in which 
64 inspections were carried out from August 2009 to January 2010, during which one 
violation was found (ILO, 2010).  
 
According to the Ministry of Labor‘s Director of Inspections, Federico Gomera, 
inspections have continued on a regular basis. For the 2010-2011 harvest, inspections 
were conducted in the plantations of various ingenios in order to verify compliance with 
labor law, including on health issues (access to drinking water, toilets, kitchens, etc.). 
The visits take place away from management so that workers can converse freely with 
the inspectors. According to Mr. Gomera, the Department of Inspections includes 
information on the prohibition of forced labor (within the framework of the ILO‘s eight 
core conventions) in its training sessions for inspectors, employers, and workers. He 
further stated that inspections include mechanisms to prevent forced labor and inform 
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workers about their right to resign in order ―to avoid this situation and to protect them 
from it." 
 
In 2011, the Inspection Protocol for the Agricultural Sector was implemented. This 
Protocol was prepared under Proyecto Cumple y Gana by Social Accountability 
International, and includes forced labor as a labor issue to be checked by inspectors. 
The Protocol includes the legal basis for the prohibition of forced labor, as well as 
verification mechanisms that can be used to detect it (including interviews and 
document reviews). 
 
In recent years, the government has begun to focus on the problems of human 
trafficking and human smuggling; however, it has not publicly admitted that human 
trafficking can result in forced labor. Following the enactment of the Law on Smuggling 
of Migrants and Trafficking in Persons, 2003 (No. 137-03), a Specialized Body on Land 
Border Security (CESFRONT)  was created in 2007 by Decree No. 325-06 to "establish 
a security force and continuous monitoring of entry and exit points along the Dominican 
land border."19 Also in 2007, the Interagency Commission against Trafficking in Persons 
and Smuggling of Migrants (CITIM) was created by Decree No. 575-07. This 
Commission is composed of the main public institutions responsible for combating 
human trafficking and smuggling. In 2009, the CITIM approved the National Plan of 
Action against Trafficking and Smuggling of Migrants 2009-2014, with technical support 
from the International Organization for Migration (IOM). The Plan, supported by Law No. 
137-03, includes specific policies and targets needed to combat human trafficking and 
smuggling, taking into account a gender and human rights perspective. The Plan 
focuses on three strategic areas: prevention; detection and prosecution of traffickers; 
and protection of victims and witnesses. Although the Plan does not explicitly refer to 
forced labor, it does state that the prevention and prosecution training offered to public 
officials should be based on ILO Conventions 29 and 105 on Forced Labor, among 
others. 
 
Despite these efforts and government claims of increased border enforcement by the 
Department of Migration and CESFRONT, the authorities have not achieved a reduction 
in the flow of undocumented migrants, nor the prevention and sanctioning of human 
trafficking, including of children and adolescents. The legislation against human 
trafficking has been called deficient.20 Furthermore, according to the National Plan, the 
budget allocated to combat these problems has never been sufficient for the size and 
complexity of the problem (CITIM, 2009:7). According to the 2010 US Department of 
State Trafficking in Persons Report, the government had not yet appointed the budget 
necessary to implement the National Plan of Action.  
 
Various UN agencies have also demonstrated their concern over the Dominican 
Republic‘s lack of action on human trafficking, human smuggling, and forced labor. In 
1998, the Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (CESCR), responsible 
for overseeing compliance with the Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights, 
urged the Dominican Republic to take the necessary measures to regularize the 
situation of "illegal residents,"21 and to combat human smuggling, human trafficking, and 
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forced labor by prosecuting and sanctioning those who violate the law against trafficking 
and by supporting public awareness campaigns to prevent trafficking. The Committee 
also expressed concern about the lack of funding to implement and monitor the Plan 
(CESCR, 2010). The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) 
acknowledged in 2008 the government's efforts to combat trafficking for economic 
exploitation, but showed concern about the trafficking of Haitians for underpaid labor in 
the sugarcane, tourism, and construction sectors (CERD, 2008). 
 
 
Methodology & Limitations 
 
The Research Center for Feminist Action (CIPAF, a Dominican Republic-based non-
governmental organization (NGO), carried out the research for this project.  CIPAF 
specializes in research, education and public policy advocacy related to issues of 
gender and equality, including labor issues. CIPAF is a member of the Iniciativa 
Regional para la Responsabilidad Social y el Trabajo Digno (IRSTD), a regional 
network of NGOs that work collaboratively on labor issues in Central America and the 
Caribbean. CIPAF‘s Executive Director supervised the overall research process; a 
methodology consultant assisted in the development of the research strategy and 
instruments; and field research teams carried out the research in the provinces. Field 
research teams included the research coordinator and two or three additional 
researchers of Haitian origin. CIPAF provided its research material and analysis to 
Verité, which throughout the project provided research consultation, review, and 
oversight. Verité analyzed the research and drafted this report.   
 
The research process included both qualitative and quantitative research to ensure a 
comprehensive analysis of such a complex issue. Qualitative data gathering techniques 
were used to clarify workers‘ motivations, perceptions and experiences; and to shed 
light on research topics that are more difficult to capture quantitatively (such as 
deception in recruitment). Quantitative methods (which were included later in the 
research process) were used to analyze the patterns and general tendencies of 
prevailing working conditions and practices, as well as the demographic and migratory 
characteristics of the workers in the sample. During the application of both methods, 
emphasis was placed on indicators of forced labor. (See below for a more detailed 
discussion of qualitative and quantitative methods.) 
 
In addition, throughout the project, an extensive literature review was carried out, 
including an analysis of books, magazine and newspaper articles, reports on human 
rights, statistics, audiovisual materials, etc. Topics in this review included the history of 
the Dominican sugar industry; history and patterns of Haitian migration to the Dominican 
Republic; and labor conditions among sugarcane harvesters in the Dominican Republic, 
with an emphasis on reports of forced labor and slavery. Documents and publications 
were obtained and analyzed in Spanish, English and French.22 
 
Desk research was supplemented with semi-structured expert interviews with 
representatives of public institutions, academia, the private sector, labor unions and 
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NGOs with experience in migrant rights. Experts consulted for the study included 
current or former representatives of: 
 Government or semi-governmental institutions, including the State Sugar Council 
(Consejo Estatal de Azúcar [CEA]), the Ministry of Safety and Health 
(Superintendencia de Salud y Riesgos Laborales), the Dominican Institute of 
Social Security (IDSS), the Institute of Industrial Health and Safety (Higiene y 
Seguridad Industrial [DGHSI]), the Labor Inspections Directorate (Sistema de 
Inspeccíon), and the Dominican Sugar Institute (INAZUCAR) 
 Various human rights NGOs 
 FUTRAZUCAR (labor union) 
 The Association of Migrant Workers from the Northwest (Asociación de 
Trabajadores Migrantes Línea Noroeste) 
 Various companies and employers organizations, including Federación de 
Colonos de Azucareros de la Región Este (Federation of Sugar Colonos of the 
Eastern Region [FECARE], Federación Dominicana de Colonos Azucareros 
(Dominican Federation of Sugar Colonos [FEDOCA]) CEA, CAEI, and CAC 
 The United Nations 
 Academic institutions 
 
Based on the results of the literature review and expert consultations, a field research 
plan and survey instruments were developed. Survey instruments were written in 
Spanish and translated into Creole. Members of the research team were provided with a 
week-long in-person training on implementing surveys among vulnerable populations.  
 
Interviews were carried out in Spanish and Haitian Creole, and Creole responses were 
later transcribed into Spanish. To ensure that researchers would be able to interact 
directly with workers without the presence of intermediaries or prior coaching, 
researchers did not solicit authorization or permits from producers (colonatos) or sugar 
companies. Instead, they conducted the interviews on the bateyes on which the workers 
lived, which were open to the public. Given the complex and sensitive nature of the 
research topic, special emphasis was placed on guaranteeing the confidentiality and 
anonymity of workers during interviews and other data-gathering activities. 
 
 
Research Timing 
 
Field work was carried out principally from May 2009 to November 2010. From the 
beginning to the end of the 2009-2010 harvest season (December 2009 through May 
2010), the Rapid Appraisal phase was carried out. From March through May 2010, the 
survey and sample were designed and researchers were trained. Between June and 
August 2010, the cross-sectional survey was carried out. During the off season (from 
June through November 2010), the research team conducted interviews in CEA bateyes 
and in the colonato and visited the border region in order to obtain information about 
migrant workers. During the rapid appraisal phase, workers were asked about their 
present experiences, whereas during the survey, workers were asked about their 
experiences during the previous harvest (December 2009 through May 2010). 
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Location 
 
Research was conducted in the eight provinces in which sugar cane is currently 
harvested: San Pedro de Macorís, El Seybo, Hato Mayor, La Romana, La Altagracia, 
San Cristóbal, Independencia, and Bahoruco. In order to simplify the field research, 
these provinces were divided into regions or production zones: the Eastern Region, 
which included the plantations of Central Romana Corporation (CR), el Consorcio 
Azucarero de Empresas Industriales (CAEI), el Consejo Estatal del Azúcar (CEA) and 
el colonato azucarero (hundreds of small producers); the Southeastern Region, which 
included the plantations of Consorcio Azucarero Central (CAC); and la Provincia de San 
Cristóbal, where some of the plantations of CAEI are located.  
 
 
Qualitative Data Gathering  
 
Preparatory Phase and Rapid Appraisals  
 
Field work began with qualitative data gathering techniques that were used during the 
first and second phases of research. Rapid Appraisals were used to allow researchers 
to obtain a qualitative understanding of working conditions in the sugar sector.23  
 
The preparatory phase consisted of the first exploratory visits to the main sugar 
producing areas in the Dominican Republic and the bateyes in which workers lived in 
order to obtain a general understanding of the situation and to carry out the first worker 
interviews. In addition, the research team identified the main human rights organizations 
(especially those that have experience in labor rights), as well as unions that worked on 
bateyes associated with the sugar industry  in order to obtain their opinions and to 
gather information about current reports of labor exploitation. 
The preparatory phase was followed by the rapid appraisal phase. The objective of this 
phase was to research the possible persistence of labor rights violations and indicators 
of forced labor. In all cases, interviews of recently-arrived workers were prioritized due 
to their increased vulnerability to forced labor (including a decreased ability to 
communicate in Spanish and a lack of a social network and knowledge about conditions 
of employment). 
 
This phase covered all of the sugar producers in all of the production zones, including a 
total of 13 trips to bateyes and plantations: nine in the Eastern Region (where the 
majority of production is concentrated); two in the Southeastern Region and two in San 
Cristóbal. Some visits were carried out randomly and others were carried out in reaction 
to key informants‘ reports of labor violations. 
 
Throughout this phase, the research team visited a total of 42 bateyes: 12 from Central 
Romana, 11 from CAEI, nine from CAC, seven from CEA, and three colonatos. 
 
In selecting the bateyes, the researchers ensured that they sampled all types of 
employers, and at least two bateyes that were geographically remote among each type 
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of employer. Central Romana bateyes were sampled more heavily, due to their larger 
scale of production and in order to ensure that a number of different areas were visited. 
Regarding CAEI, a larger number of bateyes in San Cristobal were sampled, because 
many indicators of labor rights incompliance were detected during the preparatory 
phase. In the case of CAC, surveys were carried out in all of the bateyes to avoid 
gathering a sample size so small that it was irrelevant. 
 
In the 42 bateyes visited, dozens of semi-structured one-on-one and small group 
interviews (of between two and four workers) were carried out with workers who were 
selected through convenience sampling. Researchers made an attempt to gather a 
diverse pool of workers. Additionally, in five bateyes, large group interviews were 
carried out with between eight and 15 workers during their breaks or at the end of the 
working day. Both of these types of interviews lasted from a half-hour to an hour. In 
addition to the worker interviews, three unstructured interviews were carried out with 
supervisors or ex-supervisors from the CAC, CAEI and CEA.  
 
During the off season, the research team also visited and conducted interviews in public 
and private bateyes of the CEA and in the colonato. Lastly, this phase included a trip to 
the border region, especially Puerto Escondido (Independencia Province, Duvergé 
Municipality) and the border posts of Jimaní and Dajabón, in order to obtain information 
from organizations that work on the borders on the mechanisms utilized by workers to 
migrate to the Dominican Republic. 
 
In-depth Interviews and Focus Groups  
 
Some of the workers surveyed who reported indicators of forced labor or unique 
experiences were selected for in-depth interviews. Nine in-depth interviews were carried 
out with workers who represented different paths or points of entry into the sugar sector. 
Among the producers with the largest number of recently-arrived workers (CR, CEA, 
and CAC), the researchers were able to interview at least one recently arrived worker, 
as these workers demonstrated the highest level of vulnerability. In all cases, the 
researchers verified that the workers interviewed had worked during the 2009-2010 
harvest. At least one worker from each employer was interviewed. See the chart below 
for more information on interview subjects.  
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Table 3: In-Depth Interviews 
Date Employer24 Batey Time in country Age  
06/02/2010 CR Cacata Recently arrived 24 years 
06/06/2010 CR El Salado Recently arrived 24 years 
06/06/2010 CR Las Flores Worker living in the DR (for 
a long time) 
83 years 
06/10/2010 CEA Victoria Circular migrant between 
Haiti and DR 
20 years 
06/10/2010 CEA Experiment
al 
Recently arrived 28 years 
05/05/2010 CAEI Cumbá Worker living in the DR 
(recent) 
33 years 
06/11/2010 CAEI Los dos 
Hermanos 
Worker living in the DR 
(medium-term) 
57 years 
07/16/2010 Colonos Victorina Worker living in the DR (not 
in batey) 
39 years 
07/03/2010 CAC Batey 8 Recently arrived 23 years 
 
After a review of findings, focus groups were assembled through convenience and 
purposive sampling in order to ensure that various perspectives and experiences were 
included. The focus groups were used to fill in gaps not covered by the questionnaire. 
During the final field research phase, the research team conducted five focus group 
discussions (one for each employer type), with between ten and 15 workers in each 
group. Workers were first selected through convenience sampling and then workers 
were screened using purposive sampling to ensure that various paths into the 
Dominican sugar sector, and lengths of time working in the sugar sector were 
represented in the focus groups. Focus group discussions were conducted using a 
semi-structured, flexible interview guide (see Appendix 6: Focus Group Interview 
Guide). Focus groups were used as a tool for validating/confirming critical findings and 
exploring issues that were not sufficiently understood through other research means. 
 
The focus groups were facilitated by the Research Coordinator, with the support of a 
research assistant. All the focus groups lasted between two and two and a half hours.  
 
 
Quantitative Data Gathering  
 
At the beginning of the research project, the researchers did not consider including in-
depth quantitative research, including a survey, as part of the research methodology. 
First, the effectiveness of such methods has been questioned for issues as sensitive as 
forced labor, in which obstacles exist in reaching the group under study.25 Second, the 
lack of precise, detailed information about the object of the study (the number of 
workers, the bateyes at which they work, etc.) made it difficult to obtain a sample frame 
in order to carry out a survey.  
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However, after carrying out the first qualitative phase of research, the research team 
made the decision to include a survey of sugarcane workers. The surprising ease of 
access to the living areas of the bateyes (both public and private) and to workers, as 
well as the ability to establish an estimate of the population living on the ―active‖ bateyes 
with a reasonable degree of accuracy allowed for the possibility of carrying out 
quantitative research. Researchers deemed that such quantitative research would be 
valuable and meaningful in providing the opportunity to gather robust information about 
workers‘ paths into the sugar sector, and the conditions under which migrant workers 
labor therein.  
 
Between March and May 2010, the research team prepared for the survey. The survey 
instrument was designed, the sample was determined, and field researchers were hired 
and trained.  
 
A comprehensive and up-to-date record of public and private bateyes in the country and 
the number of sugarcane harvesters was not available.26 This necessitated the 
establishment of a sample frame through the triangulation of desk and field research 
and expert consultations. This was performed during March, April and May of 2010.  
 
For the eight provinces in which sugar is produced,27 researchers used the National 
Statistic Office‘s (ONE) 2008 national territorial matrix to map out the location of the 
bateyes in areas in which sugar was still being produced. They also used reports and 
documents from sugar companies that made reference to the number of bateyes linked 
to sugar production, as well as other qualitative research techniques carried out during 
the preparatory and rapid appraisal stages (described above).   
 
Once the listing of bateyes was established, researchers went into the field to confirm 
that each batey still existed and was actively involved in sugar production for the 2009-
10 harvest.28 This process resulted in the identification of 178 ―active‖ bateyes housing 
workers involved in sugar production during the 2009-10 harvest. Since there may have 
been some bateyes that were not identified through this process, a random sample was 
not possible. The researchers conducted the survey on 52 bateyes.  
  
Survey Instrument 
 
The survey was designed taking into account the research objectives, and the 
information gathered during the Rapid Appraisals and expert consultations. It included 
106 closed, semi-closed, and open-ended questions, divided into seven sections that 
covered demographic, migratory, and labor characteristics: I. Personal and Family 
Information; II. Residence and Migratory Activity; III. Haiti-DR Trajectory; IV. Work in the 
Sugar Sector; V. Freedom of Movement; VI. Payment and Daily Life; and VII. Additional 
Observations (See Appendix 7: Questionnaire). 
 
Questions on indicators of forced labor were included in the survey regarding worker 
recruitment and hiring (Section III), their work situation (Section IV), and freedom of 
movement (Section V). 
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The research team consulted two sociologists with vast experience on forced labor in 
the Dominican sugar sector for their suggestions and observations. Finally, a pilot 
survey was carried out with workers at Batey Alejandro Bass in order to ensure the 
clarity and coherence of the questions.  
  
Design and Sample Size 
 
The universe or group under study was the population of all sugarcane workers 
(braceros) living on bateyes, including transporters (carreteros) and planters 
(cultivadores). In interviewing medical staff, workers, and other individuals, the research 
team arrived at a range of 14,325 to 17,850 sugarcane workers living and working on 
the bateyes in order to ensure that an adequate number of workers (broken down by 
employer type) was captured in the sample. For sampling purposes, employers were 
categorized into five types, listed in the table below. These five types represent an 
exhaustive list of employers producing sugar in the Dominican Republic.  
 
Table 4: Estimate of Number of Workers by Employer 
Employer Batayes  Provinces 
Number of 
Workers 
Central Romana (CR) 77 
San Pedro,  La 
Romana,  El Seibo, 
Altagracia 
11,000-13,000 
Consortium of Industrial 
Sugar Companies (Consorcio 
de Empresas Azucareras 
Industriales [CAEI]) 
32 
San Cristóbal,  San 
Pedro de Macorís 
1,000-1,500  
Central Sugar Consortium 
(Consorcio Azucarero Central 
[CAC]) 
8 
Independencia y 
Bahoruco 
325-350  
State Sugar Council (Consejo 
Estatal de Azúcar [CEA]) 
39 
El Seibo,  San Pedro 
y Hato Mayor 
1,000-1,500  
Colonos29 22 
El Seibo, La Romana,  
San Pedro y Hato 
Mayor 
1,000-1,500  
TOTAL 178   14,325-17,850 
 
While Verité understands that a representative sample was not possible, a multi-stage 
approach was still applied to ensure proportional coverage by employer type. The 
sample was determined using a multi-stage approach, in which a stratified sampling 
methodology was applied, with probability proportional to size (PPS) stratification by 
employer type. A sample for each type of employer was identified based on the 
estimated total number of workers working under each employer type. Bateyes from 
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each employer type were then randomly selected proportional to the number of workers 
employed in each batey. A sample size of 740 workers was established. 
 
Table 5: Sample Size by Employer 
Employer Sample 
Central Romana (CR) 280 
Consortium of Industrial Sugar Companies 
(Consorcio de Empresas Azucareras Industriales 
[CAEI]) 
120 
Central Sugar Consortium (Consorcio Azucarero 
Central [CAC]) 
100 
Consejo Estatal de Azúcar [CEA]) 120 
Colonos 120 
TOTAL 740 
 
In order to determine the sample size per batey, a flat rate of ten workers for each 
primary sample unit was used. In some of the larger bateyes, more than ten workers 
were interviewed as these bateyes were composed of two to three primary sample 
units. 
 
Random sampling of workers at the batey level was not possible given that no 
comprehensive roster of workers in each batey was available to researchers.  An 
additional complication was that the full population of workers was never present in one 
place at the same time, since some workers are sent to distant plantations for longer 
work days, and workers depart for and return from work at different times. Conducting 
the research later at night, after all workers had returned, was not possible due to a lack 
of electricity in many bateyes. Therefore, a convenience sample was used for the 
selection of workers. Convenience sampling is a form of non-probability sampling that 
can include snowball sampling and respondent-driven sampling. Researchers were 
instructed to ensure that newly-arrived workers were included in the sample for each 
batey, as these workers were deemed to be more vulnerable to exploitation.  
 
Between June and August 2010, the cross-sectional survey was carried out among 740 
workers in 49 bateyes (The surveys and interviews were carried out by bilingual 
interviewers (Spanish/Creole). Workers were asked about their experiences during the 
previous harvest (December 2009 to May 2010). The response rate was nearly 100 
percent.  
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Table 6: Estimate of Workers and Sample Size by Employer 
Name of batey Employer Estimate of braceros Sample 
BATEY  ISABELA 
CAC  
(Consorcio Azucarero 
de Central - Ingenio 
Barahona) 
25-50 20 
BATEY 5 25-50 10 
BATEY 7 25-50 20 
BATEY 8 25-50 20 
BATEY 9 25-50 10 
BATEY 6 (Santa Bárbara) 25-50 20 
Name of batey Employer Estimate of braceros Sample 
LA ERMITA O NAJAYO EN 
MEDIO           
CAEI  
(Consorcio Azucarero 
de Empresas 
Industriales -CAEI – 
Ingenio Cristóbal Colón) 
25-50 10 
BATEY CONTADOR 100-200 20 
BATEY COPEYITO 25-50 10 
BATEY SAN FELIPE 50-100 10 
LAS MERCEDES O LOS MELLA 25-50 10 
LOS DOS HERMANOS 50-100 10 
SAN JOSÉ 100-200 10 
BATEY ATILANO II 50-100 10 
CAÑADA DEL NEGRO 25-50 10 
MORUNO DEL GUANO 50-100 10 
CANIPA 25-50 10 
Name of batey Employer Estimate of braceros Sample 
BATEY PARAÍSO DOS 
CEA 
(Consejo Estatal del 
Azúcar – Ingenio 
Porvenir 
25-50 10 
BATEY VICTORIA 25-50 10 
BATEY ALEMÁN 25-50 10 
BATEY ULLOA 25-50 10 
BATEY ALEJANDRO BASS 25-50 10 
BATEY CONSUELITO 25-50 10 
BATEY EXPERIMENTAL 25-50 10 
BATEY MARGARITA 1-25 10 
CAONABO (BATEY SIRIA) 1-25 10 
EL BOTE 1-25 10 
LAS PAJAS 50-100 10 
MONTE COCA 50-100 10 
Name of batey Employer Estimate of braceros Sample 
BATEY BRADOR 104 
COLONOS 
100-200 20 
KM. 10/KM. 11 25-50 10 
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KM. 8 25-50 10 
BATEY SANTONI 50-100 10 
BATEY COMO QUIERA 100-200 10 
LANON 100-200 20 
LOS CHICHARRONES 100-200 10 
BATEY ALTAGRACIA 100-200 10 
BATEY TORONJA 25-50 10 
BATEY EUSKARDUNITA  
100-200 10 
Name of batey Employer Estimate of braceros Sample 
BATEY AGUA BLANCA 
CR 
(Central Romana 
Corporation – Ingenio 
Central Romana) 
200-300 20 
BATEY LA GINA 50-100 20 
BATEY LECHUGA 300-400 20 
EL SALAO O EL SALADO 200-300 20 
PRADO 16 100-200 20 
LA MAJAGUA 300-400 20 
LA MALENA 300-400 20 
BATEY 412 300-400 20 
BATEY CACATA 200-300 20 
BATEY EL 20 /El 20B 100-200 20 
BATEY LAS FLORES 50-100 20 
BATEY RENGUELITO 200-300 20 
LA CUCHILLA 100-200 20 
BATEY LIMA 300-400 20 
 
Workers were interviewed in their living quarters. The majority of interviews were carried 
out at the end of the working day. Worker interviews began between 3 P.M. and 4 P.M 
and went into the evening. Some workers who did not go to work on the day of the 
interviews, or had returned early, were interviewed earlier in the day. Workers were 
interviewed individually in the most private settings possible. Of the workers 
interviewed, the vast majority were judged by the interviewer to be comfortable and 
open during the interview process. 
 
 
Data Processing and Analysis 
 
Once all of the surveys had been completed, they were reviewed and coded and a 
tabulation plan was created. The data was processed by a data capture program, 
Epidata, which operates on a Windows platform and was exported to SPSS for 
tabulation. The digitization and data processing was monitored by double digitalization 
of 20 percent of the forms.  
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The responses to the questionnaire were analyzed according to ILO guidance on 
―Identifying Forced Labor in Practice,‖ described in the Presence of Indicators of Forced 
Labor section. The ways in which questions from the questionnaire were used to 
determine whether indicators of forced labor were present can be found in Appendix 9: 
Table of Indicators. 
 
Preliminary information which was not fully analyzed was presented by CIPAF for 
feedback in two validation workshops that brought together various stakeholders in the 
sugar sector, including representatives from public institutions, employers, NGOs and 
human rights defenders, and academics. A report was then drafted and submitted to 
Verité, followed by further analysis and formatting by Verité using the guiding framework 
that was applied to all seven countries studied under its research grant.   
 
Verité also conducted a post-hoc analysis of data in all seven country studies by 
applying a larger set of forced labor indicators issued by the ILO in December 2011 
(Hard to see, harder to count: Survey Guidelines to Estimate the Forced Labour of 
Adults of Children), which are intended for use in forced labor survey design and 
analysis but which were not available at the time the fieldwork was carried out.  See 
Appendix 7 for a chart reflecting the analysis for this study. 
 
 
Limitations 
 
The research design used a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods (non-
probability sampling).  The quantitative portion of the research was not meant to be 
statistically representative at the national or sectoral level, but rather to ensure coverage 
and interview more workers in order to triangulate information with the qualitative 
findings. Therefore, the quantitative findings from this study are biased by the use of 
nonprobability sampling.  
 
Furthermore, the possibility remains that some bateyes were not identified or that some 
existing bateyes were incorrectly deemed non-operational.30  
 
An important limitation of the study regards indebtedness while on the bateyes. Based 
on results of desk research and expert consultation, the survey instrument was 
designed to capture indebtedness related to fees paid to buscones. While questions 
were also included related to the ability of workers to buy all of their food in cash, the 
issue of indebtedness to food stores was not encompassed by the survey instrument. 
Once field research was well underway, it became clear that workers were, in fact, in 
debt to food stores. Because it was too late to alter the quantitative survey instrument, 
this issue was explored with qualitative research methods, including in-depth interviews 
and focus group discussions. Thus the findings on this subject are not as quantitatively 
robust as the findings in other areas of the study. This is an important limitation, as the 
quantity of workers‘ debt to the food stores is important in determining the level of 
induced indebtedness.  
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The questionnaires also lacked questions on perceived or actual threat of deportation.  
This resulted in a lack of harmony between the survey results, which suggested that 
most workers felt they could leave their jobs, and more in-depth case study data, as well 
as legal analysis, that suggest workers are coerced by the fact that they face 
deportation if they leave.  Because the survey questions did not probe this issue, it is 
unclear whether those who responded to the survey were effectively unable to leave 
their jobs because the consequence would be deportation. 
 
Another concern not covered by the survey instrument or the qualitative data collection 
regards the terms under which workers performed excess hours.  The quantitative 
results do not provide information about who established the work schedule that led to 
overly long workdays, nor whether workers felt obligated to work overtime for fear of 
deportation or other retribution.  These factors are relevant to understanding whether 
workers experienced forced overtime. 
  
 
Worker Demographics 
 
 
Concepts and Methodology 
 
In referring to field workers in the sugar industry, one must be precise in the use of 
terminology, as field workers perform a myriad of tasks, some of which were noted in 
the description of the sugar production process. 
 
As explained in the Legal Framework (see Appendix 2), the Labor Code stipulates that 
workers who work in the field "for daily wages" are called "braceros" (art. 145 of the 
Labor Code). However, in the sugar industry, the workers in charge of cane cutting are 
also often called braceros. This study focused on the latter, also called picadores or 
cortadores, who are Haitian workers that comprise the largest category of workers in the 
sugar sector,31 perform the most strenuous work, and are the worst paid in the industry. 
Historically, allegations of slavery and forced labor in the sugar sector have surrounded 
braceros. 
 
Braceros or picadores constitute the vast majority of sugarcane workers and represent 
the lowest level of the hierarchy. They are comprised of migrant Haitian workers or 
Dominicans of Haitian descent that have been historically repressed and exploited in 
the sugarcane sector, and are thus most vulnerable to forced labor. In addition, many 
picadores also carry out other tasks, such as cultivation and weeding. Although 
picadores are the main object of our study, the survey included a small proportion of 
carreteros (in charge of loading and transporting cut cane in carts) and cultivadores 
(who cultivate the sugar cane), as they are in a vulnerable situation comparable to that 
of the picadores. Therefore, this report covers these three types of workers (with a 
greater emphasis on picadores). 
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This study focuses on male workers, as researchers did not detect a substantial 
presence of women in the cutting or planting of sugarcane, although they did receive 
testimony in some ingenios (CEA, CAEI) that occasionally female labor was used for 
planting cane. In some colonato bateyes of the CEA, researchers did identify women 
who worked in the harvest of tomatoes and other vegetables, but in other bateyes, they 
were not employed. 
 
 
Age and Nationality           
 
Of the workers surveyed by researchers, 446 (60 percent) were 34 years old or 
younger, 372 (50 percent) were between 21 and 34 years of age and 74 (ten percent) 
were between 15 and 20 years old.32 The average age of workers surveyed was 35 
years old. Although 592 (80 percent of) workers surveyed were less than 50 years of 
age, a relatively large number,  107 (15 percent) were 55 years of age or older and 20 
workers (three percent) were 70 years of age or older and were still working. 
 
Research did not detect any workers of Dominican descent among the population of 
braceros. Of the workers surveyed, 677 (91 percent) were born in Haiti, in contrast to 63 
(9 percent) who were born in the Dominican Republic.33 However, only 55 percent of 
carreteros and 57 percent of cultivadores were born in Haiti. This shows that the 
Dominican-born descendants of Haitian migrants tend to be employed as carreteros 
and cultivadores at higher rates than Haitian-born migrants and supports the claim that 
the Dominicans of Haitian descent tend to look for other work than as picadores. 
 
 
Personal Identity Documents 
 
Of the workers surveyed who were born in Haiti, 291 (43 percent) did not have any 
identification documentation. However, 217 (32 percent) of Haitian-born workers had a 
Haitian birth certificate, 115 (17 percent) had a Haitian cedula (national identity 
document), and 54 (eight percent) had a Haitian passport. This data indicates that 
almost all of the workers interviewed had to cross the border illegally due to lack of an 
official immigration document that permits them to legally exit Haiti and enter the 
Dominican Republic. 
 
Of 63 workers interviewed who were born in the Dominican Republic, 22 (35 percent) 
reported that they did not possess any identity document, while 18 (29 percent) reported 
that they had only birth certificates, and 23 (37 percent) reported that they had identity 
cards. 
 
 
Family Situation 
 
Of the workers surveyed, 352 (48 percent) reported that they were single, 259 (35 
percent) reported being married or in a committed relationship, and 67 (nine percent) 
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reported that they were separated. In addition, 430 workers (58 percent) reported that 
they had children, while 310 (42 percent) reported that they did not. Of the workers 
interviewed, 252 (34 percent) had one or two children, 59 (eight percent) had three 
children, 37 (five percent) had four children, and 78 (11 percent) had five or more 
children.  
 
In addition, 347 workers (47 percent) reported that they lived in the Dominican Republic 
with a family member. Of these workers, 159 (46 percent) said they were living with 
their wives, sons, or daughters; 80 (23 percent) reported that they lived with a brother or 
sister; and 73 (21 percent) reported that they lived with a cousin. 
 
 
Level of Education, Literacy, and Mastery of Spanish 
 
Of the workers surveyed, 362 (49 percent) said they had never attended school. Only 
370 (50 percent) of workers interviewed reported that they had attended school. Of 
these workers, approximately half completed some primary school and the other half 
completed some secondary school.  
 
The level of illiteracy was also high. Of the workers interviewed, 355 (48 percent) 
reported that they could not read or write and 110 (15 percent) reported that they could 
read and write ―a little‖ (―solo un poco‖). Of the 275 workers (37 percent) that reported 
that they could read and write, 228 (83 percent) reported that they were literate in 
Creole, 96 (35 percent) reported that they were literate in French, and 78 (29 percent) 
reported that they were literate in Spanish. 
 
In terms of speaking fluency in Spanish, only 176 workers (24 percent) reported that 
they were able to speak Spanish and 207 (28 percent) reported that they could do so, 
but with difficulty. Of the workers surveyed, 352 (48 percent) reported that they did not 
speak any Spanish. According to the interviewers, only 136 workers (18 percent) 
demonstrated that they could speak comfortably in Spanish during the interviews and it 
was almost always necessary to conduct the interviews in Creole. In general, only 
workers living in the Dominican Republic for twenty to thirty years demonstrated that 
they were fully comfortable communicating in Spanish. 
 
 
Place of Origin and Employment in Haiti 
 
Of the 677 Haitian-born workers surveyed by researchers, 367 (54 percent) reported 
that they came from the Southeast Department of Haiti (which includes the communities 
of Jakmel, Belle-Anse, Morigot, Ansapit), 122 (18 percent) reported that they were from 
the Western Department (where Port-au-Prince and Fond Parisien are located), and 95 
(14 percent) reported that they were from the Northern, Northeastern, and Northwestern 
Departments. 
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Regarding prior employment in Haiti of Haitian-born workers, 502 (74 percent) reported 
that they had worked in agriculture, primarily on a family farm, before becoming involved 
in the sugar sector in the Dominican Republic. Only 77 (11 percent) reported that they 
had been salaried workers prior to their employment in the Dominican sugar sector.  
 
 
Links with Haiti 
 
Of the workers surveyed, 718 (97 percent) reported that they had family in Haiti and 377 
(51 percent) reported that they sent them money. Of these 377 workers, 38 (ten 
percent) reported that they sent money home every month, 234 (62 percent) reported 
that they sent money home every few months, 72 (19 percent) reported that they sent 
money once a year, and 19 (five percent) reported that they sent money every few 
years. Of the workers who sent money home, 100 (27 percent) reported that they sent 
less than DOP 1,000 (USD 28)34 ; 181 (48 percent) reported that they sent between 
DOP 1,000 and DOP 3,000 (USD 28-USD 83); and 76 (20 percent) reported that they 
sent more than DOP 3,000 (USD 83), more than half of whom did so once a year. 
Qualitative interviews indicated that workers often sent money to relatives in Haiti 
through acquaintances or money transfers. However, money transfers can only be 
made by workers with identity documents. 
  
Of the 363 workers surveyed (49 percent) who reported that they did not send money to 
their families, 243 (67 percent) reported that the main reason was that they did not know 
how to save money or simply had no money to send. For example, a worker interviewed 
at a CAEI batey said, "If I did not get enough bread to eat, how are you to send [money] 
to another country?" (―si no conseguí pa comé, como va a mandá a otro país?‖) 
 
Of all the workers surveyed, 651 (88 percent) were in contact with relatives in Haiti; 376 
(51 percent) used their own mobile phone to contact relatives in Haiti, while 257 (35 
percent) did so with a borrowed cell phone.35 After the January 12, 2010 earthquake 
that devastated Haiti, 379 (51 percent) reported that they had contacted their family 
members but did not have money to send. Of the workers interviewed 131 (18 percent) 
reported that they had tried unsuccessfully to contact relatives in Haiti after the 
earthquake, 137 (19 percent) reported that they had sent money, eight (one percent) 
reported that they had gone to Haiti to take money and/or help their family, and 22 
(three percent) reported having done nothing or had no family or friends in Haiti. An 
additional 22 workers (three percent) surveyed reported having been in Haiti during the 
earthquake.  
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Last Year of Entry into the Dominican Republic 
 
Of the 677 Haitian-born workers surveyed, 389 (58 
percent) had entered the Dominican Republic for the last 
time in the previous five years, of whom 215 (32 percent 
of Haitian-born workers) had entered the Dominican 
Republic for the last time in the previous two years 
(between 2005 and 2008), and 170 (25 percent) had 
entered within the previous year. In addition, 92 workers 
(14 percent) reported that they had entered the Dominican 
Republic for the last time between five and nine years 
earlier (between 2001 and 2004) and 197 (29 percent) 
had entered the Dominican Republic for the last time more 
than nine years earlier. 
  
 
Table 7: Last Time 
Migrant Workers Came 
to the DR from Haiti 
Year  percent 
2009-2010 25 
2005-2008 32 
2001-2004 14 
2000 or before 29 
  
Total 100 
Point of Entry into the Dominican Republic 
 
Of the five Haitian border provinces, workers often entered Dominican territory through
the two southernmost Dominican provinces of Independencia and Pedernales. It is logical 
that these two are the most commonly used because they correspond with the major 
Departments of origin of most workers: the Southeastern and Western Departments. 
 
Of the 677 migrant workers surveyed,  427 (63 percent) crossed the border at 
Independencia Province (either by the official border crossing of Jimaní, or by one of the 
clandestine border crossings, such as Puerto Escondido, el Limón, or el Aguacate). 
Another 150 (22 percent) entered the Dominican Republic through Pedernales Province 
(through the official border crossing of Ansapit or by a clandestine crossing), 49 (seven 
percent) crossed the border through the province of Dajabón, and 20 (three percent) 
crossed at Elías Piña Province. 
 
 
Transportation Over the Border into the Dominican Republic 
  
Of the 677 migrant workers surveyed, 290 (43 percent) crossed the border into the 
Dominican Republic on foot, while 301 (44 percent) crossed by bus, 49 (seven percent) 
crossed by motorcycle taxi (motoconcho), and 28 (four percent) crossed by truck.  
 
Of the 677 migrant workers interviewed, 181 (27 percent) reported that they had not 
used buscones or complicit government authorities to cross the border, while 406 (60 
percent) reported that they had made the crossing through a buscón and/or with the 
help of some authority. Of the migrant workers, 364 (54 percent) reported that they 
crossed the border with the help of a buscón, (308 used a Haitian buscón and 49 used 
a Dominican buscón), 48 (seven percent) reported that they had been helped by 
Dominican authorities and eight (one percent) reported that they had been helped by 
Haitian authorities (including immigration agents, the military, and police).  
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Transportation within the Dominican Republic 
 
After crossing the border, workers use two main modes of transportation to reach the 
final destination in the Dominican Republic: 
• Through a buscón, who generally transport workers via bus or truck 
• Independently by bus by paying a large sum of money to the driver due to their 
undocumented status (this bribe is usually called a compromiso) 
 
Research determined that in most cases the buscones transported workers over the 
border and directly to a batey. Nevertheless, in most cases, workers asked to be left at 
a specific batey as opposed to be being recruited for a particular batey.36 This was not 
the case with 78 workers (11 percent), including workers who were recruited to work for 
the CEA under the ―quota system,‖ regulated by Migration Law 285-05, under which 
workers were recruited and transported by buscones who were linked to the military, 
migration agents, and the state-run CEA. Workers brought into the Dominican Republic 
under the ―quota system‖ for the 2009-2010 harvest did not go through official migration 
channels, as required by the law, but rather were smuggled over the border. 
 
Of all the workers interviewed, 351 (47 percent) reported that they had paid a buscón to 
take them to their final destination. The buscones drop off workers across the country, 
including to the sugar region (leaving them in different bateyes). Of the workers who 
were transported by a buscón to their final destination, 234 (67 percent) reported that 
they were transported directly to an ingenio, while 85 (24 percent) were left in Santo 
Domingo and 32 (nine percent) were left in other parts of the country. The latter 
generally tended to be repeat migrants or workers with family settled in the bateyes who 
gave them instructions on how to get to the bateyes.  
 
A bribe to bus drivers, or compromiso, was the second most commonly used method, 
as 207 (28 percent) of workers interviewed reported that they used this mode of 
transportation after crossing the border. Workers paid money to the bus driver, who, in 
turn, must pay a fee for each undocumented passenger at military posts located along 
the various roads connecting the border provinces with the rest of the country. An 
additional 74 workers (ten percent) were transported by bus without having to pay a 
bribe. 
 
Finally, a third mode of transportation should be mentioned, known as the "trip" or el 
viaje, used to denote direct recruitment by Dominican and Haitian authorities during the 
period of intergovernmental recruitment. Although this type of recruitment officially 
ended in 1986, the term continued to be used to describe recruitment coordinated by 
authorities, ingenios, and buscones. Seventy-four workers (ten percent) reported that 
they had been transported by viaje. 
 
Among the 167 workers who had entered the country for the last time a year or less 
prior to being surveyed, 89 (53 percent) were transported by a buscón to their final 
destination. First-time migrants depend more on the buscones to be brought to their 
workplace, making them more vulnerable. However, of workers who had entered the 
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Dominican Republic for the last time within the twelve month period prior to being 
interviewed, 11 (seven percent) reported being transported by viaje, which was a lower 
rate than the overall percentage of workers who had used this mode of transportation. 
Researchers determined that the majority of workers who reported that they used viaje 
as a mode of transportation had been recruited by the CEA for the 2010 harvest, as 
CEA used the "quota system." 
 
CAC (Ingenio Barahona) workers reported the highest rate of using the compromiso 
system of paying bribes to bus drivers (77 percent), probably because this ingenio is 
closer to the border. In the other ingenios most workers reported being transported by a 
buscón: 48 percent of Central Romana workers, 52 percent of CEA workers, 40 percent 
of CAEI workers, and 49 percent of colonato workers. 
 
Case Study: Lilo, 23 years-old, transported by compromiso to a CAC batey 
Lilo, born in Haiti, was 23 years old, and had no wife or children. He worked in Haiti 
cultivating beans and corn.  He immigrated to the Dominican Republic because he 
could not find work in Haiti. He arrived in December 2009 in the Dominican Republic, 
entering through Malpasse and, as most workers who arrive at Ingenio Barahona, he 
came by compromiso, paying DOP 1,200 (USD 33)  to a bus driver. He had to 
borrow money from a friend saying he would pay it back when he returned to Haiti. 
However, the friend charged him 100 percent interest, so he would have to pay him 
back DOP 2,400 (USD 66) when he returned. He reached Batey 8 through a friend 
who had been working every harvest at the batey for the previous five years. When 
they arrived, the friend talked to the foreman, who assigned them a room and a 
small mattress. 
 
 
Living Situation in the Dominican Republic 
 
Of the workers surveyed, 577 (78 percent) reported residing in the Dominican Republic, 
including those born in the Dominican Republic. Of these workers, 29 (five percent) had 
resided in the Dominican Republic for less than two years, 146 (26 percent) had resided 
continuously in the Dominican Republic for between two and five years, 84 workers (15 
percent) had resided in the Dominican Republic for five to nine years, and 249 (44 
percent) had resided in the Dominican Republic for ten years or more. Of the workers 
residing in the Dominican Republic, 63 (11 percent) had been born in the Dominican 
Republic, 29 (46 percent) of whom reported that they had never been to Haiti. 
 
Table 8: Amount of Time Settled in the DR  
Time in DR No.  Percent  
Born in DR 63 9% 
Fewer than 2 years 29 4% 
2-5 years 146 20% 
5-9 years 84 11% 
10 years or more 249 34% 
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After the harvest, 496 workers (67 percent of all workers surveyed) reported that they 
stayed on the batey and 71 (ten percent) reported staying in Dominican Republic, but 
moving to another province (mainly Higuey, La Romana and Santo Domingo). 
  
Researchers identified several cases of Haitian workers who lived in the Dominican 
Republic and had worked in other sectors of the economy, but had moved into the 
sugar industry. Two workers interviewed reported that they had worked in construction 
but were temporarily working in cane cutting because there was less risk of being 
deported and because there was no work in the construction sector. Other workers 
interviewed used cane cutting as a means to "earn enough money" and be able to find 
jobs in other sectors, such as construction work in Bavaro in the Eastern Region. A 27 
year-old worker who had resided in the Dominican Republic for 12 years and had been 
forced to cut cane for the first time due to economic necessity said, "If you do not want 
to steal, you must do this [...] where I live there is no work."  
 
Additionally, 518 workers (70 percent of all workers surveyed) reported working at the 
same batey during at least two consecutive years. Of the workers surveyed, 229 (31 
percent) had worked in the same batey for between two and five years, 227 (31 
percent) had worked in the same batey for between six and nine years, and 66 (nine 
percent) had worked in the same batey for ten years or more. It is also important to note 
that 39 workers (five percent) reported that they had been born on the same batey in 
which they currently lived. 
 
CAEI is the company with the greatest number of workers settled in the batey year-
round (75 percent), followed by Central Romana (68 percent), the colonato (66 percent), 
CEA (46 percent), and CAC (27 percent). 
 
Table 9: Where Workers Reside When They Finish the Harvest 
  
Central 
Romana Colonato CAEI CEA CAC 
  No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % 
In the same batey 190 68% 76 66% 86 75% 57 46% 27 26% 
In other town/city in 
the DR 
22 8% 12 10% 11 10% 24 19% 1 1% 
In Haiti for a few 
days or months and 
then come back 
18 7% 6 5% 2 2% 1 1% 14 14% 
In Haiti until the next 
harvest begins 
27 10% 11 10% 10 9% 7 6% 32 31% 
 Other 5 2% 1 1%  0 0% 2 2% 0  0% 
Not applicable 16 6% 10 9% 5 4% 33 27% 28 28% 
 
Of the workers surveyed, 148 (20 percent) reported that they had worked for their 
employer for less than a year, 50 (seven percent) reported that they had been working 
for the same employer for one to two years, 239 (32 percent) reported that they had 
been working for the same employer for two to five years, and 298 (40 percent) had 
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been working for the same employer for more than five years. The CEA and CAC had 
the highest percentage of first-year workers, with 38 and 32 percent, respectively. 
 
Table 10: Time Working for Same Employer 
How long 
worked for 
employer 
Central 
Romana 
Colonato CAEI CEA CAC 
No
. 
% No. % No. % 
No
. 
% No. % 
Less than a 
year 
38 14% 19 16% 12 10% 47 38% 32 31% 
1-2 years 19 7% 16 14% 6 5% 8 7% 1 1% 
 2-5 years 98 35% 34 29% 36 31% 25 20% 46 45% 
 6-9 years 37 13% 11 9% 10 9% 14 11% 19 19% 
 10-20 years 33 12% 15 13% 23 20% 10 8% 4 4% 
Over 20 years 52 19% 22 19% 28 24% 20 16%  0 0% 
 
Of all the workers surveyed, 381 (51 percent) reported that they had not been back to 
Haiti since they first time they came to the Dominican Republic. Of the workers who had 
not returned to Haiti, 290 (83 percent) reported that they had not returned due to a lack 
of money, 44 (12 percent) said that it was because it was their first harvest, and (seven 
percent) said that it was because they had no contact with their family in Haiti.  
 
Table 11: Workers Who Have Never Returned to Haiti  
Why they had not returned No.  Percent 
Did not have Money 290 83% 
Were not in contact with family in Haiti 26 7 % 
Did not have family in Haiti 2 1 % 
Would not be permitted to return to DR 0 0 % 
First harvest in DR 44 12 % 
Other (did not have papers, did not have 
family in Haiti, or did not want to) 
20 5 % 
 
 
New and Seasonal Migrants 
 
Of the workers surveyed, 103 (14 percent) reported that they had worked for less than a 
year in the Dominican Republic. These workers are often called "kongos," originally a 
derogatory term used to refer to the laborers brought to the Dominican Republic through 
bilateral contracts (Plant, 1987), but now used to refer to new migrants who have never 
worked in the sugar industry and do not speak Spanish. 
 
Ingenio Porvenir (administered by CEA), Central Romana, and the Barahona Ingenio 
(CAC) were the ingenios where the largest percentages of newly arrived workers were 
found. In both the CEA and Central Romana, the arrival of new migrants was clearly 
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evident. In some Central Romana bateyes, older workers told researchers that "there 
are too many new cane cutters, more than last year." 
  
Research indicates that this increase in new migrants was not directly related to the 
earthquake that struck Haiti in January 2010, as most of these workers had already 
migrated to the Dominican Republic at the time of earthquake. The only exception was 
Ingenio Porvenir (CEA), which began its harvest in March 2010 and did have a 
substantial presence of workers who arrived after the earthquake. In 2010, CEA brought 
in a substantial number of workers from Haiti after the earthquake. In fact, 65 percent of 
CEA workers who arrived in the Dominican Republic in 2010 did so in February.  
 
Among the workers that arrived after the earthquake, especially those employed by the 
CEA, there were notable cases in which skilled workers, given the desperate situation in 
Haiti, decided to migrate to the Dominican Republic to cut cane. In the CAC, for 
example, researchers interviewed a 23 year-old worker who before the earthquake was 
a professor of mathematics at a school sponsored by an international NGO and spoke 
English and French. He explained that he arrived on January 15, 2010 with his cousin 
because he could not find any work after everything had been destroyed. Because he 
was not accustomed to farm work, he confessed that it was very hard to get used to 
cutting cane, and at the end of the harvest he would return to his country to try to 
continue working as a teacher. Another testimonial, which is summarized below, 
describes the difficult situation faced by many of these migrants. 
 
Case Study: 36 Year-Old Worker Interviewed in CEA Batey 
―Luis‖ went to the Dominican Republic for the first time on March 13, 2010. 
His house was damaged by the earthquake, but he was happy because his 
family was still alive and his wife was pregnant with a daughter. 
 
He could read and write and was a teacher of construction. He did not speak 
any Spanish, but did speak English, because he had lived for seven years in 
Saint Martin where he worked in construction. 
 
He decided to go to the Dominican Republic because he could not find work 
in Haiti. He had a passport and a visa, so he did not have to pay a buscón. 
The only setback he found was that the USD 120 that he had was stolen from 
him, so he was left without any money. 
 
This was his first time working in the cane fields. "It's so hard," he lamented. 
The worker reported that he felt that he could not do this type of work, so he 
would only keep working for a few days so that he could save enough money 
to get a return ticket to Haiti. "They cannot force me to work," he said, but he 
was sure that the mayordomo would not help him get another job because he 
would not want him to go. When researchers returned months later, ―Luis‖ 
was still at the batey. 
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Of the workers surveyed, 115 (16 percent) reported that they had returned to Haiti 
during at least part of the down time. Most of these seasonal workers had migrated to 
work seasonally in the Dominican Republic for between two and ten years. The only 
ingenio with a strong presence of seasonal workers was the CAC, with 45 percent of 
workers returning to Haiti during the down time. This probably can be explained by the 
proximity of the ingenio and its bateyes to the border region, and the fact that the CAC 
offers transportation to the border once the harvest has been completed. The CAC is 
followed by Central Romana, with 15 percent of workers returning to Haiti during the 
downtime and Ingenio Porvenir (CEA) with 11 percent. 
 
Of the workers surveyed, 175 (24 percent) reported that they would go to Haiti after the 
2010 harvest, while 92 (12 percent) reported that they were considering working in 
another sector of the Dominican economy and 459 (62 percent) reported that they 
would remain in the bateyes.  
 
 
Presence of Indicators of Forced Labor 
 
The categories for indicators of forced labor are based upon the ILO‘s guidance on 
―Identifying Forced Labor in Practice,‖ which are broken down into lack of consent and 
menace of penalty, as shown below.37 Information about wages and hours has also 
been included, as wage and hour violations may constitute indicators of forced labor. 
Although the presence of these indicators signals an increased risk for forced labor, 
each case must be assessed individually to determine the interplay of indicators and the 
context to determine whether or not it rises to the level of forced labor. The following 
findings are based on worker interviews, as well as researchers‘ direct observations, 
expert consultations, and a comprehensive literature review.38  
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Lack of Consent to (Involuntary Nature of) Work (the “Route Into” Forced Labor) 
Birth/descent into “Slave” or Bonded Status 
 
The researchers did not find evidence of indicators of workers being born into a ―slave‖ 
or bonded status in the Dominican sugar sector. 
Physical Abduction or Kidnapping 
 
The researchers did not find evidence of indicators of workers being abducted or 
kidnapped for the purposes of forced labor in the Dominican sugar sector. 
 
Sale of Person into the Ownership of Another 
 
The researchers did not find evidence of indicators of workers being sold for the 
purposes of forced labor in the Dominican sugar sector. 
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Physical Confinement in the Work Location      
 
Isolation 
 
Of the workers surveyed, 734 (99 percent) reported that they lived in employer-owned 
housing and 496 (67 percent) reported that they remained in that housing during the 
down season. As many of the bateyes are embedded in the sugar plantations, which 
are far away from other communities, many workers do not leave these bateyes unless, 
as one expert put it, ―it is to go to the doctor.‖ In addition, the low level of workers‘ 
wages, coupled with the high cost of transport, makes it difficult for workers to leave the 
bateyes. Finally, workers‘ physical isolation is accentuated by a lack of access to 
information, as only 217 workers (29 percent) reported that they had access to a radio 
and 81 (11 percent) had access to a television. 
 
Carnets 
 
Republic Act No. 285-04 on Migration states that immediately after clearing customs, 
temporary migrant workers (under the individual and quota systems) must be provided 
with a "temporary worker card" (carnet de trabajador de temporero).39 This carnet 
enables foreign workers "to perform the gainful activity for which they were admitted, for 
the authorized period of time and within the authorized area." According to the law, a 
worker may be considered an "illegal alien subject to deportation‖ due to the lack of a 
carnet, the failure to carry a carnet outside of the authorized work area, or the expiration 
of a carnet. Migration Law 285-04 stipulates that employers should ―repatriate‖ workers 
once their carnets expire, giving employers the authority to deport workers. The carnets 
are issued by the General Migration Directorate (Dirección General de Migración) and 
are provided to some non-resident braceros by their employers.  
 
This creates a legal restriction on workers‘ freedom of movement, as these cards only 
allow migrant workers to remain in an ―authorized zone‖ under the threat of deportation. 
In addition, these carnets link workers to a specific employer and do not allow them to 
work for another employer without losing their legal status, even if they are unsatisfied 
with their conditions of employment. This is a unique system that allows employers to 
confer workers with temporary ―legal‖ status, even if they have crossed the border 
illegally. It also makes the workers dependent upon their employer for their legal status 
and restricts them to a limited geographical area in which their employer may be the 
only source of employment. Verité consider this to be a mechanism which ties workers‘ 
legal status to their employer and creates an inherent menace of penalty of deportation 
for leaving their jobs or workplaces. 
 
Although the carnets allow workers limited movement within an ―authorized zone,‖ they 
do not constitute official migration or identity documents and do not allow workers to 
travel freely throughout the Dominican Republic nor to travel to Haiti and return legally 
to the Dominican Republic. Additionally, the carnets are intended for ―temporary 
workers‖ and are only valid for six months, while the majority of workers surveyed 
resided in the Dominican Republic year-round. Therefore, during the six months that 
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their carnets are expired, workers who possess these carnets risk deportation if they 
travel outside of the bateyes.  
 
The failure to provide workers with these carnets further limits their freedom of 
movement since they are at risk for deportation anywhere in country including at and 
around the worksite. In practice, certain employers (such as the CEA during the 2009-
2010 harvest) were in possession of workers carnets, but did not provide them to 
workers with the possible consequence of preventing workers from leaving the bateyes, 
as workers who lack the carnets and leave the bateyes and travel even within the 
―authorized zone‖ are subject to deportation. Of the workers surveyed, just 157 (21 
percent) reported having been provided with a carnet. Worker interviews and expert 
consultations indicated that the only employers that provided workers with carnets in 
2010 were the CAEI and CAC. Additionally, only 34 percent of these carnets were 
issued in 2010, meaning that the 687 (93 percent of) workers lacked carnets or had 
expired carnets, and were thus eligible for deportation. The percentage of workers who 
reported receiving carnets is extremely low considering that 89 percent of workers 
surveyed were employed by a sugar company with the ability to provide workers with 
carnets. 
 
Only three workers surveyed (less than one percent of all workers surveyed) reported 
that they could not return to Haiti because they ―had no papers.‖ However, this does not 
mean that the lack of a carnet or the fact that carnets restricted workers to a certain 
geographical area did not prevent workers from leaving the bateyes to seek 
employment in other areas of the Dominican Republic. For example, when one worker 
was asked why he had not left his employment before the end of the harvest season, he 
said, ―Well, it is mandatory, at the time I had no papers, that is the reason why I stayed, 
because I had no papers.‖ ("Bon, c'est forces, je pas de papiers n'avais, c'est la raison 
que je me reste, parce que je n'ai pas de papiers"). 
 
Workers‘ undocumented status thereby contributes to their vulnerability. The lack of 
identity documents and the undocumented status of Haitian migrants and Dominican-
born workers of Haitian decent restrict their freedom of movement and make it harder 
for them to leave their jobs, even if their terms of employment are changed and/or they 
are made to work under poor conditions.   
 
Surveillance 
 
In addition, there were some cases of surveillance of workers. Two workers interviewed 
(less than one percent of workers surveyed) reported that they could not leave the 
bateyes because they had ―been watched‖ or because their supervisor would not let 
them go. In addition, all 11 CEA workers interviewed during a focus group discussion 
carried out in 2010 reported that workers recruited by the CEA under the ―quota system‖ 
(see below) were under constant surveillance by guards (guardacampestres) in Ingenio 
Porvenir bateyes. They reported that these guards would not let these workers leave, 
especially during the first few weeks of the harvest and that some workers fled at night 
and had to leave their belongings behind.  
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Psychological Compulsion (Order to Work, Backed up by a Credible Threat of a 
Penalty for Non-Compliance) 
 
The CEA-administered Ingenio Porvenir (which is the only ingenio administered by the 
government) recruited workers for the 2010 harvest with the help of the General 
Migration Directorate (Direccion General de Migracion) and other public authorities, 
including local military authorities, under the ―quota‖ system. The General Migration 
Directorate is empowered by law to enable this type of recruitment, as Migration Law 
285-04 allows a ―quota‖ recruitment system.  Workers were recruited from Haiti by CEA-
contracted buscones, who transported them illegally across the border to the CEA 
bateyes in complicity with migration and military authorities. They sometimes went days 
without food and slept outside in another batey before being brought to the CEA batey. 
Once arriving at the plantation, the workers were divided into different bateyes 
according to demand, as determined by the harvest coordinators (ajusteros), who had 
to guarantee to the CEA that the workers would stay in the bateyes. These workers had 
no employment contracts, no prior knowledge of how or how much they would be paid, 
no control over where they lived or worked, and no guarantee of access to food or water 
for at least several days. Some workers were also subjected to surveillance and threats 
to prevent them from leaving at the beginning of the harvest. The complicity between a 
government-run employer, buscones, the military, and migration authorities to recruit, 
smuggle, transport, and employ vulnerable migrant workers creates a coercive system 
in which workers were ordered to work and perceived credible threats for non-
compliance with these orders. 
 
Ingenio Porvenir (administered by the CEA), has not operated on a regular basis in 
recent years, which reduced the number of workers living on Ingenio Porvenir bateyes 
who were available to work for the 2009-2010 harvest. After several setbacks, the 
Ingenio‘s harvest period began in March 2010. In order to recruit the necessary work 
force, the CEA, together with the General Migration Directorate and other public 
authorities began a program of recruitment of Haitian workers through buscones, under 
the "quota" system created by Migration Law 285-04 (Article 51). 
 
During the months of February and March 2010, hundreds of workers were smuggled 
into the Dominican Republic in an operation that lasted several weeks, with the 
complicity of the CEA, migration officials, and local military authorities. The operation 
used buscones to recruit workers in Haiti and to smuggle them into the Dominican 
Republic through the remote village of Puerto Escondido, Independencia Province, 
which has been used in the past to smuggle thousands of Haitian migrants. 
 
Both qualitative techniques and survey results helped researchers to reconstruct the 
facts. Survey data validated the information gathered by qualitative techniques, 
indicating that the CEA was the employer with the largest number of recently-arrived 
workers in absolute terms (despite the fact that CEA‘s Ingenio Porvenir was the last 
ingenio to begin the harvest and produced less than five percent of the Dominican 
Republic‘s sugar). In addition, 26 percent of CEA braceros were workers who had never 
before been in the Dominican Republic and at least 20 percent had come to the 
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Dominican Republic during the month of March 2010. A key informant reported that in 
Batey Jalongo and Batey Consuelito alone, 150 migrant workers were brought in under 
the ―quota‖ system and placed in the barracones for single workers. Researchers 
estimate that at least 300 workers were brought in by the CEA using the ―quota‖ system. 
 
The recruitment process lasted several weeks, according to information collected by 
inhabitants of Puerto Escondido, including a representative of Red Janó Siksé (a human 
rights NGO operating in the border region). Researchers found that Haitian migrants 
crossed the border on foot, accompanied by buscones, who grouped them together 
after they had crossed the border. From there, they were transported by truck to 
Duvergé, and then to Ingenio Barahona‘s Batey 9 (Ingenio Barahona was previously 
administered by the CEA, but was being administered by CAC at the time of research). 
The workers stayed at Batey 9 for up to a week until the next group of workers was 
brought in. During this time, they slept in the open in most cases and received almost 
no food, at best eating once a day. Several of the workers interviewed who migrated in 
this way reported that they had no money to buy food and "suffered and went hungry" 
during this time.  
 
Inhabitants of Batey 9 who were interviewed and witnessed these groups of migrants 
that came in under the ―quota‖ system reported that they came by viaje. They reported 
that one group came right after another, including a group that arrived in eight buses. 
Inhabitants of Batey 9 also reported that these migrants were accompanied by soldiers 
and men in black jackets with the word ―migracion‖ printed on them. Researchers later 
verified that the General Migration Directorate in fact authorized and participated in this 
operation, as permitted by the Migration Act. 
 
Workers were then brought to the CEA‘s Ingenio Porvenir, where researchers 
interviewed foremen, mayordomos, workers, and colonos. These interviews indicate 
that once transported to Ingenio Porvenir, ajusteros 40 (and in some cases colonos) 
"divided up" workers, depending on the demand for labor and the size of areas of 
production. 
 
During a research trip to the CEA bateyes in March 2010, when the harvest was just 
beginning in Ingenio Porvenir, the researchers identified dozens of workers who were 
recruited in Haiti and had arrived the night before. They reported that they had come by 
viaje, for which they had paid DOP 3,500 (USD 96) to a buscón who had offered them 
work in the cane fields ("Koup travayer kann"). They decided to leave Haiti because 
they could not find work after the earthquake, as Haiti had collapsed ("Ayiti Karst"). 
They reported that they were in the batey because they had been left there, but that 
they wished to find a better job because they were not able to make enough money 
harvesting sugarcane ―even to eat.‖ 
 
The mayordomo of one of the bateyes described how workers were brought to the 
batey, "they bring them in groups. The buscones take them to the ingenios …  last night 
nine busses arrived in Ingenio Porvenir ...  the ajusteros go and distribute them by 
batey" (―los están trayendo por parte. Los buscones los llevan al Ingenio…anoche 
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llegaron 9 guaguas al Ingenio Porvenir… los ajusteros van y se los reparten por batey‖).  
The mayordomo said that Ingenio Porvenir (administered by the CEA) coordinated the 
trip from Haiti to the Dominican Republic and that the government paid the buscones 
and made sure that workers were not charged. He said that once workers were 
delivered in the batey, he had to make sure that they stayed in the batey¸ according to 
him ―by giving them the best treatment‖ (―dándoles el mejor trato‖).  
 
Once they were on the bateyes, researchers verified forms of coercion that prevented 
them from leaving. Researchers verified that these workers were issued carnets during 
the recruiting process, but none of the workers were provided with these carnets, which 
were retained by the authorities. This finding was based on workers interviews, focus 
groups, and unofficial information received from the Directorate General of Migration. In 
the focus group, for example, three workers pointed out that they had taken a photo in 
Batey 9 for the carnets, but that they had never received these documents.  
 
Researchers received reports that, in some bateyes, there were some cases of threats 
and other coercive mechanisms to keep the workers from leaving. According to survey 
results 98 percent of CEA workers felt that they could leave their jobs and 99 percent 
reported that they could leave the batey at any time. However, one worker interviewed 
reported that he could not leave because he was being watched and another worker 
reported that he could not leave because doing so would be illegal.  The apparent 
discordance between these survey results and the aforementioned case study data and 
legal analysis (which suggest that workers are coerced by the fact that they may be 
deported if they leave their jobs) may be due in part to the lack of survey questions on 
perceived or actual threats of deportation experienced by workers.   
In interviews on non-CEA bateyes, researchers identified some workers who had come 
to the Dominican Republic through the CEA, but had moved on to work for other sugar 
companies. Such was the case of Gaspar, who, after several weeks in the CEA‘s 
Basque Batey, sought a way to get to Central Romana. His testimony highlights the 
harsh conditions that workers brought in under the ―quota‖ system were subjected to. 
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Case Study: Gaspar, from CEA to Central Romana   
Gaspar, a young man in his twenties, decided to migrate to the Dominican Republic in 
March 2010 in search of work and in order to visit another country. He crossed the 
border walking with a group of migrants led by a buscón, to whom he paid DOP 2,500 
(USD 69). After entering the Dominican Republic close to Jimani, he spent a night in 
Puerto Escondido, sleeping in the open. From there, he was taken in a truck to Ingenio 
Barahona‘s Batey 9, where he slept on the floor in an area he described as "large, 
roofed, and empty." He stayed there for three days without food or drink. 
 
The buscón, who was accompanied by "immigration agents," then left him in an Ingenio 
Porvenir batey. He stayed there for two weeks. As he was alone and knew no one and 
had a brother and a cousin in a Central Romana batey, he decided to leave the CEA 
batey and go to the Central Romana batey. He left the CEA batey without incident. He 
took a bus to San Pedro de Macoris, another to Central Romana, and yet another bus 
to the batey (with help from other Haitians, who told him how to take a bus to the batey 
without encountering any problems). Since then, he has cut cane for Central Romana. 
 
He told the researchers that he believed that he would not continue to harvest 
sugarcane because ―cutting cane is a job that is too hard‖ (―travay two di coupé can‖). 
He was planning to return to Haiti at the end of the harvest, as he did not want to live 
alone in the Dominican Republic (and his brother and cousin would also be returning). 
He did not think that he would find work in Haiti, but his parents were there and he could 
grow corn and bananas. However, he said that if he found a better job in the Dominican 
Republic that he would stay.  
 
Another case serves to illustrate the desperation that motivated many Haitians to leave 
their country following the January 2010 earthquake and highlights these migrant 
workers‘ lack of rights and dissatisfaction with working conditions. 
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Case Study: Frito, 28 years old 
Frito went to the Dominican Republic for the first time in March 2010 at the age of 28. 
He had raised animals in Haiti and decided to migrate to the Dominican Republic after 
the earthquake because he had lost everything and needed to make a living. He said, 
―after the disaster of January 12, all I had was lost … so we came to look for resources 
in the Dominican Republic … I came for a better life, but did not find it‖ (―apre katastròf 
12 janvye, tout saw te genyen pèdi […] epi nou te vinn chache resous nan Repiblik 
Dominiken  … m vin deyè on lavi miyò, m pa jwenn li‖ ). 
 
He was brought to the Dominican Republic by a buscón who had contacted him through 
a friend, and charged him DOP 2,000 (USD 69) to smuggle him in. He told researchers 
that he had crossed the border by foot, spent two hours in Puerto Escondido, and was 
then left in Batey 9 by the buscón. He then rode by bus accompanied by the ―chiefs‖ 
(―chèf yo‖). The bus, stuffed with 52 migrants, stopped at each checkpoint and the 
―chiefs‖ gave a paper to the soldiers, who counted the workers and let them through. 
They arrived at Ingenio Porvenir at 10P.M. and were divided up among bateyes ―as if 
we were objects to be distributed‖ (―se kòm si se on bagay yap distribye‖).  
 
When he started cutting cane, he found that the work was very difficult. He said, ―the 
work was not good … it is difficult cutting cane … we cut it but we were not used to this 
work, we had the problem of water, we had all kinds of problems‖ (―travay la pat bon[…] 
li di coupé can […]nou koupe li men nou pat abitye travay la, nou gen poblèm dlo… nou 
gen tout poblèm‖). After being paid, he and his friends decided to buy a bus ticket for 
DOP140 (USD 4) to another batey because one of his colleagues had previously 
worked there. No one tried to prevent him from leaving, although they took away the 
mattress and machete that they had given him.  
 
He told the researchers that he felt better in the new batey because he had been 
treated well and because "here the cane is weighed better" (―aquí la caña pesa mejor‖). 
However, he did not know how much he was being paid per ton of cane that he 
harvested. He said that after each time he harvested cane, they gave him a receipt 
(―recibo‖), which he could cash in. He also said that he always bought food on credit 
and that he paid the grocery store when he was paid. 
 
He longed to find a better job but stated that he knew that he needed to have identity 
documents, saying ―if I had papers, I would seek work elsewhere, but I have no papers‖ 
(―Sim te gen papye m ta chèche travay lòt kote; menm m pa gen okenn papye‖). 
 
Additional information surfaced during focus groups that illustrated the use of coercive 
practices against workers brought into the Dominican Republic by the CEA under the 
―quota‖ system in March 2010. In a focus group conducted with eleven CEA workers in 
July 2010, workers reported that workers who were recruited through the ―quota‖ 
system were watched by guards (―guardacampestres‖) who would not let them leave 
the bateyes, at least during the first few weeks of harvest. Workers interviewed in the 
focus groups further reported that in order to leave the bateyes, they had to leave at 
night and leave behind all of their belongings.  
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In addition, 13 percent of CEA workers interviewed reported that they were not satisfied 
with their treatment. Seventy percent of these workers reported that this unsatisfactory 
treatment involved verbal abuse by their supervisors, while one worker reported 
physical abuse, and the rest reported too much work and too little pay. This shows how 
the ―quota‖ system can lead to worker vulnerability.  
 
One worker interviewed, who had first come to the Dominican Republic in 2008 and had 
returned to Haiti on several occasions, was recruited through the ―quota‖ system to work 
for the CEA in 2010. His testimony, in Creole, revealed the existence of remnants of 
coercive and violent practices in some CEA bateyes. In a focus group, he stated, "from 
the time that you arrive at the batey you cannot leave, it's as if one were in prison ... you 
cannot refuse to cut cane because people are watching you‖ (―gen moun kap veye 
w‖).This worker explained how workers were recruited through the ―quota‖ system and 
transported by buscones and authorities to work on CEA bateyes. He distinguished 
between workers who arrived on their own and paid their own smuggling fees (who 
could go whenever they wanted) and those who arrived through the ―quota‖ system 
(who could not easily leave once they had arrived on the bateyes). He said, ―if they 
found you in Haiti, you cannot go easily‖ (―depi se Ayiti yo ta chache ou, ou vini isit ou 
pa ka alé fasil‖). He said that ―bosses" (―jefes‖) told workers brought in under the ―quota‖ 
system that they had paid for them to get to the bateyes (―moun te paye pou w‖) and 
that they had been fed, both during the trip (for a cost of DOP 50 or USD 1) and when 
they arrived at the batey. Therefore, they were not able to leave the batey at the 
beginning of the harvest and had to sneak out at night if they wanted to leave, leaving 
behind the few belongings that they had (including the mattress and machete that were 
given to them). He added that experienced workers could find a way to escape, but that 
it was difficult for most "new" workers, who may have to stay at the bateyes for months 
before being able to leave. Another worker interviewed in a focus group reported having 
to leave a CEA batey at night, but the other workers interviewed in the focus group 
reported this had not happened in their bateyes.  
 
The CEA was the only employer identified during research that worked in complicity 
with public authorities and buscones to recruit, smuggle, and transport workers to their 
bateyes using exploitative mechanisms that violated their rights. Workers were 
transported across the border illegally, forced to sleep in the open, given little or no 
food, and provided with no information about their rights. Furthermore, there were 
reports that their carnets were retained, they had to pay the buscón, and they were 
subjected to surveillance and threats to make them stay on the bateyes. The workers 
who came in under the ―quota‖ system were also very aware of the collaboration 
between migration authorities, the military, buscones, and their employers, which can 
create a high level of fear in workers and a disincentive to leave or complain. Therefore, 
it is clear that the Directorate General of Migration‘s authority to engage in this type of 
recruitment through the ―quota‖ system results in the violation of workers‘ rights and 
increases their vulnerability to forced labor.  
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Induced Indebtedness (by Falsification of Accounts, Inflated Prices, Reduced 
Value of Goods or Services Produced, Excessive Interest Charges, etc.) 
 
Buscones 
 
Although most workers did not have to borrow money to pay for smuggling fees and 
transport from Haiti to their workplaces in the Dominican Republic, many had to sell 
their possessions to pay these fees and some of those who borrowed money had to 
provide collateral and/or were charged excessive interest rates. 
 
Of the 677 migrant workers interviewed, 437 (65 percent) reported that they paid money 
directly to a buscón, 159 (24 percent) paid money to a bus driver to transport them to 
their final destination, and 34 (five percent) reported that they made direct payments to 
Dominican or Haitian authorities. Of the migrant workers interviewed, for 450 (67 
percent), the total cost of their last trip to their workplace in the Dominican Republic was 
between DOP 1,000 and DOP 5,000 (USD 28-USD 138); 111 (16 percent) had paid 
less than DOP 1,000 (USD 28); and 59 (nine percent) had paid over DOP 5,000 (USD 
138). Of the 170 workers who entered the Dominican Republic for the last time within 
the previous year, 142 (84 percent) had paid between DOP 1,000 and DOP 5,000 (USD 
28-USD 138).  
 
Table 13: Amount Paid (in DOP and USD) for Trip from 
Haiti to the DR Carried out Within the Past Year  
Amount paid Percent 
Did not have to pay 3% 
Less than 1,000 DOP (USD 28) 7% 
From 1,000-2,000 (USD 28-USD 55) 21% 
From 2,001 to 3,000 (USD 55-USD 83) 15% 
From 3,001 to 4,000 (USD 83-USD 110) 23% 
From 4,001 to 5,000 (USD 110-USD 138) 25% 
More than 5,000 (USD 138) 6% 
 
The cost of illegal migration is not extremely high compared to the cost and difficulty of 
obtaining the documents required to migrate legally (the cost of a passport, visa, and 
administrative expenses).41 However, the cost of smuggling fees is high for Haitian 
migrants, many of whom do not have any savings, and earn low wages in the sugar 
sector and well above the cost of the trip back to Haiti at the end of the harvest. For 
example, for workers in the CAC (the ingenio closest to the border) the cost to return to 
Haiti does not exceed DOP 200 (USD 6), while the cost to enter the Dominican 
Republic was between DOP 1,000 and DOP 2,000 (USD 28-USD 55). For Central 
Romana workers (whose plantations are the furthest away from the border), the cost of 
return is DOP 1,200 (USD 33), while the cost to enter the Dominican Republic and to 
get to the bateyes was more than DOP 3,000 (USD 83), for 46 percent of workers. 
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It should be added that some workers did not have to pay to enter the Dominican 
Republic. Many workers who came by viaje, as well as workers who were recruited and 
brought to work in CEA bateyes in 2010 did not have to pay for the trip.  
 
Table 14: Percent of Workers who 
did not Have to Pay According to 
the Last Year of Entry  
Last entry into DR  % 
2009-2010 3% 
2005-2008 2% 
 2001-2004 10% 
 1991-2000 14% 
 1990 or before 29% 
 
Of the 677 migrant workers surveyed, 600 (89 percent) used their own resources to pay 
for transit from Haiti to their workplace in the Dominican Republic. However, as the vast 
majority of workers did not have savings, many of them had to sell goods or animals to 
afford the trip. In addition, 77 (11 percent) of migrant workers surveyed had to borrow 
money to pay their smuggling fees, including 31 (five percent) who borrowed money 
from a money lender and 46 (seven percent) who borrowed money from a family 
member. In some cases, workers borrowing money from both money lenders and family 
members had to put up collateral in order to obtain the loan, generally in the form of a 
deed to a piece of land. Of the 77 workers who had to borrow money, 35 (46 percent) 
reported that they had to pay interest on the loan. Interest rates were generally between 
five and 30 percent. However, researchers identified cases of workers who arrived in 
2010 who had to pay 100 percent interest on their loans. Of the 77 workers interviewed 
who reported that they had to borrow money, 46 (59 percent report) reported that they 
still owed money when they were interviewed. 
 
Although researchers did not find that workers owed money for smuggling fees to either 
the buscón or their employer, researchers consider that any debt for smuggling fees 
increase workers‘ vulnerability to forced labor, especially when compounded with high 
interest rates, low wages, and additional debt to food stores. 
 
Food Stores 
 
Workers and their families depend almost entirely on grocery stores and bodegas 
located in the bateyes for their food, as they do not generally have their own parcels of 
land on which they can grow subsistence crops and do not have access to affordable 
food programs or grocery stores outside of the bateyes. Although CAC and Central 
Romana claim to have programs that offer workers food at affordable prices, workers 
interviewed were not aware of these programs.  
 
High food prices and low wages often prevent workers from buying their food with cash: 
332 workers (45 percent) reported that they acquired food "on credit" at least part of the 
time from stores located within the bateyes. Focus group and expert interviews 
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indicated that while the vast majority of these stores were independently owned, some 
were tied to employers.  
 
Even more troublesome, research indicated that workers continued to purchase food 
with "tickets" (or vouchers), which shows that the voucher system continues to be used 
despite international repudiation. In this system vouchers (official, numbered company 
documents that specify the amount to be paid to workers) are provided by employers to 
workers ahead of paydays, which generally come every seven to 15 days. Workers can 
either cash them in at the end of the pay period or use them as credit in order to acquire 
cash or food in the colmados or bodegas before their payday. Food stores then cash 
these vouchers in for their full value with the ingenios on payday although the vouchers 
have the workers' names or identification numbers on them, showing that employers are 
aware of this practice. Workers interviewed reported that if they use these vouchers as 
credit, ten to 20 percent of the value of the voucher is deducted by the stores as 
interest. Therefore, if a worker has a voucher worth DOP 1,000 (USD 28) and cashes it 
in early to buy food or to obtain cash for other necessities such as medical care, the 
worker will only receive DOP 800 to DOP 900 (USD 22-USD 25) in cash or food.  Of the 
workers interviewed, 56 (eight percent) reported that they paid for food with vouchers. 
Over 40 percent of CEA workers interviewed reported that they paid in vouchers, while 
the percentage of workers employed by other ingenios who reported that they paid with 
vouchers did not exceed seven percent.  
 
Workers‘ already low wages are thus reduced further by their need to ―borrow‖ money at 
high rates of ―interest‖ of ten to 20 percent. All workers interviewed reported that they 
wanted to buy food in cash all the time. However, their low wages meant that many of 
them had to buy food on credit regularly. This can lead to a vicious cycle of debt in 
which workers are permanently indebted to grocery store owners, as they are forced to 
cash in their vouchers early every pay period because they have already cashed in or 
redeemed their vouchers from previous pay periods to pay off their previous loans. 
Sometimes, workers are indebted throughout the harvest season, and there were cases 
in which workers were not able to pay off their debt at the end of the harvest, even with 
their end-of-harvest bonuses. A worker at Batey Contador (CAEI) told the researchers 
that he did not have enough money to buy food and that workers had to work very hard 
to pay off their debts, as the owners of the stores had power over workers.  
 
In some cases, the cycle of debt can originate at the beginning of the employment 
relationship. In the case of the CEA, there were cases in which mayordomos advanced 
money to workers so that they could buy food before they got their first voucher or 
payment. In the case of Central Romana, ajusteros (batey administrators in charge of 
paying workers‘ salaries) gave advances to workers when they arrived on the bateyes. 
In both cases, the workers had to pay back these advances when they received their 
paychecks, forcing them into a cycle of debt, as they then had no money with which to 
buy food and thus had to buy it on credit. These workers sometimes end up in this cycle 
of debt throughout the harvest season and sometimes even after it ends, as their 
weekly wage is inadequate so they are forced to rely solely on credit. 
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CAC workers were the most susceptible to indebtedness for food, as 77 percent of CAC 
workers interviewed reported that they had to buy food on credit at least part of the time. 
In a focus group of 20 CAC workers, one worker said, ―when I cash in my check, I 
cannot finish paying off [the debt]. I can never finish paying it. The little money that they 
pay me is not enough‖ ("lèm touche, m pa ka finn peyel. M pa janm ka finn peyel. Ti sa 
yo peye a pa soblá ").  
 
Another CAC worker reported that he was forced to live off of "what he had in his pocket 
to eat" and could not pay off his debt of DOP 4,000 (USD110) to the grocery store 
because what he earned each week was "almost nothing." He reported that he would 
try to pay off half of the debt with his next payment and pay the rest of the debt with his 
end-of-harvest bonus.  
 
Workers also reported that they could not leave without paying off the debt and, some 
said that they were resigned to that fact. One worker said, ―I want to go, but as I have 
not paid the grocer I cannot‖  
 
Even more troublesome, some workers are unable to pay off the debt for their 
smuggling fees by the end of the harvest season. A young CAC worker interviewed 
reported that even after he had finally made enough to pay off the bodega owner, he did 
not have enough money to pay off his debt for his smuggling fees. He reported that he 
would have to work planting sugarcane during the down season in order to pay back the 
DOP 3,200 (USD 88) that he still owed to the friend who loaned him the money for the 
smuggling fees. 
 
The cycle of debt is in many cases due to the payment system. Workers are paid per 
ton of sugarcane that they harvest. While 462 workers (62 percent) reported that they 
were satisfied with this system, 162 (22 percent) reported that they thought that the 
cane was not being weighed properly and 102 (14 percent) reported that they were not 
satisfied with this system. Upon further inquiry, approximately one-third of the workers 
who reported they were not satisfied with the payment system reported that it was 
because their employers did not always weigh the cane accurately and ten percent 
reported that they were deceived or cheated in the weighing of the cane. Some of these 
workers reported that the cane was not weighed in front of them and that the cane was 
sometimes left on the ground for days before it was weighed (allowing the cane juice to 
evaporate and reducing its weight). Workers reported that when payday came they 
were paid much less than the amount that they were entitled to.  
  
Focus group interviews and expert interviews indicate that workers earn extremely low 
wages for the amount of cane that they harvest, and these wages may be reduced 
through deductions and fraud in the weighing of cane, as there are no verification 
systems in place. The sub-minimum wages that workers earn, combined with the 
payment of workers with vouchers, and the high interest rates charged when cashing in 
the vouchers before payday, result in extremely low payments to workers. The products 
sold at the food stores are priced at above market value in many cases, which causes 
workers, especially those with families, to have to spend more than they earn or to have 
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to borrow money between paydays just to buy enough food to survive. Therefore, 
workers accrue debts of DOP 3,000 to DOP 5,000 (USD 83-USD 138) that can continue 
until to the end of the harvest season. Some workers are unable to pay off their debts 
even with their end-of–harvest bonuses or incentives, causing them to have to stay after 
the end of the harvest season to pay off their debt. As one worker put it, "this here is to 
be in jail" (―esto aquí ta preso‖).  
 
Focus group interviews indicated that the majority of workers who were indebted were 
able to pay their debts each pay period or by the end of the harvest and workers did not 
report explicit penalties for failing to pay back the loans. In addition, the researchers 
reported that workers could generally choose between two or more colmados or 
bodegas in each batey and the researchers did not generally find links between food 
stores and employers, so workers were not directly indebted to their employers. 
Nevertheless, researchers judged this worker debt to represent an indicator of forced 
labor due to the fact that they are sometimes drawn into a cycle of debt due to their low 
wages, the inflated cost of food, the issuance of vouchers by employers, and the high 
interest rates charged by the stores. Furthermore, subcontracting of the provision of 
food effectively shelters the employer from culpability for the workers‘ indebtedness 
while enabling that employer to benefit from the potentially coercive nature of that debt. 
 
Deception or False Promises About Types and Terms of Work 
 
Of the 677 migrant workers surveyed, 364 (54 percent) reported having entered the 
Dominican Republic through an intermediary, known as a buscón. About half of workers 
interviewed who used a buscón found their buscón through a friend or family member, 
101 (28 percent) knew the buscón prior to migrating, and 65 (18 percent) reported that 
the buscón contacted them to offer them work in the Dominican Republic. 
  
Contracting mechanisms vary, but generally workers ask to be taken to a specific batey. 
Upon arrival at the workplace, workers present themselves at the offices of the ingenio 
and fill out documents with human resources staff or present themselves to the 
contactor or foreman, who assigns them work according to labor needs. Many workers 
go to bateyes or plantations which they know are seeking employees, or they access 
them through the buscones. Generally, after hiring the worker, the foreman or contractor 
also sends the worker to an available bed in a barracks room and provides the main 
tools (machete, lime, etc.) needed for the job. In some cases, especially the CAC, 
employers announce the date that the harvest will begin by radio in Haiti. 
 
Workers‘ vulnerability to deceptive recruitment is exacerbated when workers are taken 
directly to the bateyes by buscones. Workers surveyed were asked why they had gone 
to a specific batey, of which 482 (65 percent) reported that it was because there was 
work there, 106 (14 percent) reported that it was because a family member lived there, 
and 78 (11 percent) reported that it was because a buscón had brought them there. 
This means that about one in five of the 364 workers who were brought into the 
Dominican Republic by a buscón were brought to a specific batey based on a buscon‘s 
decision. Of the 170 workers who had made their last journey to the Dominican 
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Republic less than a year prior to the survey, 68 (40 percent) had been left in a Central 
Romana batey, 17 (ten percent) were left in a CEA batey, 13 (eight percent) were left in 
a CAEI batey, eight (four percent) were left in an Ingenio Barahona batey, and seven 
(four percent) were left in a colonato.  
 
Of all the workers surveyed, 71 (ten percent) reported that they knew who the buscón 
who brought them into the Dominican Republic was working for. Of these workers, 23 
(32 percent) reported that the buscón worked independently, while the other 48 (68 
percent) reported that they worked for sugar companies (23 percent said they worked 
for the CEA, 17 percent reported that they worked for the CAEI, and 18 percent 
reported that they worked for Central Romana). Of the workers who emigrated in 2009-
2010 who reported that they knew who the buscón worked for, 62 percent reported that 
they worked independently, but four workers reported that they worked for the CEA, one 
worker reported that he worked for Central Romana, and another worker reported that 
he worked for another individual. Any link between buscones and employers can result 
in increased vulnerability of migrant workers, as in this case the buscones are acting as 
labor brokers who are more prone to deceive workers about the conditions under which 
they will be working, rather than simply smuggling workers over the border. 
 
Worker interviews indicate that workers are not deceived about the type of work that 
they will be carrying out, as they are told that they will be working in sugarcane and the 
researchers did not detect cases in which workers were deceived into thinking that they 
would be obtaining other types of employment. However, there are indications that 
workers were not informed about the conditions under which they would be working, as 
described below. 
 
The Dominican Labor Code does not require that workers be provided with written 
employment contracts. Workers in the sugar sector do not generally sign a written 
contract detailing their conditions of employment, despite Decrees that encouraged this 
practice. Even when workers are provided with written contracts, they are almost never 
written in Creole, and workers‘ high level of illiteracy, especially in Spanish, prevents 
them from being able to understand the contracts. Most workers interviewed were not 
aware of having a "contract," verbal or written, with their employer.  
 
Private sugar companies generally provide workers with an ID (card also known as 
fichas or códigos) when they start working, while those working for independent colonos 
or the CEA do not receive this documentation. This card contains a code or number that 
identifies the employee during their employment relationship and allows the cane 
cutters to record the number of tons that they cut for salary purposes. In some cases, 
including Central Romana and CAEI, a worker‘s photo is inserted into the ID card. Of 
the workers surveyed, 570 (77 percent) reported that they had received an ID card or 
number that identified their employment status. The only ingenio in which the majority of 
workers interviewed reported that they did not possess such a document was Ingenios 
El Porvenir (CEA), where 81 percent of workers reported that they did not have an ID 
card or number. 
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In the vast majority of cases, workers do not receive any other document or oral or 
written information on the conditions governing their employment relationship (hours, 
wages, rights, etc.) at the time of recruitment or hiring. For this reason, often after 
months or years harvesting sugarcane, workers continue to lack an accurate 
understanding of their conditions of employment. A lawyer who is an expert on this 
issue, said, "Each time a harvest begins, workers begin to cut the sugarcane without 
knowing how much they will earn."42 
 
Generally, the only information that workers are aware of is the amount that they are 
paid per ton of sugarcane harvested. Of the workers surveyed, 694 (94 percent) knew 
how much they were paid per ton of sugarcane, but 46 workers (six percent) were not 
even aware of this basic information. In addition, 15 percent of CAC workers and 17 
percent of CEA workers interviewed were unaware of the amount that they were paid 
per ton of sugarcane harvested. In a CAC batey in March 2010, after months of cutting 
cane, all workers interviewed except for one did not know how much they were being 
paid per ton (which was DOP 50 or USD1).  
 
Research further indicates that workers did not receive clear information about 
deductions. While employer representatives interviewed (from CAEI, CEA, CAC, and 
colonos) indicated that they did not make deductions from workers‘ wages for social 
security, housing, meals, or union fees, 359 workers (49 percent of workers surveyed) 
reported that they believed that deductions for these services were made from their 
wages. As migrant workers are not eligible for social security, deductions for social 
security would constitute fraud.  
 
In addition, 460 workers (62 percent) reported that they believed that deductions were 
made for the tools and equipment needed for their jobs (i.e. machetes, lime, boots, 
gloves, and goggles). Most workers interviewed did not know the exact amount 
deducted, with the exception of Central Romana workers, who reported deductions of 
DOP 400 (USD11) for boots, DOP 200 (USD 6) for a machete, and DOP 100 (USD 3) 
for a ration of lime (workers can use up to four in one season). In addition, some CAC 
workers interviewed reported that they had to buy boots for DOP 400 (USD11) from a 
bodega.  These deductions for equipment are in violation of the Labor Code, which 
establishes employers‘ obligation to provide workers with the materials/equipment that 
they need to carry out their jobs free of charge (Article 46.5).  
 
Workers also lack information on bonuses and incentives, which the ILO noted in the 
1980s were used as a way to retain workers‘ wages until the end of the harvest, in 
contravention with ILO Convention 95 concerning the Protection of Wages. Thus 
workers cannot verify whether the ―bonuses‖ or ―incentives‖ paid to them at the end of 
the harvest season are actually withheld wages. Although collective bargaining 
agreements recognize workers‘ right to bonuses and production incentives, most 
workers do not know that they are entitled to these benefits, and in some cases, 
especially in the CAEI, employers have ignored the existence of this benefit. This may 
be due to the fact that the production goals on which the incentives are based are too 
high for workers to reach in many cases. Some CAEI workers interviewed reported that 
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for several years, they were told that they were going to receive attendance incentives 
and a bonus, but that they never received these payments. They reported that they had 
been making demands for these payments for a long time, saying "we fight for the 
bonuses." Only a few CAC workers interviewed reported that they were entitled to an 
"incentive" at the end of the 2009-2010 harvest of DOP 1,000 or DOP 1,500 (USD 28 or 
USD 41), but were unclear of the factors that determined the amount of the incentive. 
 
The researchers judged that workers were not provided with clear information about 
their conditions of employment during recruitment, hiring, or when starting work. In a 
number of cases, workers were still unaware of their conditions of employment after 
years spent cutting cane for the same employer. 
 
Withholding and Non-Payment of Wages 
 
As mentioned above, the ILO has reported that in the past, employers have retained 
part of workers‘ wages to be paid to them at the end of the harvest season in the form of 
a ―bonus‖ or ―incentive.‖ As workers lacked awareness on salary deductions and bonus 
and incentive payments, researchers could not determine whether this practice 
continued. However, employers‘ failure to provide workers with documents detailing 
their conditions of employment and payments and deductions make them extremely 
vulnerable to the withholding and non-payment of wages.  
 
In addition, the CAEI reported that they were going to offer an incentive of DOP 5.00 
(USD 0.14) per day of work to workers who had worked for at least 80 percent of the 
harvest. As the vast majority of workers were paid under the minimum wage, this can be 
considered a retention of wages due to workers, which is used to ensure that they work 
for most of the harvest. In addition, nine CAEI workers interviewed during the 2010 and 
2011 harvests reported that if they complained or protested about their conditions of 
employment, their ID cards would be cancelled and they would not be paid for their 
work. 
 
Retention of Identity Documents or Other Valuable Personal Possessions 
  
Republic Act No. 285-04 on Migration requires that workers be provided with a 
"temporary worker card" (carnet de trabajador de temporero) and that workers who lack 
a current carnet may be considered an "illegal alien subject to deportation.‖ The carnets 
are issued by the Directorate General of Migration (Dirección General de Migración) 
and are to be provided to non-resident braceros by their employers.  While the carnets 
come with many limitations (see Psychological Coercion section above), they do 
provide workers with limited freedom of movement in a reduced geographical area and 
the failure to provide workers with these carnets limits their freedom of movement and 
subjects them to an elevated risk of deportation.  
 
Only 157 workers (21 percent) reported having been provided with a carnet, and only 34 
percent of these carnets were issued in 2010, meaning that the 687 (93 percent) of 
  P a g e  | 62 
workers lacked carnets or had expired carnets, and could thus be deported. The only 
employers that provided workers with carnets in 2010 were the CAEI and CAC.  
Nevertheless, only 43 percent of CAC workers and 36 percent of CAEI workers 
interviewed reported that they possessed carnets and research indicates that Central 
Roman had last provided workers with carnets in 2008. During the 2009-2010 harvest, 
CEA was in possession of workers‘ carnets, but did not provide them to workers with 
the possible intention of making sure that the workers did not leave the bateyes, as 
workers who lack the carnets and leave the bateyes and travel even within an 
―authorized zone‖ close to the bateyes are subject to deportation. The percentage of 
workers provided with carnets is extremely low, especially considering that 89 percent 
of workers surveyed were employed by a sugar company with the ability to provide 
workers with these carnets, and the percentage of workers provided with carnets in 
previous years was much higher. 
 
 
Menace of a Penalty (the Means of Keeping Someone in Forced Labor) 
Actual Presence or Credible Threat: 
 
General 
 
Workers interviewed reported menace of penalty for missing work and leaving the 
bateyes and their jobs. Of all the workers surveyed, 148 (20 percent) reported that they 
would have problems with their supervisor if they missed work for one or more days, 
including 70 (ten percent) who said that they would be issued a warning (―les llamaba la 
atención‖), 19 (three percent) who said that they would make less money and would not 
be able to eat, and 20 (three percent) who reported that they would ―be taken off the 
batey" (because their housing was employer-provided). In addition, 23 workers (three 
percent of all workers interviewed) reported that they could not leave the batey when 
they wanted, while 47 (six percent) reported that they could not leave their jobs during 
the harvest. Of these workers, 25 (three percent of all workers interviewed) said that 
they could not leave their jobs because they would be thrown out of their houses, seven 
workers (less than one percent) reported that they would be issued a warning (―les 
llamaba la atención‖), 11 workers (two percent) reported that they did not have another 
place to work, and another 11 workers (two percent) reported that they did not have 
enough money to leave.  
   
The incidence of menace of penalty was much higher among workers recruited to work 
for the CEA in 2010 through the ―quota‖ system. Surveys and interviews indicate that 
that in some CEA bateyes threats and other mechanisms of coercion were used to keep 
workers on the bateyes. Once on the bateyes, it was hard for workers who were brought 
into the Dominican Republic through the ―quota‖ system to leave during the harvest and 
some had to sneak out in the middle of the night and leave all of their possessions. New 
recruits had to stay for many months before being able to leave the bateyes. Workers 
interviewed during focus groups reported that they could not leave their CEA batey 
because they were being watched and because they lacked carnets, which the CEA 
had retained.  
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Physical Violence Against Worker or Family or Close Associates 
 
The ILO considers an important factor to take into account when determining whether 
physical violence is being used against workers is the presence of physical signs of 
violence among workers interviewed, such as anxiety or bruises (Andrees, 2008: 18). 
The researchers judged that eight workers (one percent) showed signs of fear, anxiety, 
or intimidation. This was mostly observed among recently-arrived workers. In addition, 
seven workers interviewed (less than one percent of workers interviewed) reported that 
they could not leave because their supervisor was violent or threatening towards them, 
and two workers (less than 0.5 percent) reported that they could not leave because they 
had ―been watched‖ or because their supervisor would not let them. One CEA worker 
was reportedly subjected to violence at a CEA batey. 
      
Sexual Violence 
 
The researchers did not find evidence of sexual violence being used against workers as 
a threat or practice in the Dominican sugar sector.      
   
Imprisonment or Other Physical Confinement 
    
While workers were in fact confined to the bateyes in some cases, the researchers did 
not find evidence of threats or the use of imprisonment or physical confinement being 
used as a penalty for workers in the Dominican sugar sector. 
    
Financial Penalties    
 
Nine CAEI workers interviewed reported that if they complained about their conditions of 
employment, their ID cards would be canceled and they would not be paid for their 
services.  
 
Denunciation to Authorities (Police, Immigration, etc.) and Deportation 
 
Dominican Law states that temporary migrant workers must be provided with a 
"temporary worker card" (carnet), which allows them "to perform the gainful activity for 
which they were admitted, for the authorized period of time and within the authorized 
area." This law provides for the deportation of workers who lack a carnet, are found 
without a carnet, travel outside of the ―authorized zone,‖ or have an expired carnet. The 
carnets are intended for ―temporary workers‖ and are only valid for six months, while the 
majority of workers surveyed resided in the Dominican Republic year-round, and the law 
states that employers should ―repatriate‖ workers once their carnets expire. The carnets 
are issued by the General Migration Directorate (Dirección General de Migración), but 
are generally provided to workers by their employers. This creates a legal mechanism 
that ties workers to their employers and a limited geographical area, which creates an 
inherent menace of penalty of deportation for workers leaving their place of work. It also 
confers on employers the power to provide workers with documents that give them a 
semi-legal status and to deport workers whose carnets have expired.   
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There were cases in which employers were in possession of the carnets or had the 
ability to produce and distribute them, but did not provide them to workers, leaving them 
vulnerable to deportation. Of the workers surveyed, 157 (21 percent) reported having 
been provided with a carnet, but only 34 percent of them had carnets that were issued 
in 2010, meaning that only 53 workers (seven percent) had valid, unexpired carnets. 
This meant that the vast majority of workers were vulnerable to deportation due to 
employers‘ failure to provide them with carnets, as required by law. 
 
CEA workers brought in under the ―quota‖ system were especially vulnerable. The 
complicity between the CEA (which was government-run), buscones, migration 
authorities, and the military in bringing workers into the Dominican Republic reinforced 
that notion that their employer had strong links to the military and migration authorities 
with the power to deport them. In addition, CEA workers were not provided with their 
carnets, which were produced, but withheld by the CEA and authorities and were never 
distributed to workers during the 2009/2010 harvest. 
 
Dismissal from Current Employment     
 
One CAC worker interviewed reported that a foreman had fired him for complaining that 
"he did not get paid much" (―no cobraba mucho‖). 
       
Exclusion from Future Employment 
 
Of the workers surveyed, 28 (four percent) reported that they would receive a 
punishment or penalty if they missed work, all of whom reported that the penalty was 
that they would not be able to harvest sugarcane the next day. In addition, a labor 
contractor who supplied workers to the CAC informed researchers that any worker who 
does not like cutting cane can leave work at any time, but that their ―code‖ (worker ID 
number that allows them to be paid) is erased and they cannot return" (―se le borra el 
código y no puede regresar‖). Nine CAC workers interviewed reported that if they 
complained about their conditions of work, their ―code‖ would be erased. 
         
Exclusion from Community and Social Life 
    
The researchers did not find evidence of exclusion from community and social life being 
used against workers as a threat or in practice in the Dominican sugar sector.  
 
Removal of Rights or Privileges 
     
―Removal of rights or privileges‖ was interpreted by the research team as rights and 
privileges at the workplace (for example, taking away workers‘ right to bathroom breaks 
as a form of reprisal).  The researchers did not find evidence of the removal of rights or 
privileges being used against workers as a threat or in practice in the Dominican sugar 
sector.  
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Deprivation of Food, Shelter or Other Necessities 
 
Of the workers surveyed, 734 (99 percent) reported that they depended on employer-
provided housing and 496 (67 percent) reported that they remained in the same bateyes 
even during the down season. Of the workers surveyed, 20 (three percent) reported that 
they would ―be taken off the batey if they failed to show up to work for one or more 
days. In addition, 25 workers (three percent of workers surveyed) reported that they 
could not leave their jobs because they would be thrown out of their houses.  
 
While 19 workers (three percent) feared leaving their jobs because they would not be 
able to make enough money to buy food, researchers did not find evidence that 
deprivation of food was used as an explicit penalty. However, CEA workers interviewed 
reported that they were deprived of food during their transport to Batey Porvenir.  
    
Shift to Even Worse Working Conditions 
 
The researchers did not find evidence of shifts to even worse working conditions being 
used against workers as a threat or in practice in the Dominican sugar sector.  
 
Loss of Social Status 
 
The researchers did not find evidence of loss of social status being used against 
workers as a threat or in practice in the Dominican sugar sector.  
 
 
Wages and Hours 
 
Wages 
 
Of the workers surveyed, 699 (94 percent) reported that they were paid in cash and on 
time (either weekly or biweekly) almost all of the time. However, 41 workers (six 
percent) reported that their payments were sometimes or always delayed. Of these 
workers, 19 (48 percent) reported that they did not know why their payments were 
delayed, five (12 percent) reported that the payment office delayed their payment, and 
other workers reported that records of the amount of cane that they had cut had not 
been reported to the payment office. 
 
Of the workers surveyed, 703 (95 percent) reported that they were paid a piece rate 
(based on the number of tons of cane cut or transported), while 30 (four percent) 
reported that they were paid a daily wage, most of whom were cultivadores, who 
generally earn a daily wage of between DOP 100 (USD 3) and DOP 200 (USD 6) pesos 
per day. While 462 workers (62 percent) reported that they were satisfied with this 
system, 162 (22 percent) reported that their cane was not being weighed properly, and 
102 workers (14 percent) reported that they were not satisfied with the weighing system. 
Upon further inquiry, a little over half of the workers who reported they were not satisfied 
reported that it was because they were paid too little, while a third reported that their 
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employers did not always weigh the cane accurately, and ten percent reported that they 
were deceived or cheated in the weighing of the cane. Some of these workers reported 
that the cane was not weighed in front of them and that the cane was sometimes left on 
the ground for days before it was weighed (which can reduce the weight through 
evaporation of the cane juice), and that when payday came they were paid much less 
than the amount that they were entitled to according to the number of tons of sugarcane 
that they had actually harvested.  
  
Picadores and carreteros are paid in tons of sugarcane harvested and transported, 
respectively. The amount that workers earn per ton varies slightly depending on the 
work carried out, as carreteros earn less per ton but transport more tons of cane per 
day than picadores. For this reason, while approximately 80 percent of picadores 
reported that they earned between DOP 100 (USD 3) and DOP 200 (USD 6) per ton, 
almost half of the carreteros interviewed reported that they earned less than DOP 100 
(USD 3) per ton. The researchers determined that the only employer that paid picadores 
less than DOP 100 (USD 3) per ton of cane harvested was Ingenio Barahona (CAC). 
The remaining employers paid between DOP 100 (USD 3) and DOP 140 (USD 4) per 
ton. There were some variations, such as some companies paying less per ton for burnt 
cane than green cane because the green cane requires more work and yields less. In 
addition, some workers are paid more per ton when they do not have the assistance of 
a mechanical ―lift‖ (alce). For example, colonatos, which usually do not have lifts, 
generally pay workers more per ton as a way of attracting workers. Incentives and 
bonuses were another way to attract workers. 
 
Table 15: Payment and Incentives/Bonuses Offered to Cane Cutters by 
Employer (2009-10 harvest) 
Employer Price per ton of 
green cane 
Price per ton of 
burned cane 
Mechanical 
lift 
Incentives 
CAC DOP 60 (USD 2) 
DOP 55 (USD 2) 
(authorized 
burning) 
DOP 45 (USD 1) 
(unauthorized 
burning) 
Sometimes DOP 10 (USD 
0.27) per 
workday and 
DOP 2 (USD 
0.06) per ton 
in excess of 
14 tons per 
week 
CAEI DOP 110 (USD 3)  DOP 90 (USD 2) 
 
Sometimes 
 
None 
CEA DOP 127 (USD 4) N/A No None 
Central Romana 
DOP 110 (USD 3) 
(increased to DOP 
120 (USD 3) in 
May 2010) 
N/A 
 
Sometimes 
DOP 120 
(USD 3) per 
ton in excess 
of 11 tons per 
week 
Colonato (Salvo 
Central 
Romana)43 
DOP 130-DOP 
140 (USD 3.58-
USD 3.86) 
N/A 
No  
 
None 
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Of the workers surveyed, 647 (87 percent) reported that they were paid weekly and 93 
(13 percent) reported that they were paid bi-weekly. Workers who were paid bi-weekly 
were concentrated in the CEA, where 95 percent of workers were paid every other 
Friday, as well as in the colonato, where 39 percent of workers were paid bi-weekly, 
which probably corresponds with colonos who sell their sugarcane to the CEA. 
 
National Wage Committee Resolution No. 1-2010 established the 2010 minimum wage 
for field workers in the sugar industry as DOP 110 (USD 3) per working day. As the vast 
majority of workers surveyed (88 percent) reported working seven days per week, they 
should be entitled to a weekly minimum wage of DOP 770 (USD 21), a biweekly 
minimum wage of DOP 1,540 (USD 42), and a monthly minimum wage of approximately 
DOP 3,300 (USD91). These minimum wages correspond to a regular workweek of a 
maximum of ten hours per day, while workers in fact worked in excess of legal limits, 
and should thus be entitled to a higher payment. 
 
Of the workers who were paid weekly, 65 (ten percent) reported that they earned DOP 
500 (USD 14) or less in their last weekly 
payment, 276 (43 percent) reported that they 
earned DOP 501-1,000 (USD 14-USD 28) per 
week, 256 (40 percent) reported receiving 
between DOP 1,001 and DOP 2,000 per week 
(USD 28-USD 55), and 23 (four percent) 
reported receiving more than DOP 2,000 per 
week (USD 55). Therefore, at least ten 
percent of workers who were paid weekly 
were earning less than the minimum wage, 
even before taking into account overtime 
payments owed to them. The amount 
picadores and carreteros earned was roughly 
the same. However, 50 percent of 
cultivadores, who are generally paid a daily 
wage, earned between DOP 500 and DOP 
1,000 (USD 14 and USD 28) per week.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 16: Last Amount Received by 
Workers Paid Weekly 
Amount paid in DOP 
(USD) No.  % 
500 or less 
(USD 14) 
65 10% 
From 501 to 1,000 
(USD 14-28) 
276 43% 
From 1,001 to 2,000 
(USD 28-55) 
256 40% 
From 2,001 to 3,000 
(USD 55-83) 
17 3% 
More than 3,000 
(USD 83) 
6 1% 
Did not know/ 
respond 
27 4% 
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Of the workers surveyed who were 
paid biweekly, 48 (52 percent) reported 
that they earned between DOP 1,001 
and DOP 2,000 (USD 28-USD 55) in 
their last bi-weekly payment, 14 (15 
percent) earned DOP 2,001 to DOP 
3,000 (USD 55-USD 83) every two 
weeks, another 14 (15 percent) 
reported that they earned between 
DOP 501 and DOP 1,000 (USD 14-
USD 28), and eight workers (9 percent) 
earned DOP 500 (USD 14) or less 
every two weeks. This indicates that at  
least 24 percent of workers who were 
paid bi-weekly (who were generally 
affiliated with the CEA) were earning 
less than the bi-weekly minimum wage 
of DOP 1,540 (USD 42), even before 
taking into account overtime payments 
owed to them.  
 
The researchers further noted that workers‘ incomes can be subject to change based on 
the weather, the capacity of the ingenio, the amount of workers or braceros, etc. in any 
given pay period. For example, a 27 year-old worker in Batey Las Flores (CR) pointed 
out that on a good week he could earn DOP 1,500 (USD 41), but on a bad week, he 
could only earn DOP 500 (USD 14). Another respondent from San Germán Batey (CR) 
informed researchers that he generally earned DOP 200 (USD 6) to DOP 600 (USD 17) 
per week, but that on a "good week" he could earn DOP 1,000 (USD 28).  
 
Article 151 of the Labor Code establishes that workers should be paid when they are 
inactive due to factors that are outside of their control and Article 46.7 establishes that 
workers should be paid for the time that they are unable to work due to the fault of the 
employer. Therefore, workers should be paid when their employer suspends the 
harvest. However, in practice, external factors that affect workers‘ ability to harvest cane 
were born by the workers instead of by their employers, including the time that it takes 
to transport the cane to the ingenio, the evaporation of the cane juice (causing it to 
weigh less), the low quality of sugarcane, and decreased production due to rain. Many 
workers interviewed reported that when the harvest was suspended by their employer, 
they were unable to work for several days or worked on and off, reducing their ability to 
earn money. Some workers reported that they were without work and pay for two 
weeks, during which  they had to live off of ―what they had in their pockets to eat‖ (―de lo 
que tienen en el bolsillo pa comé‖). This forced them to become indebted to store 
owners or impeded them from saving money.  
 
Of the workers surveyed, 133 (18 percent) reported that they also worked on small plots 
of land (―conucos‖) during the down time to supplement their income, while 496 (67 
Table 17: Last Amount Received by 
Workers Paid Bi-Weekly 
Amount paid in DOP 
(USD) No.  % 
500 or less 
(USD 14) 
8 9% 
From 501 to 1,000 
(USD 14-28) 
14 15% 
From1,001 to 2,000 
(USD 28-55) 
48 52% 
From 2,001 to 3,000 
(USD 55-83) 
14 15% 
From 3,001 to 4,000 
(USD 83-110) 
1 1% 
From 4,001 to 5,000 
(USD 110-138) 
2 2% 
Did not know/ respond 5 5% 
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percent) remained in the bateyes once the harvest was over. In order to survive, 446 of 
the workers who remained on the bateyes during the down time (90 percent) continued 
working on the bateyes planting, weeding, and fertilizing the sugarcane. In the CAEI, 
dozens of workers from the San Cristobal Batey noted that they earned DOP 100 (USD 
3) per half day of work weeding or fertilizing the cane. In Central Romana, workers were 
paid DOP 32 (USD 0.88) for each tarea of land they planted.  
 
In addition to minimum wage violations, the researchers found that the payment system 
resulted in a number of other labor law violations. Article 156 of the Labor Code and 
National Salary Committee Resolution No. 1/2010 establish that workers should be paid 
overtime for hours worked exceeding normal working hours. As almost all workers 
worked in excess of ten hours per day, they should have been entitled to overtime pay 
(even if they received a piece rate). Article 164 of the Labor Code stipulates that 
workers are entitled to double time for hours worked on their weekly day of rest. Again, 
as almost all workers surveyed worked seven days per week, they should have been 
entitled to one day of double time pay per week.  
 
The low piece rates paid per ton of sugarcane harvested did not allow workers to earn 
the minimum wage or a living wage during a normal workday. According to Frank Báez 
Evertsz, this causes workers to exploit themselves (―auto-explota‖) by working 
excessively long hours, as employers do not guarantee workers the minimum wage for 
working the maximum number of legally permitted weekly working hours. As one 
scholar put it, ―A piece rate system quietly ensures that the braceros work hard almost 
without direct supervision. The salary is so low that they must work shifts of 10 to 12 
hours or more just to earn enough to feed themselves"(Martinez, 1996: 20). 
 
Voucher System 
 
Many employers provide their workers with receipts or ―tickets‖ that detail the money 
due to workers on their paydays, which they can use as vouchers to obtain food or 
money from bodegas and colmados. These vouchers generally include workers‘ ID 
numbers or names. Workers can either cash the vouchers in at the end of the pay 
period or use them as credit in order to acquire cash or food in the colmados or 
bodegas before their payday. Of the workers surveyed, 56 (eight percent) reported that 
they paid for food with "tickets" (or vouchers), with over 40 percent of CEA workers 
interviewed reporting that they paid in vouchers, while the percentage of workers 
employed by other ingenios who reported that they paid with vouchers did not exceed 
seven percent. Workers interviewed reported that if they used these vouchers as credit, 
the value of the voucher was devalued by ten to 20 percent by the stores. This 
effectively means that workers were charged ten to 20 percent interest by the stores, 
which further reduced their already low incomes. 
 
Bonuses 
 
About half of worker surveyed reported that they received a bonus or incentive from 
their employer, the vast majority of whom were employed by Central Romana or 
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colonatos sourcing to Central Romana, where 80 percent of workers reported receiving 
bonuses. These bonuses represent an attraction for some workers who consider the 
bonuses to represent a way to receive a lump sum of money at the end of the harvest, 
allowing them to ―save‖ money. Various workers interviewed at other ingenios reported 
that they wanted to work at Central Romana because of the bonus. 
 
Although the collective bargaining agreements of CAEI and CAC also mandate 
bonuses, many workers did not report receiving them in practice. This may be due to 
the fact that the production goals on which the incentives are based are too high for 
workers to realistically reach.  
 
The ILO noted that bonuses were used in the 1980s as a way to retain workers‘ wages 
until the end of the harvest, in contravention with ILO Convention 95 concerning 
Protection of Wages. Researchers determined that workers lack information on their 
bonuses or incentives and workers could not verify whether the bonuses or incentives 
paid to them at the end of the harvest season were actually withheld wages. 
      
Deductions 
 
Research indicates that workers did not receive clear information about deductions and 
that illegal deductions were made from workers‘ pay in practice. Various employer 
representatives interviewed reported that they did not make deductions from workers‘ 
wages for social security, housing, meals, or union fees. However, 359 workers (49 
percent) reported that they believed that deductions for these services were in fact 
made from their wages. Some workers commented, ―they discount what they want … if 
they charge us, we do not know." A worker living for many years in a CAEI batey said 
"There is no paperwork to see whether we are being charged for housing or not, but we 
cannot lie, we do not know if we are being charged or not."  
 
Workers did not know whether payments were being withheld for healthcare, and if so, 
how much was being withheld. Researchers determined that payments for ―social 
security‖ were deducted from some field workers‘ pay at Central Romana by inspecting 
their ID cards. Researchers were unable to conduct interviews at the Central Romana 
factories.  Therefore they were not able to determine whether these deductions were for 
private healthcare or for the social security system, to which migrant workers cannot 
register under the Social Security Law, and which would thus constitute fraud. Among 
other employers, researchers determined that deductions were made for private 
healthcare. 
 
The Labor Code establishes employers‘ obligation to provide their workers with the 
materials/equipment that they need to carry out their jobs free of charge (Article 46.5). 
Of the workers surveyed, 460 (62 percent) reported that they believed that deductions 
were made for the tools and equipment needed for their jobs, including machetes, lime, 
boots, gloves, and goggles. Most workers interviewed did not know the exact amount 
deducted. However, Central Romana workers reported deductions of DOP 400 (USD 
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11) for boots, DOP 200 (USD 6) for a machete, DOP 100 (USD 3) bags of lime, and 
DOP 400 (USD 11) for a mattress.  
 
Working Hours 
 
Of the workers surveyed, 518 (70 percent) 
reported that they worked from five or six in 
the morning until five or six in the 
afternoon, meaning that they worked an 
average of 12 hours. In all cases the 
average number of working hours per 
employer was greater than 11 hours per 
day and exceeded the legal maximum of 
ten working hours per day established for 
farm workers in Article 281 of the Labor Code. 
 
In addition, 651 workers (88 percent) reported that they 
worked seven days per week, with no days off. Some 
employers only required that workers work half days on 
Saturdays and Sundays, and beginning in 2010, the 
CAEI began to pay DOP 50 (USD 1) to workers for 
working on Sundays (in violation of Article 164 of the 
Labor Code). Workers interviewed for the survey and 
focus groups indicated that while workers were not 
obligated to work on Sundays, in practice only Christian 
workers generally took Sundays off. Only 70 workers 
(ten percent) reported that they took at least one day off 
per week. This shows that employers were not respecting the legal requirement 
contained in Article 163 of the Labor Code that workers be provided with 36 hours of 
uninterrupted rest, beginning at noon on Saturdays. 
 
There were also many cases in which workers reported working two consecutive shifts 
(a day shift and a night shift). Some workers preferred to work at night in order to avoid 
prolonged exposure to the sun. Some workers reported that they lost count of the 
number of hours that they work per week, including a worker who reported, ―I am not 
calculating the time anymore … as I am working all the time‖ (―Yo no ‗toy calculando el 
tiempo… como yo ‗toy trabajando to‘ el tiempo‖). 
 
During the harvest, workers were not usually provided with a one-hour break, as 
required by the Labor Code, and were generally only provided with a short break in the 
shade.  
 
Employer representatives interviewed by researchers denied that workers generally 
worked such excessive hours and said that workers who exceeded limits on working 
hours chose to do so. However, researchers noted that the payment system, which 
provides workers with extremely low piece rate wages that are further reduced through 
Table 18: Average Number of Daily 
Working Hours by Employer 
    Employer 
Average number 
of hours 
 Central Romana 12.1 
Colonato 12.0 
CAEI 11.2 
CEA 11.6 
CAC 12.5 
Table 19: Workers that 
Work 7 Days per Week 
Employer % 
Central 
Romana 
88 % 
Colonato 88 % 
CAEI 85 % 
CEA 86 % 
CAC 91 % 
Total  88 % 
  P a g e  | 72 
the use of vouchers, requires workers to work excessively long hours in order to earn 
the minimum wage, which should be guaranteed to all workers. 
 
On several occasions, researchers witnessed workers returning from work at 3 P.M. 
and noted that some workers had little or no work. This can also be problematic, as 
workers who were not provided with work were not able to make enough money. For 
example, during the December 2009 harvest, researchers witnessed that Central 
Romana bateyes (especially Lechuga and Baiguo) were filled with workers during the 
day who complained that they had been provided with little work, saying ―the cut is 
stopped‖ (―el corte ‗ta parao‘‖), and that they were not able to make enough money to 
eat. Some workers had worked every other day since November, as there were too 
many workers and not enough cane to cut.  
 
 
Other Issues of Concern 
 
 
 Benefits 
 
Very few employers give workers other benefits besides health care. Exceptions include 
the literacy programs offered by CAEI and Central Romana, although only ten workers 
(one percent of workers surveyed) reported that they had attended a literacy program or 
technical training. The researchers noted that this may be due to workers‘ lack of free 
time.  
 
Central Romana has offered healthcare to workers for years through a medical center in 
the city of La Romana and two sub-centers located in the bateyes, one in Lechuga and 
one in the Baiguo. The healthcare program also includes two mobile medical units and 
a mobile dental unit. While the company reported that it does not discount money from 
workers‘ wages for this benefit (CR 2008), researchers' inspection of workers‘ ID cards 
indicated that deductions were being made for ―social security‖ to which migrant 
workers are not entitled. Central Romana workers complained about the high cost to 
travel to the Central Hospital in La Romana, and Central Romana workers employed 
near the municipality of Guaymate reported that they had to go to the nearest public 
hospital to avoid spending between DOP 100 and DOP 300 (USD 3 and USD 8) for 
transport, so they were unable to use the medical services offered by the company. 
Moreover, according to an organization working in the area, Central Romana‘s Mobile 
Units operated only on Fridays and provided workers with very poor medical attention. 
 
The CAEI provides workers and their dependents with private health insurance (la ARS 
Universal). Through this system, they have established 16 primary healthcare centers in 
bateyes. The Director of Institutional Relations of Grupo Vicini (which owns CAEI) 
reported that deductions were not made from workers‘ pay for this benefit. Among CAEI 
workers who were injured or had become ill, 43 percent had visited a public hospital, 11 
percent said they had not sought any medical attention, and 10 percent said they had 
bought their own medicine. 
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CAC uses ARS Salud Segura, which has replaced the old social security system to 
provide migrant workers not entitled to social security coverage with health care (a 2007 
National Social Security Council Resolution, cited in the legal framework section, 
created this temporary solution for migrant workers excluded from the social security 
system). According to ARS Salud Segura representatives, ARS Salud Segura only 
covers health insurance, and does not cover occupational hazards or provide workers 
with pension funds (both of which are covered under the normal social security system). 
For ARS Salud Segura, CAC deducts 2.5 percent of workers‘ pay and contributes the 
equivalent of seven percent of workers‘ pay to ARS Salud Segura. Workers can go to a 
hospital located in the Central Batey or a Primary Care Center in Batey 6 if they are 
injured, and an ambulance is available for workers. 
 
Case Study: Alexis, 20 years old (CAC) 
Alexis arrived in the Dominican Republic in September 2009 and did not speak 
any Spanish. He had had a machete wound on his hand that was a little over a 
week old. His hand was severely swollen and looked infected. He had been 
treated at a clinic in Batey 6, which gave him some medication. Since then he 
could not work and was hungry "grangou mwen." He noted that he had tried to 
talk to the foreman, but that he told him he that he "had nothing to complain 
about," so he decided to keep silent. When the researchers met him again 
months later, he told them that he had been unable to work for four weeks and 
that the ingenio still owed him DOP 3,000 (USD 83) for the weeks during which 
he was unable to work. 
 
Workers employed by Ingenio Porvenir (administered by CEA) in 2010 and workers in 
the colonato (except those sourcing to Central Romana) did not have access to health 
benefits. In the case of accidents or health problems, they must go to public hospitals 
on their own. In a limited number of cases, employer representatives brought them to 
hospitals or private clinics. It should be noted that in 2011, Azucarera Porvenir, which 
took over the lease of Ingenio Porvenir, began to offer workers health care coverage 
under the ARS Salud Segura system. A CEA worker interviewed reported that he had a 
high fever for four days and the foreman only provided him with "a few aspirins" as the 
company did not have the ability to send him to a hospital.  
 
Although most employers provided workers with some type of healthcare system in 
place of social security coverage, the researchers found this system to be deficient. One 
reason is that workers are not provided with occupational risk insurance or a pension 
fund as they would be under the social security system. Workers are not generally 
entitled to compensation if they are disabled due to a work-related injury. A CAEI 
representative reported that the company was contemplating providing workers with 
occupational injury insurance and a representative of the CAC informed researchers 
that workers who were injured were provided with a lump sum payment, depending on 
the amount of time that they would have to miss work. However, the researchers found 
various cases in which workers were injured and did not receive any compensation and 
did not find cases in which CAC workers had received compensation. One CAEI worker 
interviewed who had been working for the company for 25 years reported that after he 
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suffered a workplace accident in 2005 that had prevented him from working ever since, 
he was only given DOP 8,000 (USD 220) in compensation. In addition, workers who 
worked for the same employer for years were not entitled to retirement benefits. It is 
thus not surprising that twenty workers (three percent) were 70 years of age or older. 
Another problem is that workers showed low levels of awareness of the medical benefits 
available to them and the amount of money deducted from their pay for these benefits. 
 
Of workers surveyed, 345 (47 percent) had been injured or become ill during their 
employment in the sugar sector. Of these workers, only 114 (33 percent) had been 
treated at a hospital or by a doctor at an ingenio, with most of these cases taking place 
in Central Romana, while 128 (37 percent) reported that they had gone to a "hospital del 
seguro" (which are generally public hospitals related to the old social security system), 
and 54 (16 percent) reported that they went to a public hospital. The quality of medical 
services provided proved to be deficient in some cases. Some workers reported that 
they were given pills and told to go home, while others reported that they were only 
given medication when they had a severe medical problem, and that their only option 
was to go to a public hospital.  
 
Workers are legally entitled to additional benefits under the Labor Code, including paid 
vacation (Article 177), a Christmas bonus (Article 219), a percentage of company profits 
(Article 223) and other benefits, including severance pay (Article 80). During the 2011 
harvest, the CAEI informed workers that they would receive a Christmas bonus for the 
first time. However, researchers found that workers were not provided with the benefits 
to which they were legally entitled in almost all cases. Although 30 workers (four 
percent) reported that they were given ―vacation,‖ researchers determined that many 
workers took ―vacation‖ to mean time off instead of the paid vacation required by the 
Labor Code.  
 
Some employer representatives reported that braceros were not provided with these 
benefits because they were ―seasonal contract workers." However, according to Article 
30 of the Labor Code, braceros contracts should be considered permanent workers 
entitled to benefits. Mr. Federico Gomera, the Director of Inspections for the Ministry of 
Labor said that braceros "are not seasonal workers according to the Labor Code [...] 
They work all their lives cutting cane and they should be counted as permanent 
workers."44 In addition, the Court of First Instance of San Pedro de Macoris recognized 
that a picador who had worked more than 15 years for Ingenio Cristóbal Colón (CAEI) 
had the right to vacation, a Christmas bonus, a share of the company‘s profits, and 
severance pay.45 
 
 
Health and Safety 
 
Cutting sugar cane is intense agricultural work lasting many hours, and workers face the 
risks of dehydration and work-related accidents, especially regarding the use of 
machetes (HRW, 2004). Other factors that affect the workers‘ health is the practice of 
burning cane just before it is harvested  to facilitate cane cutting (WWF, 2004),46 which 
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exposes workers to toxic gases such as carbon monoxide and causes eye irritation and 
respiratory problems. While most of the ingenios use this practice, researchers found 
that CAC utilizes this practice the most. CAC workers interviewed complained about the 
health implications of this practice, and stated that they preferred to harvest green cane, 
as it also made them less dirty.  
 
Of the workers surveyed, 345 (47 percent) reported that they had been injured or had 
become ill during their employment in the sugar sector. Healthcare services were 
generally deficient and worker compensation was essentially nonexistent (see Benefits 
section above). 
 
 
Discrimination 
 
The primary issue of discrimination in the sugar sector concerns the discriminatory 
practices carried out against undocumented workers. As mentioned earlier, 
undocumented workers are expressly excluded from the Social Security system, 
although the Constitution guarantees the fundamental right to social security and even 
though many of these workers are issued carnets which are supposedly intended to 
"regularize" their migration status.  
 
Generally speaking, undocumented workers are given lower-paying, more demanding 
jobs such as picadores, cultivadores, vagoneros, and carreteros. This is also true to a 
certain extent with Dominicans of Haitian descent. In general, the better paying jobs that 
are higher up in the hierarchy are given to Dominicans, who work as mayordomos, 
ticketeros, and listeros. Some ingenios require that applicants for these higher level jobs 
have a Dominican identity card. In Central Romana, undocumented Haitian migrants 
and Dominicans of Haitian descent can only work as carreteros, capatazes de carreta, 
or capatazes de corte (even if they have lived in the Dominican Republic and worked for 
the company for decades). The rest of the workers (listeros, pesadores, ayudantes de 
pesador, etc.) must be Dominican. This constitutes an illegal form of discrimination, as 
Principle VII of the Labor Code states that promotion should be based "on the 
qualifications required for a particular job," not the migration status or ethnicity of 
workers. In addition, as picadores, carreteros, and vagoneros are often characterized as 
"temporary" workers year after year, they are not provided with a number of benefits to 
which they are legally entitled.  
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Living Conditions 
 
Worker interviews and site visits indicate that many picadores, cultivadores, carreteros, 
and vagoneros had little or no access to electricity, waste collection, and kitchen 
facilities (see Table 20: Living Conditions)
The living conditions on CEA bateyes were 
generally the worst in terms of infrastructure 
and sanitation, as many CEA bateyes were 
abandoned after the failure of privatization 
(Yanguela-Tejada, 2001). However, 
conditions were not much better among 
other employers. 
 
Table 20: Living Conditions 
Services No.  % 
Employer-provided 
housing 
734 99% 
Mattress 118 16% 
Electricity 92 12% 
Potable Water 297 40% 
Sanitary Services 364 49% 
Housing 
 
As for employer-provided housing, which 734 workers (99 percent of workers) lived in, 
the vast majority was in very poor condition. Picadores were generally housed in 
barracones (blocks of rooms that each house four to eight workers and/or family 
members), which were often in the worst physical condition. Of the workers surveyed, 
427 (58 percent) lived in barracones; 238 of these workers (56 percent) shared their 
barracones with other workers and 189 (44 percent) shared their barracones with their 
family members. In addition, 278 workers (38 percent) reported that they lived in 
―collective houses‖ (―casas colectivas‖); 175 of these workers (63 percent) shared their 
collective houses with other workers and 103 (37 percent) lived in the houses with their 
families. 
 
The researchers indicated that there were many issues surrounding crowding and a 
lack of adequate beds and cooking and dining facilities. Of the workers surveyed, 538 
(73 percent) shared a room with one to four other people, 131 (18 percent) shared a 
room with between 5 and 8 people, and 44 (six percent) shared a room with more than 
eight people. Workers only had small beds and only 118 workers (16 percent) reported 
that they had a mattress. Workers also lacked kitchen facilities and dining rooms, 
forcing them to use improvised stoves outdoors and to eat on the floor. 
 
Electricity 
 
Of the workers surveyed, 92 (12 percent) reported that they had access to electricity. 
Central Romana workers had the lowest rates of access to electricity. Only six percent 
of Central Romana workers surveyed reported that they had electricity, followed by 22 
percent of colonato workers, 27 percent of CEA workers, 41 percent of CAEI workers, 
and 62 percent of CAC workers. As bateyes housing CAC workers were not 
administered by the CAC, the higher level of access to electricity among CAC workers 
was not reflective of increased efforts of the company. 
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Drinking Water 
 
Of all the workers surveyed, 297 (40 percent) reported that they had access to drinking 
water. Central Romana workers had the lowest rates of access to potable drinking 
water. In Central Romana‘s Batey Guazuma (Magdalena Division), for example, 
workers and their families had one well for 69 homes. Over 60 percent of CAC and 
CAEI workers surveyed reported that they had access to drinking water, while 30 to 40 
percent of workers employed by other employers reported that they had access to 
drinking water. 
 
Sanitary Services 
 
Of the workers surveyed, 364 (49 percent) had access to sanitary services. The only 
employer that provided access to sanitary services to more than half of workers 
surveyed was Central Romana (with 58 percent), followed by the CAC and CAEI (with 
approximately 30 percent each), the colonato (with 23 percent), and CEA (with 15 
percent). In many cases, even when workers were provided with sanitary services, the 
bathrooms or toilets were closed or cannot be used due to their poor sanitary 
conditions.  
 
 
Food 
 
Workers and their families depended almost entirely on colmados and bodegas located 
in the bateyes for their food, as they did not generally have their own parcels of land on 
which they could grow subsistence crops and did not have access to affordable food 
programs or grocery stores outside of the bateyes. Although CAC and Central Romana 
claimed to have programs that offered workers food at affordable prices, workers 
interviewed were not aware of these programs. High food prices combined with low 
wages forced 332 workers (45 percent) to buy food "on credit" at least part of the time, 
including with vouchers (see Induced Indebtedness).  
 
Of the workers surveyed, 47 (six percent) reported 
that their employer provided them with food and 242 
(33 percent) reported that their employer provided 
them with water. Research indicates that CAC and 
CAEI have begun to distribute lunches to the 
workers during the harvest (and CAEI also 
distributed a gallon of water). However, workers 
complained that the distribution was very irregular 
and that they were provided with small amounts of low-quality food. Central Romana 
does do not provide lunches for the workers, so workers generally prepare their own 
food or buy food from independent cooks. CEA workers were not provided with food. 
Many workers interviewed reported that they brought something to eat to the cutting 
area or bought food for DOP 75 (USD 2) to DOP 100 (USD 3). Some workers 
interviewed reported that they ate sugar cane to keep up their energy level. 
Table 21: Provision of 
Transport, Water, and Lunch 
Workers 
provided with 
No. Percent 
Transport  564 76% 
Water 242 33% 
Lunch  47 6% 
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Transport  
 
Of the workers surveyed, 564 (76 percent) reported that their employer provided them 
with transportation. Traditionally, braceros had to walk to the cutting area, which 
increased the amount of time and energy that they had to expend. In recent years, 
however, some employers have begun to transport workers on buses or trucks. This 
system has been put in place not only as a benefit to workers, but also because of the 
increased distance between workers‘ homes and the cutting areas. Still, 163 workers 
(22 percent) surveyed reported that they had to get to the cutting areas on their own, 
either by walking or asking for a ride from a tractor or truck. 
 
 
Child Labor 
 
Until 2007, there had been numerous complaints about the widespread use of child 
labor in the planting and harvesting of sugar cane. When the researchers asked 
workers about child labor, all workers answered that it was not allowed by the 
employers and that employers did not hire minors. However, the researchers did find 
some cases of child and juvenile labor and stress that the reduction of child labor has 
been fairly recent, and it is thus important to maintain efforts to combat child labor to 
ensure that it does not resurface. For example, according to key informants, 2010 was 
the first harvest in which Central Romana carried out an effective ban on child labor.   
 
The researchers detected two cases of child labor concerning boys of nine and twelve 
years of age who were employed cutting cane.47 The nine year-old resided in a CAEI 
batey and the 12 year-old resided in a CEA batey. The researchers were only able to 
interview the nine year-old, who reported that he had worked helping his father to 
harvest sugarcane since he was eight years old. He reported that he was currently 
helping other picadores, who paid him DOP 50 (USD 1) per day to help harvesting 
cane. He reported that he only worked during the hours that he did not attend school. 
This reflects a common phenomenon, especially in CAEI bateyes, in which laborers 
who are not directly employed by the companies (and lack a worker ID card) harvest 
cane for workers directly employed by CAEI. The workers pay these ―helpers‖ a portion 
of the amount that they receive per ton of cane harvested. This mechanism increases 
the possibility of child labor, as these workers are not directly hired by the companies. 
 
In addition, the researchers found cases of juvenile labor in the sugarcane sector. 
Ministry of Labor Resolution No. 52-2004 determined that the planting and harvesting of 
sugar cane constituted a dangerous job for all minors under the age of 18, which makes 
it a worst form of child labor in which no minor under the age of 18 should be working. 
Despite this prohibition, the researchers found and surveyed ten adolescents between 
the ages 15 and 17. In the interviews, researchers were informed that some ingenios, 
especially the CEA, used workers between the ages of 15 and 17 years to plant 
sugarcane. In a CEA batey, a 17 year-old worker was interviewed who reported that he 
had been cutting cane for several years, during which he had not been studying, as he 
left school in second grade. He said he had to work "because my family is poor and you 
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have to work to not go hungry." Researchers interviewed a 15 year-old "seed picker" 
(―picasemillas‖) at a CEA batey who reported that he earned DOP 50 (USD 1) per tarea, 
but that he only worked when he did not attend school. Researchers also interviewed a 
15 year-old CAC worker who had come to the batey at 14 years of age on his own and 
was cutting cane.  
 
 
Worker Satisfaction  
 
Of the workers surveyed, 685 (93 percent) reported that they did not think that the 
conditions had improved much over the past few years. Only four workers interviewed 
(less than one percent) reported that they thought that conditions had improved. Of 
workers surveyed, 525 (71 percent) indicated that the main change that they would like 
to see is fair payment of wages. Additionally 111 workers (15 percent) reported feeling 
dissatisfied with their treatment by their superiors, including 77 (69 percent) who 
reported that the foreman "talked bad" to them, 11 (ten percent) who reported "hard 
work and low pay," six (less than one percent) who reported that they ―treat them like 
animals," and five (less than one percent) who reported that they were cheated in the 
weighing of the sugarcane. Other recurring complaints surrounded poor living 
conditions, especially in relation to a lack of electricity and drinking water, and that 
employer representatives did not listen to or respond to their complaints. 
 
Workers also made much reference to how hard it is to cut cane. One worker 
interviewed stated, ―Sometimes one cannot get up the next day … we are experiencing 
misery.‖ Another worker interviewed for an in-depth interview in a CAC batey said, 
―There are days when one does not eat … if you work they should give you food, at 
mid-day, when the sun is hot, they should give you a place to rest so that you can then 
return to work. You almost do not get hungry, I mean, it is a job that becomes difficult.‖  
 
 
Conclusions  
 
This report has covered background information on the Dominican Republic and the 
sugar sector, the methodology that was developed to study the presence of indicators of 
forced labor in the Dominican sugar sector, findings on the presence of indicators of 
forced labor and other labor violations, and the factors that increase workers‘ 
vulnerability to labor exploitation. These findings are not statistically representative of 
the Dominican Republic or the sugar sector and this report does not claim to determine 
the existence or scale of forced labor in the Dominican Republic. However, the report 
does provide an overview of the indicators of forced labor and other forms of labor 
exploitation uncovered among sugar sector workers in the Dominican Republic, as well 
as factors that increase workers‘ vulnerability to labor exploitation. 
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Main Findings 
 
Using ILO guidance on ―Identifying forced labor in practice,‖ research detected evidence 
of the presence of the following indicators of lack of consent and menace of penalty, as 
well as other issues of concern: 
 
Lack of consent:  
 physical confinement in the work location,  
 psychological compulsion,  
 induced indebtedness,  
 deception or false promises about terms of work,  
 withholding and non-payment of wages, and  
 retention of identity documents. 
 
Menace of penalty (the actual presence or threat of):  
 physical violence against workers,  
 deportation,  
 dismissal from current employment,  
 exclusion from future employment, and  
 deprivation of food and shelter. 
 
Wages and hours: 
 subminimum wages,  
 the continued use of the voucher system,  
 illegal deductions,  
 working hours in excess of legal limits, and 
 a lack of days off. 
 
Other issues of concern:  
 a lack of benefits,  
 poor health services,  
 discrimination,  
 poor living conditions, and  
 child labor. 
 
 
Risk Factors 
 
An increased incidence of risk factors was detected amongst workers who were 
recruited to work for the CEA under the ―quota system,‖ including: 
 a higher incidence of being transported across the border by viaje (buscones in 
complicity with ingenios and government authorities), 
 deprivation of food and shelter during transportation to the bateyes, 
 a lack of employment contracts,  
 a lack of knowledge about payment mechanisms,  
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 a lack of control over where they would live and work,  
 retention of carnets, and 
 a higher level of surveillance and threats about leaving work. 
 
A higher rate of risk factors was detected amongst new workers (kongos), including:  
 an inability to communicate due to a lower level of Spanish, 
 a lack of a social network in the Dominican Republic, 
 a lack of knowledge about conditions of employment, 
 a higher rate of being recruited to work on specific bateyes by buscones, 
 a higher incidence of being transported across the border by viaje (buscones in 
complicity with ingenios and government authorities), 
 a higher rate of working for the CEA under the ―quota system,‖ and 
 a higher incidence of migration following the January 2010 earthquake in Haiti. 
 
 
Lessons Learned 
 
This research exposed some of the challenges of conducting research on hidden 
populations and vulnerable workers. These challenges included the inability to randomly 
sample respondents due to the lack of a list of workers, a lack of a list of all active 
bateyes, and the emergence of new issues, such as indebtedness to food stores, which 
were not captured on questionnaires. In addition, some of the factors that made workers 
more vulnerable to exploitation also made it difficult to obtain information from them. For 
example, workers with lower levels of education sometimes found it harder to 
understand payment mechanisms or answer researchers‘ questions about them.  
 
To try to overcome these challenges, researchers used multiple sources of both 
quantitative and qualitative information to triangulate findings and provide an accurate, 
nuanced picture of the Dominican sugar sector. This included a literature review; expert 
consultations with a wide variety of stakeholders; interviews with employers, 
supervisors, labor brokers, and other actors; focus groups; and qualitative and 
quantitative interviews with workers.  
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Appendix 1: Haitian Migration to the Dominican Sugar Sector 
 
At the beginning of the modern sugar industry in the Dominican Republic, cane cutters 
were predominantly Dominican. However, in the early twentieth century, sugar 
producers began to hire workers from English-speaking Caribbean islands, known as 
"cocolos," to do such work (Latorre, 1980). Thousands of workers were recruited by 
agents of private plantations from St. Kitts, Nevis, Anguilla, Antigua, Montserrat, and St. 
Martin (Smith, 1999). 
 
In 1919, in the midst of U.S. military occupation, Haitian labor was used for the first time 
to harvest sugarcane, after three executive orders issued by the occupation government 
(Cuello, 1997). This marked the beginning of the displacement of the Dominican labor 
force from this work despite the resistance of the peasantry. 
 
During the 1930s, with Trujillo in power, a process of regulating immigration and labor 
through the adoption of several laws on migration was put into place to hinder migration 
into the sugarcane sector and promote the use of Dominicans in the sector. In 1932, 
Trujillo passed an immigration bill that doubled the cost of entering the country for all 
foreigners (from USD 3 to USD 6), and mandated an annual payment of USD 6 for 
residence and the cost of ID cards. Dominican sugar companies and the U.S. 
government opposed these laws, objecting that the Act allowed for Haitian aliens not 
working in the sugar sector to be sentenced to work in "agricultural colonies of the state" 
until they could pay fines, "which amounted to virtual slavery." In 1934, Trujillo was 
forced to change the law to reduce the cost of entering the country for foreign laborers. 
A year later, Law No. 837 on "Dominicanization" of Labor (which required that 70 
percent of the employees of any company be Dominican) was passed.48 The following 
year, Trujillo relaxed the requirements of the law, allowing for foreigners with family 
members born and living in the Dominican Republic to be legally considered Dominican. 
In 1937, the National Congress - controlled by Trujillo - approved Law 1243, which 
sought to regulate within six months the status of all foreigners in the country (Caves, 
1999: 123 ff.). 
 
In October 1937, on the orders of Trujillo, thousands of Haitians were massacred in 
Dominican territory. Although no exact figures exist regarding this atrocity, many experts 
agree that at least 12,000 Haitians were killed in the border provinces of northern and 
central Dominican Republic.49 But the so-called "1937 massacre of Haitians" did not 
affect Haitians working in the sugar sector nor did it stop the seasonal migration of 
Haitians into this sector, which was far too important to the Dominican economy. On the 
other hand, this episode resulted in military control of the border to stop "illegal 
immigration" (Baez-Evertsz, 1986). 
 
In 1939, Trujillo passed Immigration Act No. 95, which required "that every individual 
who was not of the Caucasian or Native American descent, should pay DOP 500 (USD 
14) to reside in the Dominican Republic" while those of Caucasian or Native American 
descent only had to pay DOP 6 (USD 0.17). This law authorized sugar mills to recruit 
laborers through presidential decrees. At the same time, the regime encouraged 
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smuggling of Haitians to sugar plantations (Veras, 1985:26). 
 
In 1942, the Haitian government suspended "official" government recruitment of Haitian 
workers, resulting in periods in which there was a lack of braceros. This ushered in a 
new system in which the Dominican government resorted to sending troops to recruit 
Haitian men in non-sugar producing areas of the Dominican Republic and bringing them 
to the sugar plantations to work as braceros (Martinez, 1999). 
 
In 1952, Trujillo and the Haitian dictator, Francois Duvalier, signed an international 
convention on the recruitment of Haitian workers for the Dominican sugar harvest. This 
agreement marked the beginning of an institutionalized system of trafficking and 
exploitation that would last several decades under which thousands of Haitian migrants 
were victimized. Under the first agreement, 16,400 Haitian braceros were brought into 
the Dominican Republic (Gavigan, 1996:8). From 1952 until 1966, the recruitment of 
these workers was governed by three agreements approved by Congress, each with a 
duration of five years.  
 
Through these agreements, the Haitian government received between USD 1-2 million 
annually for the recruitment and transportation of a certain number of Haitian migrants. 
In turn, the Dominican government had to make guarantees regarding wages, 
transportation, housing, and medical insurance, among others. These guarantees were 
never observed. Furthermore, Haitian braceros recruited through this system were 
required by the agreements to stay on the plantations until the end of the harvest (ILO, 
1983: 126). The agreements allowed new mechanisms of coercion by legally tying the 
braceros to the ingenios that they were recruited to work for. Under this system, an 
illegal migrant could be arrested and sent to an ingenio under the pretext of having left 
his place of employment (Martinez, 1999). 
 
Beginning in 1971, the "recruitment" of braceros by Haitian authorities was coordinated 
by the CEA, although this entity was never expressly authorized to do so. The 
government also ceased to submit the agreements with Haiti to Congress for approval 
or publish the terms of the agreements. In 1980, for the first time in nearly ten years, the 
government made public the terms of the contract between the CEA and the Haitian 
government. It revealed the "commissions" for the Haitian government for the delivery of 
workers and the financial conditions of the contract, creating controversy both nationally 
and internationally (Cuello, 1997: 64 y ss).  
 
The "importation" of braceros, however, continued. According to some sources, while 
the private ingenios benefited from it, they claimed not to participate directly in the 
process. Roger Plant noted that of the 16,000 Haitians brought to the Dominican 
Republic by the CEA for the 1979-80 harvest, 14,000 were assigned to State ingenios, 
but 1,500 were delivered to Central Romana and 500 were delivered to ingenios owned 
by the Vicini Group (Plant, 1987: 79). Another source, however, reported that private 
ingenios owned by Central Romana and Vicini used "illegal laborers each year" hired 
through their own recruiters (Veras, 1985:29). 
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During the twelve years of the Joaquin Balaguer government (from 1966 to 1978), the 
"importation" of braceros remained relatively stable: 14,000 during the 1966-67 harvest, 
10,000 in 1967-68, and 12,000 between 1969 and 1977, with the exception of three 
years during which there was no contract (Plant, 1987: 93). By 1983, according to 
government statements, the Dominican sugar industry employed 44,800 agricultural 
workers, and between 12,000 and 14,000 were brought in under inter-governmental 
agreement (ILO, 1983: 186). 
 
Robert Plant in his book, Sugar and Modern Slavery: A Tale of Two Countries (1987) 
describes precisely how the recruitment of braceros worked. According to Plant, after 
the contract was signed between the Haitian and Dominican governments and a 
payment had been made to the Haitian government, Haitian public radio stations began 
to announce where Haitian workers should report for work, and gave a deceptive 
description of the working conditions and the pay that workers would receive. Due to the 
lack of decent paying jobs in Haiti, there were sometimes more applicants than there 
were positions for braceros (p. 87).  
 
In 1986, with the fall of the dictatorship of Jean Claude Duvalier (Baby Doc), the inter-
governmental contracting system died out. The Dominican sugar industry was without a 
labor force and the government had to resort to emergency measures to save the 
harvest, replacing the Haitian migrants with 5,000 Dominican soldiers (González Báez, 
1990). According to Plant (1987:3), that did not stop the military from forcing Haitians 
living in different parts of the country to work on sugar plantations. Thereafter, the CEA 
assured the supply of Haitian migrants to cut sugar cane, not through contracts with the 
Haitian authorities, but rather through buscones (called passeurs in Haiti) (Cuello, 
1997:67), who were labor brokers with experience recruiting workers and smuggling 
them to the sugar plantations (Ferguson, 2006). The end of the inter-governmental 
agreement system thus ushered in a system under which the majority of sugarcane 
workers were smuggled by buscones, who had previously co-existed with the inter-
governmental agreement system. This gave rise to the prevalence of amba-fils (Haitian 
workers who arrived illegally in the Dominican Republic). 
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Appendix 2: Legal Framework 
 
 
International Instruments 
 
The Dominican Republic has signed a number of treaties and international instruments 
that protect labor rights, including all eight of the International Labor Organization‘s 
(ILO) Core Conventions, which set out the principles and fundamental rights of workers, 
established by the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work 
(1998), as shown below: 
 
ILO Core Conventions Ratified by the DR 
Fundamental 
Principles or 
Rights 
Conventions Date of Ratification 
Freedom of 
Association and 
Collective 
Bargaining 
Freedom of Association and 
Protection of the Right to Organize 
Convention, 1948 (No. 87) 
December 5, 1956 
Right to Organize and Collective 
Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No. 
98) 
September 22, 1953 
Elimination of 
Forced or 
Compulsory 
Labor 
Forced Labor Convention, 1930 
(No. 29) 
December 5, 1956 
Abolition of Forced Labor 
Convention, 1957 (No. 105) 
June 23, 1958 
Elimination of 
Discrimination 
Equal Remuneration Convention, 
1951 (No. 100) 
September 22, 1953 
Discrimination (Employment and 
Occupation) Convention, 1958 (No. 
111) 
July 13, 1964 
Elimination of 
Child Labor 
Minimum Age Convention, 1973 
(No. 138) 
June 15, 1999 
Worst Forms of Child Labor 
Convention, 1999 (No. 182) 
November 15, 2000 
 
Regarding the protection of migrant workers, the Dominican Republic has ratified only 
the ILO Equality of Treatment (Accident Compensation) Convention 19.50 The 
Dominican Republic has not ratified ILO Convention No. 97 (1949) or Convention No. 
143 (1975) on migrant workers. 
 
It should be noted that the Dominican Republic has also ratified the main UN 
conventions on human rights, including provisions on the right to work and non-
discrimination, such as the Universal Declaration on Human Rights;51 the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; 52 the Convention on the Elimination 
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of All Forms of Racial Discrimination;53 and the Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination against Women.54 
 
The Free Trade Agreement between the United States, Central America, and 
Dominican Republic (DR-CAFTA) was ratified by the Dominican Republic in 2005. 
Chapter 16 refers to inter-country cooperation on the protection of labor rights. The 
agreement also highlights the parties‘ commitment to protecting labor.55  
 
 
Dominican Legal Framework 
 
Labor Law  
 
In the Dominican Republic, workers' rights are protected by the Constitution, the Labor 
Code, and other legislation and regulations. 
 
The new Dominican Constitution, promulgated on January 26, 2010, provides in Article 
62 that "Work is a right, a duty and a social function that is exercised with the protection 
and assistance of the State. Promoting decent work and pay is an essential function of 
the State. Public authorities shall promote dialogue and cooperation between workers, 
employers, and the state.‖ Article 62 also lists a number of principles and rights, such 
as: 
 Equality between men and women in employment. 
 The prohibition of discrimination in access to employment or services. 
 Freedom of association and the right to strike. 
 The right to just wages that provide workers with a decent life and allow them to 
cover their families‘ basic material, social and intellectual needs. 
 Other basic rights, including social security, collective bargaining, professional 
training, and respect for privacy and personal dignity. 
 
The Labor Code of the Dominican Republic (Law No. 16-92)56 was approved in 1992, 
and demonstrated the intention to comply with international standards set by the ILO. 
Among the main improvements in the 1992 Labor Code are the recognition of the right 
to fuero sindical (protection of union members),57 the right to strike in cases of disputes 
concerning the collective interest of workers,58 equality between men and women, the 
formal establishment of Labor Courts,59 and grievance mechanisms for labor disputes 
(Albuquerque, 1995: 46). 
 
The Code is supplemented by special laws and by Decree No. 258-93 of October 1, 
1993 and other executive orders and Ministry of Labor resolutions. 
 
Braceros' Legal Rights 
 
The Labor Code defines braceros as laborers who are employed exclusively in field 
work (Article 145). Braceros‘ employment contracts are covered by Title VI of the Labor 
Code, entitled "Del Trabajo del Campo," which defines field workers (trabajadores de 
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campo) as agricultural workers not engaged in industrial or commercial activities 
(Articles 277-278). 
 
The Labor Code provides that agricultural enterprises, including sugar ingenios, are 
subject to all of its provisions, except those related to working hours and the closure of 
businesses during holidays: 
  Instead of eight  hours per day, field workers can work ten hours per day (Article 
281), and 
 farms are not required to suspend their activities on Sundays and non-working 
days (religious and national holidays).60 
 
Article 208 of the Labor Code states that agricultural workers‘ wages should be paid at 
least every 14 days. Field workers are guaranteed all rights laid out in the Labor Code 
and supplementary rules regarding the minimum wage, days off, vacations, Christmas 
pay, and severance pay.  
 
The minimum wage is set by the National Wage Committee. For sugar sector workers, 
the minimum wage was established by Resolution No. 1 / 2010 as RD 110 (USD 3) per 
eight-hour workday, to be increased or decreased proportionately according to the 
number of hours worked. 
 
Article 30 of the Labor Code states that the "seasonal" employment contracts of workers 
in the sugar industry are to be deemed valid for an indefinite period of time unless 
otherwise provided for by law or collective agreement. The Code states that the working 
time of workers who are employed for several consecutive seasons should be accrued 
in order to determine the benefits and rights to which they are entitled. 
 
Labor law gives foreign workers the same rights as Dominican workers. However, it also 
calls for a "nationalization of work" by demanding that Dominican nationals comprise at 
least 80 percent of workers in an enterprise (Article 135). Agro-industrial companies are 
exempted from complying with these provisions because the Labor Code authorizes the 
Executive to grant permits each year to such companies to employ braceros in excess 
of the legal limit (Article 145). 
 
Regarding the minimum age for field work in the sugar industry, Ministry of Labor 
Resolution No. 52/2004 of August 13, 2004 has defined the planting, cutting, and 
transport of sugarcane as dangerous and unhealthy work not suitable for individuals 
under the age of 18.61 
 
Social Security 
 
Article 60 of the Constitution states that, ―everyone has the right to social security. The 
State shall encourage the progressive development of the social security system to 
ensure universal access to adequate protections against diseases, disability, 
unemployment and old age.‖ 
 
  P a g e  | 88 
The right to Social Security is guaranteed by the Constitution and Social Security Act 
No. 87-01 of 2001, which created the Dominican Social Security System (SDSS). This 
system is universal and compulsory and comprises health, old age, disability, and 
occupational hazard insurance. 
 
Despite the assertion that access to social security is ―universal,‖ Law 87-01 states that 
the only beneficiaries of the system are "Dominican citizens and legal residents in the 
country" (Article 5). This provision excludes workers whose residence in the country is 
not legal (i.e. the vast majority workers of Haitian descent). The exclusion represents a 
setback in terms of protection of migrant rights, as the old Social Security Act of 1948 
(No. 1896) provided compulsory social security insurance regardless of gender, 
nationality, occupation, or type of employer.62 
 
Given the legal loophole left by Law 87-01, the National Social Security Fund (CNSS) 
attempted to find a temporary solution. In August 2007, Resolution No. 165-07 was 
issued, authorizing the SDSS to continue providing health services to migrant temporary 
construction, agricultural, and port workers, and required that employers continue to 
make payments into the social security system on these workers‘ behalf for a period of 
90 days.  
 
Although the Resolution expired in 2007, as the CNSS took no subsequent action, the 
Resolution has continued to be implemented, mainly in construction, but also in the 
sugar sector to ensure that workers excluded from the Dominican Social Security 
System are provided with minimum health insurance coverage. 
 
Workplace Health and Safety and Living Conditions 
 
The Dominican Constitution protects the "right to integral health". Article 61 states that 
the government must ensure all peoples‘ access to clean water, nutrition, health 
services, sanitation, prevention and treatment of all diseases, quality medications, and 
medical and hospital care. The Constitution further requires that all employers ensure 
that their employees work in a safe, hygienic, healthy, and adequate working 
environment (Article 62.8). 
 
The Labor Code includes rules allowing workers to resign (i.e. to terminate their labor 
contracts without liability) if the employer fails to protect them from "a serious threat to 
the safety or health of the worker" (section 97.11). The Labor Code also sets out severe 
criminal penalties for employer violations of these standards (Article 720.3). 
 
In 2006, the Executive approved the Regulations on Safety and Health at Work (No. 
522-06), which regulate working conditions and the prevention of workplace accidents 
and damage to workers‘ health. The Regulations require that employers eliminate all 
physical and mental threats to workers‘ health and safety (Article 2.21). It also 
guarantees workers‘ right "to participate in the design, adoption and implementation of 
preventive actions" by workplace Committees on Workplace Health and Safety (Article 
4.2). In addition, the Regulations list employers‘ obligations, including to ensure the 
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safety and health of workers in all aspects of work (Article 6.1 .1) without any cost to 
workers (section 6.1.4).  
 
The Regulations lay out the precautionary measures that companies must take to 
protect workplace health and safety (Article 7) and require, among other things, the 
design and implementation of "Workplace Health and Safety Programs " on a regular 
basis. Finally, the Regulations empower the Directorate of Industrial Safety and Health 
of the Ministry of Labor to prevent and control the risks of occupational accidents and 
diseases through evaluations, investigations, and monitoring (Article 3). They also 
establish the obligations of workers, who must comply with preventative measures laid 
out in the labor laws, as well as by employers (Article 5). 
 
In 2007, the Secretary of Labor adopted Resolution No. 04-2007, to complement and 
ensure the implementation of Regulation 522-06 and Social Security Law 87-01. The 
Resolution establishes requirements regarding workplace health and safety in all 
economic sectors, as well as requirements for workplace health and safety "conditions‖ 
for specific sectors (particularly construction, offices, and mines). The following are 
some of the most important requirements: 
 Ensure that the worksites and tools are in good condition. 
 Ensure access to a sufficient quantity of drinking water or other healthy beverage 
and indicate the sources of drinking water. 
 Ensure the maintenance and cleanliness of sanitary facilities (which must include 
sinks, toilets and showers) "in the vicinity of the workplace.‖ 
  Ensure that there is a portable, well-equipped first aid kit. 
 
Forced Labor and Human Trafficking  
 
Regarding the prohibition of forced labor and human trafficking and other forms of 
servitude, the new Constitution of the Dominican Republic represents an important 
advance because for the first time it expressly: 
 regulates the rights, guarantees, and fundamental duties of individuals and 
includes a ban on all forms of slavery, servitude, and trafficking in persons 
(Article 41); 
 prohibits anyone from forcing another person to work against his or her will; and  
 states that the deprivation of liberty should only be used for convicted criminals 
and that their incarceration shall not involve forced labor (Article 40).  
 
However, the Dominican Republic lacks specific legislation on the prevention and 
punishment of forced or compulsory labor. The Penal Code neither defines nor 
sanctions forced labor. The Labor Code only refers to forced labor implicitly, referring to 
the voluntary nature of employment contracts in its Fundamental Principle II, stating 
"every person is free to pursue any profession or trade, industry or commerce allowed 
by law. Nobody can prevent others from working or force them to work against their 
will." 
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Only the Code for the Protection of the Rights of Children and Adolescents (Código 
para la Protección de los Derechos de los Niños, Niñas y Adolescentes), Law 136-03, 
explicitly sanctions forced labor in Article 25. This article bans the sale of children and 
adolescents in various forms and prohibits forced labor as an internationally recognized 
worst form of child labor. The Act provides for penalties of 20-30 years imprisonment 
and fines of 150 minimum monthly wages for those who subject minors to forced labor. 
 
Law on Human Trafficking and Migrant Smuggling (No. 137-03)  
 
The Dominican Republic is a country of origin, transit, and destination for victims of 
human trafficking (CITIM, 2009).  
 
The government‘s actions to combat human trafficking have been minimal. In 2003, the 
Dominican Republic passed a law on Smuggling of Migrants and Trafficking in Persons 
(No. 137-03), which defines, explicitly prohibits, and establishes sanctions for both 
offenses, as well as prevention and prosecution guidelines. The law recognizes the 
seriousness of human trafficking and the various forms it takes, stating that "millions of 
people, mostly women, children, and adolescents, are deceived, sold, coerced or 
otherwise subjected to situations of slavery, sexual exploitation, forced labor and other 
forms of exploitation." 
 
The law defines the crime of human trafficking (based on the definition of the Palermo 
Protocol) as "the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt of persons by 
means of threat, force, coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or 
vulnerability or the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of 
a person having control over another person, for purposes of exploitation, to exercise 
any form of sexual exploitation, pornography, debt bondage, forced labor or services, 
servile marriage, illegal adoption, slavery and/or similar practices, or the removal of 
organs "(Article 1). 
 
In turn, the law establishes the Smuggling of Migrants as "facilitating the entry, exit, 
transit or passage of a person illegally into the country or abroad, without fulfilling the 
legal requirements to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other benefit " (Article 1). 
 
These definitions make clear the differences between human trafficking and human 
smuggling, but these terms are often confused or used interchangeably, especially 
since the term trata de personas (human trafficking) is confused with the term tráfico de 
ilícito de personas (human smuggling). The main distinction is that human trafficking is 
a violation of human rights and can occur both within and outside of national 
boundaries, while smuggling is an offense against the state and requires crossing a 
national border. In addition, smuggled people generally consent to be illegally 
transported to another country; while in trafficking, consent is achieved through 
coercion, deceit, or threats. Finally, victims of trafficking are exploited sexually or 
through forced labor, while people who are smuggled generally do not maintain a 
relationship with their smuggler after they are transported and are thus not victims of 
ongoing exploitation (CITIM, 2009). 
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Finally, under the law, there are stiffer prison sentences for human trafficking and larger 
financial penalties for human smuggling. Law 137-03 provides for a penalty of 15 to 20 
years imprisonment and a fine of 175 minimum monthly wages for the crime of human 
trafficking and imprisonment of 10 to 15 years and a fine of 150 to 250 minimum 
monthly wages for human smuggling (articles 2 and 3). The law further states that both 
individuals and corporations may be convicted of these crimes, with corporations being 
subjected to additional penalties (Article 4). 
 
Migration 
 
In 2004, Congress passed Republic Act No. 285-04 on Migration (LGM). This law 
regulates migration, emigration, and the return of nationals (Article 1), recognizing 
international migration as "one of the most important social processes of the Dominican 
nation at the beginning of XXI Century". 
 
The Act defines the categories and sub-categories of foreigners (who are classified as 
non-residents) and immigration and residency requirements and procedures, as well as 
procedures to combat human trafficking and human smuggling. It also establishes the 
rights and duties of foreigners, promotes the regularization of migrants (via a 
regularization plan), and includes regulations on the birth of children of foreigners in the 
Dominican Republic. 
 
The Act stipulates that workers "entitled to work" in the Dominican Republic are covered 
by labor and social protections (Article 26). It also states that when foreigners are 
deported, it must be done "with due respect for human rights, as provided in existing 
laws and agreements ratified by the Dominican Republic" (Article 27). 
 
The implementation of the Act is delegated to the Ministry of the Interior and the Police 
(through the Directorate General of Immigration) (Article 5). However, the Act also 
created the National Migration Council (CNM), composed of representatives of 11 
institutions, responsible for implementing immigration policy (Article 7) and policy design 
and planning (Article 9.2), among other functions. Under the Act, the CNM must form a 
National Migration Institute for technical support and to aid in the "design, promotion, 
and implementation of studies on international migration" (Article 11). 
 
Section (XI) of the Act regulates the entry into the Dominican Republic of "temporary 
workers," defined as a sub-category of non-residents, including "all foreigners who enter 
the country to offer their labor services for a given time, and under contract" (Article 
36.5). The CNM is given the authority to determine the sectors of the economy that 
need to bring in "temporary workers"63 and to establish quotas per sector as a result of 
consultations with producers, employers, and trade unions (Article 49). 
 
Article 36 adds that seasonal work contracts in the sugar sector shall be of a temporary 
nature, thereby ensuring that braceros remain temporary workers unable to obtain 
"regular status" once the harvest has ended. 
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Article 49 prohibits the employment of temporary workers in free trade zones or tourism, 
except in border areas. 
 
The definition of temporary workers is split into two types of workers: those recruited 
individually, and those recruited through "quotas". Article 50 of the Act establishes that 
individual workers must apply for admission into the Dominican Republic to a Dominican 
Consulate and provide necessary documentation. Under the "quota system,‖ an 
application for admission to the Directorate General of Immigration may be made by the 
individual or by a company interested in hiring migrant laborers. The law requires that 
the applicant ensures compliance with requirements on labor rights and working 
conditions, provision of information to workers, transportation, travel expenses, and 
repatriation (Article 51). 
 
The law establishes that individuals who are physically disabled, have a contagious 
disease, or lack necessary identification documents may not be admitted into the 
Dominican Republic as temporary workers under Article 53.  
 
Article 54 states that immediately after clearing customs, temporary migrant workers 
(under the individual and quota systems) must be provided with a "temporary worker 
card" (carnet de trabajador de temporero).64 This card enables foreign workers "to 
perform the gainful activity for which they were admitted, for the authorized period of 
time and within the authorized area." According to the law, a worker may be considered 
an "illegal alien subject to deportation‖ due to the lack of a carnet, the failure to carry a 
carnet outside of the authorized work area or expiration of a carnet (Article 56). This 
restricts foreign workers‘ freedom of movement and creates the menace of penalty for 
failing to carry a valid carnet or for traveling outside of the authorized area. 
 
The Act requires that employers contracting temporary workers obtain a surety bond for 
each worker hired under the quota system (Article 57) to ensure compliance with their 
responsibility for repatriating the temporary workers upon eight days after the expiration 
of their contracts (Article 58). 
 
In 2007, the Dominican government passed Circular 17 and Resolution 12, thereby 
requiring that the civil registry investigate the birth certificates of individuals born to 
foreigners for irregularities. Under these provisions, when a person of Haitian origin 
solicits a Dominican birth certificate from the civil registry, they may be investigated to 
ensure that no fraud is being committed. In addition, on January 26, 2010, the 
Dominican Constitution was amended to require that in order for children born in the 
Dominican Republic to obtain citizenship, at least one of their parents must be a legal 
resident of the Dominican Republic. In practice, it was reported that individuals of 
Haitian ancestry who solicited their birth certificates (even when one parent was 
Dominican) were told that their issuance had been suspended due to investigations, but 
that investigations were not in fact taking place. There have also been reports that these 
provisions have been used to discriminate against individuals of Haitian descent, who 
need birth certificates and citizenship to graduate from high school, register in higher 
education, obtain a passport, register for social security, and to get married.65 
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It should be noted that these laws have been widely debated due to controversy 
surrounding provisions on the right to Dominican nationality and other provisions 
considered discriminatory against Haitians and Dominican-born children of Haitian 
descent. This led a group of civil society organizations to file a suit before the Supreme 
Court, claiming that the law was unconstitutional. The Supreme Court held that the law 
was constitutional.66 In addition, the full implementation of Republic Act No. 285-04 on 
Migration depends upon the drafting and approval of General Regulations and the 
Migration Regularization Plan. 
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Appendix 3: History of the Sugar Sector 
 
Dominican sugar production goes back to the beginning of the seventeenth century with 
the creation of rudimentary mills, called trapiches (Latorre, 1988). The modern sugar 
industry emerged in the late nineteenth century, driven by Cuban investors who began 
to invest in the Dominican Republic, as a result of the Cuban ten-year war, bringing the 
country's capital, technology, and business knowledge to the Dominican sugar sector. 
Between 1875 and 1895, more than 30 mills driven by steam were built and in 1896 
sugar production reached 36,000 tons (Madruga, 1986). 
 
Between 1900 and 1914, the sugar industry was affected by low prices and U.S. 
preferential treatment of Puerto Rican and Cuban sugar. Later, however, sugar price 
increases during the First World War caused the expansion and domination of the 
Dominican sugar industry by U.S. monopolies (Evertsz Báez, 1986). 
 
During the U.S. occupation of the Dominican Republic (1916-1924), an industrial model 
was implemented, which transformed the Dominican economy from a subsistence 
economy to an agro-export economy. U.S. control of the Dominican Republic resulted in 
the increased presence of U.S. companies in the country and ushered in a period of 
economic integration between the two nations, creating the so-called "enclave 
economy" (Madruga, 1986). This led to the modernization of the sugar industry and the 
definitive replacement of the Dominican labor force by foreign workers, first from the 
Virgin Islands and then from Haiti (Báez-Evertsz, 1978). 
 
By 1920, the sugar industry was concentrated in three business groups: the Vicini 
family, the Cuban-Dominican sugar company, and the South Porto Rico Sugar 
Company, which managed to insert in the Constitution of 1924 (Article 89) a prohibition 
on taxes on exports ( Cuevas, 1999: 122). 
 
Sugar production would remain controlled by foreign capital up until the 1950‘s, when 
the dictator Rafael L. Trujillo, in the name of "national interest," declared the sugar 
sector the "high priority of the regime." The Trujillo regime benefitted significantly from 
the increase in world sugar prices (Cuevas, 1999: 161). In 1948, Trujillo created three 
new mills67 and between 1952 and 1956 nationalized nine of the thirteen mills that were 
owned by foreigners.68 
 
The 1950‘s also marked the last period of growth in terms of total volume of sugar 
production and the establishment of new mills. In 1958, 838,000 tons of sugar were 
produced, about 700,000 of which were exported. At that time, Britain was the leading 
importer of Dominican sugar and only 58,000 tons were destined for the United States 
(Latorre, 1988). With the triumph of the Cuban revolution in 1959 and the subsequent 
suspension and annulment of the Cuban sugar quota by the United States, the Cuban 
quota of 3.2 million tons was redistributed among other countries and the U.S. came to 
monopolize Dominican sugar exports. In 1960, the Dominican Republic increased its 
sugar exports to the U.S. market by 300 percent, for a total of 460,000 tons. At that 
time, Trujillo controlled twelve of the sixteen ingenios in the country.69 
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In May 1961, Trujillo was executed and in November his family members were exiled. In 
1962, with the final collapse of the dictatorship, there were two important developments 
for the sugar sector: first, the mills owned by Trujillo were transferred to the Dominican 
government,70 and secondly, the economic sanctions imposed on the Dominican 
Republic by the Organization of American States (OAS) against the Trujillo regime were 
lifted. This led to an increase in the share of sugar exports to the U.S. by 130 percent, to 
863,000 metric tons of sugar. With the new U.S. preferential market access, the 
Dominican Republic‘s dependence on U.S. sugar policy increased. (Cuevas, 1999: 181-
2). 
 
In 1966 the State Sugar Council (CEA) was created as an autonomous body 
responsible for managing state-owned mills. In 2003, the CEA produced over 60 
percent of Dominican sugar, making it the leading company in the country (CEA, 2003). 
 
Until the 1980‘s, when the worst crisis in the sugar sector‘s history began, the country 
was extremely dependent on sugar exports. Between 1975 and 1981, an annual 
average of 775,715 tons of sugar was exported. In 1982, there were 16 mills producing 
1.2 million metric tons of raw sugar (TMVC). But by 1988, there were indications of the 
sugar crisis: two of the state mills had closed, CEA production was reduced by 50 
percent, and significant portions of the sugar lands were ceded to private hands for 
production of "nontraditional" agricultural products (CESDEM, 2007). 
 
The collapse of the sugar sector was exacerbated by a number of factors, both 
international and domestic. Internationally, the development and commercialization of 
high fructose corn syrup as a sugar substitute in the U.S. led to a reduction of the sugar 
quota, reaching only 123,000 tons in 1988 (Latorre, 1988) . This also caused the price 
of sugar to fall significantly from USD 0.19 per pound in the early eighties to USD 0.04 
in 1985. At the national level, a decisive reduction in the levels of productivity, a lack of 
investment, inefficiency in the administration of the mills, and high levels of corruption in 
the CEA led to further decline of the sugar sector (Wooding, Moseley-Williams, 2004).71  
 
Between 1989 and 1999 the preferential sugar quota for the Dominican Republic was 
reduced by more than sixty percent, from 460,996 to only 190,657 metric tons. 
However, private sugar companies (Central Romana and Grupo Vicini), which were not 
affected by this reduction or by the State production decline, started to produce almost 
70 percent of sugar in 1996 and became the main exporters. They were assigned 45 
and ten percent of the sugar quota, respectively (Cuevas, 1999: 217). 
 
The final significant change that the industry experienced in the last five years of the 
twentieth century was a result of the enactment of the Ley general de Reforma de la 
Empresa Pública No. 141-97 in 1997. The law promoted the reform and privatization of 
public enterprises in order to ensure "efficient management." The state sugar industry 
embarked on this process by allowing private entities to lease state-owned sugar mills 
for thirty-years, resulting in the transfer of administration of the CEA mills to Dominican 
and foreign investors.72 The ten CEA mills were leased in late 1999, recording the 
lowest sugar production in its history at 59,000 metric tons. 
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Although that process allowed some of the CEA-owned mills to continue to operate 
temporarily, most of the leases with private groups did not go beyond the 2004-2005 
harvest. Out of the CEA’s Barahona, Boca Chica, Consuelo, and Montellano sugar 
mills, only the first remained in operation in 2011, and was administered by CAC. 
 
In recent years the price of sugar recorded a significant increase due to a number of 
factors: the rise of renewable energy sources such as ethanol and biomass, the 
decrease in production in some countries due to climate change, and growing demand 
from countries like China. The price of raw sugar (which is listed on the NYSE) went 
from USD 0.07 per pound in 1999 to USD 0.24 in 2009 (EFE, 2009). By January 2011, 
the price of raw sugar reached the highest price in decades, standing at USD 0.30 per 
pound. However, the price fell to USD 0.24 in April, and in June 2011, prices went up 
slightly to USD 0.25 per pound.73 Experts estimated that in 2011-2012 there would be a 
production increase of 5.8 percent.74 The increased price of sugar has generated an 
increase in world sugar production, which was as high as 158.2 million tons in 2010, a 
rise of four percent compared with 2009 (INAZUCAR, 2010). 
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In 2011, the Dominican Republic had a 
total of 106,000 hectares of sugarcane 
planted and produced a total of 520,878 
tons or raw and refined sugar for both 
local consumption and export. It also 
produced about 30 million gallons of 
molasses and more than twenty 
thousand tons of furfural, both derived 
from sugarcane (INAZUCAR, 2009). 
The total sugar production in the 
Dominican Republic has increased 
slightly since 2000. Currently, the 
Dominican Republic‘s sugar production 
is about equal to that of the mid-nineties, 
but much lower than production in 1986. 
 
The decline in sugar production has been accompanied by a reduction in the area under 
cultivation and the total number of jobs created by the sugar sector. The table below 
compares the area planted, the amount of raw sugar produced, and the amount of 
refined sugar produced in the Dominican Republic from 1980 to 2010. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The sugar industry now represents less than one percent of the Dominican Republic‘s 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Similarly, the number of mills has declined 
dramatically: only three private ingenios produced over 96 percent of all sugar in 2010 
(INAZUCAR, 2010).  In recent years, the sugar sector has experienced slight economic 
growth: according to Central Bank data, in 2009 the sector grew by 4.5 percent from 
production increases of five percent in raw sugar production and 5.8 percent in refined 
sugar production (Central Bank, 2009). This increase was due, among other factors, to 
the improved international marketing of Dominican sugar.75  
Production of Sugarcane and Derivatives in 
the DR (1986-2010)  
Source:INAZUCAR 
Year 
Surface 
Area 
Planted 
Raw 
Sugarcane 
Refined 
Sugar 
Hect???s?? M???????????????????? TVC 
1986 255,008 8,904,663 866,872 
1990 205,560 6,483,455 589,658 
1995 219,202 5,442,473 508,314 
2000 142,891 6,549,180 437,868 
2005 116,389 4,858,059 463,856 
2010 106, 939 -- 504,900 
Dominican Sugar Industry 1980 and 2010 
 1980 2010 
Area Planted 200,000  106, 939^ 
Percentage of GDP 5 percent 0.9 percent* 
Sugar production  1.3 million 504,900^ 
Number of Ingenios 16  4  
Colonos (percent of 
National production) 
7,200 (40 
percent of 
sugarcane) 
 3,000 -aprox- 
(32 percent of 
sugarcane^) 
Jobs created 80,000 30,000^ 
Number of braceros 49,000**  10,000^ 
Source: *Banco Central, 2009; ^INAZUCAR (Informes 2009-
10), Latorre (1980), **Báez Evertsz, 1986. 
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The Dominican Republic sells sugar and its derivatives, furfural and molasses, both 
nationally and internationally, to the U.S., the European Union, and other countries.76 
Exports to the United States reached 185,000 tons in 2009, and increased by ten 
percent after the signing of DR-CAFTA. The United Kingdom received 30,000 tons in 
2009, but there were no exports to the EU in 2010.77 According to INAZUCAR, 215,945 
tons of sugar valued at USD 111.2 million had been exported from the 2009/2010 
harvest as of June 2010, a significant increase of 22.2 percent over 2009. Exports of 
molasses and furfural totaled USD 10.5 and USD 16.8 million, respectively (INAZUCAR, 
2010). 
 
In 2009, 326,477 tons of sugar were consumed domestically. Surprisingly, the 
Dominican Republic often has to import sugar due to shortages and speculation. In 
2010, for example, according to INAZUCAR, hoarding, speculation, and smuggling of 
sugar to Haiti led to the importation of 70,000 tons of sugar, valued at USD 53 million 
(INAZUCAR, 2010), in a year in which total exports exceeded USD 100 million. 
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Appendix 4: Sugar Producers 
 
 
Consorcio Azucarero Central, C. x A. (CAC) 
 
Since 1999, CAC has administered Ingenio Barahona, which is owned by the CEA and 
leased to CAC.78 CAC is owned by the Guatemalan Grupo Campollo and Dominican 
investors. 
 
CAC‘s contribution to the DR‘s total sugar output has increased in recent years. Ingenio 
Barahona currently produces about ten percent of all sugar in the Dominican Republic, 
including 63,478 tons of sugar in 2009 and more than 68,000 tons in 2010. In 2010, 
Ingenio Barahona registered the largest harvest in 25 years (INAZUCAR, 2010). 
 
CAC is also the company that has achieved the highest levels of mechanization in the 
past ten years (80 percent according to the INAZUCAR -2009), which has significantly 
decreased the number of picadores it uses from 4,000 in 2000 to 350 in 2011. 
 
The main problem that CAC has faced is fires on its sugar plantations in the provinces 
of Bahoruco, Barahona, and Independencia. In 2010, about 80,000 tons of sugarcane 
were burned, resulting in large losses for the company. 
 
Union and Collective Agreement: 
 
CAC currently has two unions, the Sindicato de Picadores de Caña del Ingenio 
Barahona (formed in 1986) and the Sindicato Unitario de Trabajadores del Consorcio 
Azucarero Central (created in 2000 after the privatization process). Both unions signed 
a collective agreement that ―benefits all employees except management, supervisors, 
inspectors, security, monitors or quality control [...]." 
 
The Agreement reinforces rights provided for by the Labor Code, including: a bonus 
comprising ten percent of profits at the end of the fiscal year (in accordance with Article 
223 of the Labor Code), a Christmas bonus, vacation time, double time for working on 
days off, and overtime pay, among others. Moreover, beyond their legal obligations, the 
company is committed to ensuring additional ―privileges‖ such as loans for home 
furnishings, staff training through programs with INFOTEP, a ―alimentos de primera 
necesidad‖ program by which workers may buy food from stores through payroll 
deductions, a Christmas celebration for workers, financial assistance in case of death of 
relatives, and a contribution to school fees for the children of workers. 
 
The Agreement also provides certain benefits for cane cutters, including: 
- Medical workshops for all picadores; 
- A vaccination and de-worming program.; 
- Motivational workshops in all bateyes; 
- Dinner the night before the start of the harvest; 
- Festivals and awards, once every two months; 
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- A ―DR Assistance Bonus‖ of DOP 11.00 (USD 0.28) per day ; 
- A ―DR Productivity Bonus‖ of DOP 5.00 (USD 0.13) per ton if over two tons are 
harvested; 
- An end of harvest bonus of DOP 5.00 (USD 0.13) per ton harvested; 
- Transportation to and from the workplace; 
- Company provided lunch at the workplace; 
- Transfer to the batey at the start of each harvest, a mattress, a plate, a spoon, and 
potable water; 
- Tools. 
 
Social Investment 
 
CAC has established a "social assistance program" that includes improvements to living 
conditions, support for agricultural production, and micro-loans, among other things 
(CEA, 2006). Unlike other ingenios, according to CAC representatives, the bateyes 
where CAC workers live are independent of CAC and the vast majority of its inhabitants 
do not depend on the company for work or shelter.79  
 
CAC made a social investment of USD 4 million between 2003 and 2008 (INAZUCAR, 
2009). The social investment of CAC is significantly less than the two other major 
private sugar companies (partly because of this separation from the bateyes). According 
to the directors of CAC, social investments include infrastructure improvements in the 
barracones; prizes for the best workers (every two months the 15 best workers are 
awarded televisions, stoves, radios, etc.); parties; and educational seminars for workers 
in Creole (as set out in the Collective Agreement). 
 
 
Consorcio Azucarero de Empresas Industriales (CAEI) 
 
The CAEI was founded in 1859 by Juan Bautista Vicini Canepa, who created several 
ingenios in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. In 1921, the family 
business, Cristóbal Colón C x A., acquired Ingenio Cristóbal Colón (which was founded 
in 1883). 
 
CAEI comprises Ingenio Cristóbal Colón and Ingenio Angelina (although the only 
currently operating ingenio is Ingenio Cristóbal Colón), which today is one of the most 
important businesses in the Dominican Republic. The ingenio is dedicated to the 
production of cane sugar and molasses and the cultivation and marketing of mangoes, 
pineapple, livestock, and construction. As for sugar production, CAEI was the second 
largest producer in recent years, comprising about 15 percent of the Dominican 
Republic‘s sugar production (77,688 tons of raw sugar in 2008). However, in 2009 its 
share fell to 69,765 tons as a result of the explosion of a boiler at Ingenio Cristóbal 
Colón (which forced it to stop the harvest for a month). 
 
The company has sought to improve its profitability through a sustained increase in 
sugar production and its derivatives, using greater efficiency to reduce production costs 
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(BSR, 2010). 
 
Union and Collective Agreement 
 
The two companies that administer Ingenio Cristóbal Colón, located in San Pedro de 
Macoris, and CAEI, located in San Cristobal, have signed collective agreements with 
their unions. Current agreements were signed in August 2010, and are valid until 2013 - 
the first between the company Cristóbal Colón, C. by A. and the Sindicato de 
Empleadores y Trabajadores de la Industria Azucarera de la Empresa Cristóbal Colón 
(Obreros y Empleados) and the second between Compañía Anónima de Explotaciones 
Industriales and the Sindicato Autónomo de Trabajadores del Ingenio CAEI (SATIC). 
 
Both agreements apply to "all production and maintenance workers" employed by the 
companies with the exception of those carrying out management and inspection 
responsibilities and echo provisions of labor laws regarding working hours, days of rest, 
minimum wages, overtime, holiday pay, profit sharing, etc. The Agreements also 
provide for the creation of several committees comprised of union and company 
representatives, including a "Grievance Committee" to settle and resolve  complaints 
and disputes surrounding the Agreement and the "Committee for Home Improvement" 
to study topics such as housing availability and workers' compensation. 
 
Some specific ―privileges‖ guaranteed by the two Agreements are that workers are to be 
paid a bonus for meeting production goals, a Christmas and Labor Day contribution to 
the union, financial contributions to cover the costs of the death of a worker or family 
member, the provision of scholarships and school supplies for children of union 
members, and ambulance service for workers and their dependents, among others. 
 
The agreement between Cristóbal Colón C. by A. and the Sindicato de Empleadores y 
Trabajadores de la Industria Azucarera de la Empresa Cristóbal Colón (Obreros y 
Empleados) also mandates the creation of a disability and social expenditures fund and 
a fund for a savings and loan cooperative (Cooperativa de Ahorros y Préstamos del 
Ingenio Cristóbal Colón) - two percent of net profits for savings and one percent for 
loans.  
 
Social Investment 
 
In 2010, BSR conducted a study for the U.S. Department of State on CAEI cane cutters, 
entitled, ―Labor Conditions and Human Rights in Dominican Sugar Production.‖ This 
study was based on a survey of 1,200 braceros and evaluated freedom of movement, 
freedom of association, child labor, discrimination, wages, and occupational health and 
safety. The study included the following recommendations for CAEI:  
 the adoption of a Code of Conduct; 
 the evaluation of the wage system and the adoption of necessary changes; 
 an increase in the amount of support offered to workers‘ families in or to prevent 
child labor; 
 issuance of personal identity documents to workers; 
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 changes to the occupational health and safety systems, in accordance with 
international standards; and  
 the reevaluation and improvement of internal communication channels. 
According to the report, CAEI began to immediately implement the recommendations. 
 
According to INAZUCAR, CAEI has been the sugar company that has made the largest 
social investment (USD 60 million between 2003 and 2008). Among its social projects 
has been a project to improve the quality of life of workers in three bateyes. This Project 
included the construction of a ―model batey‖ named Nuevo Cayacoa that was 
inaugurated in 2009 and includes housing, a church, an educational center, a 
community center, a recreational area, and a health center. 
 
CAEI has invested in the construction of 28 schools (administered by the Ministry of 
Education), especially the Felipe Vicini Perdomo School, located in the Central Batey of 
Ingenio Cristóbal Colón (INAZUCAR, 2009). 
 
 
Consejo Estatal del Azúcar (CEA)  
 
The CEA was created in 1966 (by Law No. 7) as the independent body responsible for 
control and operation of the 12 State-owned ingenios. The CEA administered these 
ingenios until 1999 when the administration was leased to private companies, under the 
mandate of Law No. 141-97 (previously addressed) - which promoted the reform and 
privatization of public enterprises. However, Law 141-97 allowed other forms of 
transformation and reform of public companies beyond privatization, such as 
concessions (consortiums, management, leasing, etc.) and the transfer or sale of 
stocks, shares, and/or assets (Article 16). Under this Act, in 1999 the state sugar 
industry embarked on a process by which the ten CEA ingenios still in operation were 
leased out under a simple thirty-year lease, resulting in the transfer of the administration 
of the CEA ingenios to Dominican and foreign investors. 
 
The CEA was put in charge of monitoring compliance with leases, in order to preserve 
the properties. However, the "lack of capital in state enterprises," along with the inability 
of groups of investors to meet their commitments, among other difficulties, led to the 
failure of the privatization process, as explained in the analysis of historical context of 
the industry (INAZUCAR, 2006). 
  
Therefore, the CEA has returned to intermittently and precariously managing two of its‘ 
ingenios, Porvenir and Consuelo, which have deteriorated due to a lack of government 
capital to invest in the mills and road and railway infrastructure (CEPAL, 2008). 
 
Social investment 
 
Since its creation, the CEA has continued to assume responsibility for maintenance of 
the bateyes under its jurisdiction. Nevertheless, the CEA‘s ability to make social 
investments gradually decreased, especially with the decline of the sugar sector. 
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Despite this, in 2006 the CEA signed an agreement with various public institutions and 
NGOs working in sugar bateyes80 "to promote sustainable development on behalf of 
thousands of people inhabiting the bateyes." In the agreement, a commitment was 
made to repair roads and bridges in order to improve access to state-run bateyes, and 
to promote reforestation campaigns in the bateyes. An agreement was also made to 
continue to develop assistance plans, including for "medical and dental procedures, 
distribution of food and furnishings in the case of natural disasters, and financial aid to 
cover the funeral services of indigent persons." The CEA has also established 
agricultural programs to stimulate the economy in depressed areas, which according to 
the CEA, have benefited the bateyes of San Pedro de Macoris. 
 
In the 2010-2011 harvest, the CEA was not administering any ingenios, and had leased 
Ingenio Porvenir to Azucarera Porvenir (SRL), a company with Spanish capital. SRL 
mechanized the harvest and hired about 800 cane cutters. SRL also made some 
improvements to the barracones (painting and waterproofing, etc.). However, SRL 
alleged that the lease also included 6,000 hectares of land in another CEA-owned 
ingenio in San Pedro Macoris, Ingenio Santa Fe. Ingenio Santa Fe, along with inactive 
CEA ingenios Consuelo and Quisqueya, were later leased to Constructora Castelar, 
owned by Grupo Vicini and Grupo Campollo (which own CAEI and CAC).81   
 
 
Central Romana Corporation, Ltd. (CR) 
 
Central Romana Corporation, Ltd. is an "agro-industrial and tourism business" 
belonging to the multinational Fanjul Corporation, which owns some of the world's major 
sugar companies.82 For decades, this company has been the main producer of sugar in 
the Dominican Republic (producing more than 70 percent of the Dominican Republic‘s 
sugar in 200983). It also has the only sugar refinery in the Dominican Republic. 
 
Over time, in addition to sugar, Central Romana Corporation has diversified into 
different areas of the Dominican economy: chemicals, Free Trade Zones, livestock, 
meat processing and dairy products, construction materials iron production, and the 
operation of a port, airport, hotels, and real estate business. Central Romana 
Corporation‘s enterprises generate about 25,000 jobs.84  Central Romana has been 
classified by the Central Bank as one of the largest companies registered as a "foreign 
business" in the country.85 
 
Central Romana was the most efficient sugar business in the country and according to 
INAZUCAR, had mechanized 50 percent of its production and aimed to reach 70 
percent between 2014 and 2015 (INAZUCAR). 
 
Union and Collective Bargaining Agreement 
 
The union of CR is Sindicato Unido de Trabajadores, which has 15,000 members, the 
largest in the Dominican Republic. A collective bargaining agreement was signed in 
2007, which contemplated a salary increase of 30 percent for workers. The union has 
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defensores del trabajador (worker representatives) in each batey (CR 2008). The 
currently collective bargaining agreement was signed in May 2010 for a period of three 
years and applies to employees whose salaries do not exceed DOP 17,000 (USD 437) 
and who do not exercise certain leadership positions such as in administration or 
human resources. 
 
The collective bargaining agreement reiterates many of the rights established by the 
Labor Code, such as wages, Christmas bonuses, vacation, and days off.  In addition, it 
grants additional benefits - annual wage increases during the term of the agreement 
(between eight and ten percent), reimbursement of expenditures for technical studies 
and/or basic education, awards to distinguished workers, educational plans for the 
children of workers, ambulance service, and housing.  
 
The following are among the measures that affect braceros:  
 -   Installation "to the extent of their abilities" of faucets in the bateyes and water 
fountains close to where the cane is cut (Article 24). 
- Creation of health facilities "in the places legally deemed necessary" and their 
maintenance (Article 28) 
- Transport adequate "to all workers who are ordered to work outside their 
workplace (Article 31.b). 
- Provision of the supplies and tools needed to perform the work (Article 32). 
 
Social Investment and Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) 
 
CR has a variety of CSR programs, including for: health (a health center at Romana 
headquarters, two sub-centers in the bateyes, and three mobile medical units, with a 
budget of DOP 30 million [USD 770,614] per year); education (the construction and 
maintenance of 57 schools in the braceros communities, which provide schooling to 
approximately 8,500 students, as well as adult literacy programs, with 250 people 
graduating between 2003 and 2007); food (subsidized food programs); among others 
(CR, 2008/Bacardi, 2009). According to INAZUCAR, the total social investment made 
by CR between 2003 and 2009 reached USD 32 million (INAZUCAR, 2009). 
 
 
The Sugar Colonato  
 
Although the first sugar colonato dates back to the late nineteenth century, the type of 
tenant farmers that exist today emerged in the 1960s, after the fall of the Trujillo 
dictatorship. By 1966, the CEA was created, and colonos controlled nine percent of 
Dominican sugarcane plantations and supplied their sugarcane mainly to Central 
Romana (Neck, 1997). 
 
Since 1969, colonos are governed by Law No. 491 on the Sugar Colonato, which 
defined the settlers as "all persons or entities engaged in the cultivation of sugarcane 
which is designated as a raw material for the industrial processing of raw sugar and its 
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derivatives, whether such persons possess a title to the land or are entitled to use it by 
virtue of a lease, tenant farming, sharecropping, or any other temporary title." 
 
This law determined that according to their performance and the link and history that 
they had with a particular company,86 colonos could benefit from "grandfathering‖. The 
law also created a system by which sugar companies could finance colonos‘ sugar 
harvests.87 Likewise, the legislation delegated to sugar companies the responsibility for 
the transport of the sugarcane and payment to colonos based on the percentage of 
sucrose sugar resulting from the processing of all ground sugarcane, after making 
deductions for tax payments and cash payments to the colonos or their workers (as well 
as social security and workplace accident insurance).88 
 
Since 1970, the sugar colonato spread mainly in the eastern and southeastern areas of 
the Dominican Republic (but also in the north, in the Province of Puerto Plata). At the 
end of the 1970s, there were about 11?000 colonos who cultivated sugar on 48 percent 
of the total amount of land under cultivation for sugar. They also produced 45 percent of 
the sugar produced by state-owned ingenios and 38 percent of the amount of sugar 
produced by the largest private  producer, Central Romana (Murphy, 1989 ). In the late 
eighties, colonos were affected by the collapse of the sugar industry and 35 percent 
decrease in sugar prices. Subsequently, the failure of reforms in the sugar industry that 
began in 1999, and the subsequent closure of most of the CEA plantations, has made it 
difficult for colonos to maintain production, especially those with smaller plots of land. 
 
Colonos are organized into two federations: la Federación Dominicana de Colonos 
Azucareros (FEDOCA), created in 1968 and la Federación de Colonos Azucareros de 
la Región Este (FECARE). According to FEDOCA president, Mr. Bernardo D?a?,
 
FEDOCA has a membership of approximately 3,800 colonos. Both federations meet 
?with colonos‘ associations created around the old plantations of the CEA. Many of these 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????.  
There is also an Asociación de Colonos de Romana (linked to Central Romana) with 
over 700 members, which has maintained steady production by not depending on the 
old ingenios of the CEA, and whose mode of production is different from that used by 
the CEA ingenios. It is the association that is the most independent of FEDOCA 
(CIPAF, 2009). 
 
Projects and Social Investment 
 
In 2010 and 2011 FECARE colonos were part of Proyecto Cultivar, a Social 
Accountability International (SAI) project implemented in the Dominican Republic for the 
Center for Research and Cultural  Aid (Centro de Investigación y Apoyo Cultural -
CIAC), which aims to improve compliance with labor rights in the agricultural sector in 
Central America and the  Dominican Republic. As part of this project, trainings were 
carried out on labor rights and occupational health and safety for the colonos and their 
workers. Additionally, as part of this project, several Social Dialogues were conducted 
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concerning the main problems which impact these sugar producers (migration, social 
security, etc.). 
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Appendix 5: Reports on Forced Labor in the Sugar Sector 
 
It was not until the middle of the twentieth century that some authors began to write 
about the inhumane conditions faced by Haitian migrants in the Dominican bateyes. 
One such author was the Haitian ambassador in Santo Domingo, Price-Mars (1953), 
who described the "drama of Haitian immigration" in the early fifties. He expressed how 
migrants lacked "all legal status" and continued: 
 
―[…] The ingenios that employed the braceros granted a sui generis statute that 
transformed them into the property of the company. They did not have the right 
or the freedom to leave the places where they worked and were even less able to 
escape the tasks that they had been assigned. The police would catch them just 
outside the mills without any personal identification documents (such as a 
national identity card) since the only ID they had was the workers‘ residence 
permit issued and held by the head of the company they worked for. They were 
paid as directed by the company and once the harvest was complete, the 
employer could terminate all salaries […].‖ 
 
Although the exploitation of Haitian migrants in the Dominican Republic was known to 
many, it was not until the late sixties and early seventies that people began to formally 
study the conditions of migrants in the Dominican Republic. Sociologists, 
anthropologists, social scientists, and Dominicans of Haitian descent took on the task of 
analyzing and interpreting the so-called "question of Haiti." These intellectuals included 
such individuals as Gerard Pierre Charles, Suzy Castor, Franklin Franco, Frank 
Hernandez, Isis Duarte, Magda Acosta, Jose del Castillo, Ruben Silié, Roberto Cassa, 
Lis Despradel, Franc Báez, Wilfredo Lozano, Joseph M. Madruga, Carlos Dore, and 
Frank Moya Pons, among many others. Many of them focused their academic studies 
and publications on the "sugar issue" and described migrant labor in the Dominican 
sugar industry. 
 
During the same period, various international organizations and individuals concerned 
with human rights, such as the Anti-Slavery Society, also became active in addressing 
the issue of Haitian migrants in the Dominican Republic. Individuals such as author 
Roger Plant, journalist Maurice Lemoine, and attorney Ramon Veras89 published books, 
papers, and reports denouncing the bilateral contracting agreements on braceros 
between Haiti and the Dominican Republic and the conditions of "slavery" to which 
these workers were reduced. The growing number of domestic and international 
accusations added weight to the claims of the exiled Duvalier regime and eventually 
drew the attention of the United Nations and the International Labor Organization 
(Ferguson, 2006: 314).  
 
It should be noted that these allegations of systematic human rights violations in the 
sugar sector were generally alleged against the CEA (although many also mentioned 
how the private mills benefited from the system). At first, these reports mainly criticized 
the "massive hiring of workers" under inhumane conditions, under an intergovernmental 
agreement between the Dominican Republic and Haiti. This agreement essentially 
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meant the "sale" of Haitian workers by the Haitian government to the Dominican 
Republic. The reports also documented the physical abuse committed against workers 
and the restrictions on freedom of movement achieved through constant surveillance in 
the bateyes and in the fields. After the elimination of the inter-governmental recruitment 
system in 1986, the Dominican government began to remove the armed forces and the 
CEA from their involvement in the forcible recruitment of Haitian migrants living in the 
country. Finally, the reports also criticized the deplorable working conditions and wages, 
as well as the miserable living conditions of workers (lack of potable water, latrines, 
electricity, overcrowding, etc.). 
 
Some international organizations called for economic sanctions against the Dominican 
Republic. One example was Human Rights Watch, which in 1989 asked the US 
government to investigate the Dominican Republic before renewing their status as a 
beneficiary of the Generalized System of Preferences (Minorities at Risk Project, 2004). 
This request, in addition to the other allegations levied against the Dominican Republic, 
was met with staunch denials by Dominican authorities, as well as the general 
Dominican public (Gavigan / NCHR, 1996). 
 
Starting in the mid-nineties, local and international human rights organizations (such as 
the Center of Social Studies Juan Montalvo, Amnesty International, Christian Aid, the 
National Coalition for Haitian Rights, among many others) began to question and 
criticize human rights violations and various forms of discrimination faced by Haitian 
migrants and their descendants in the Dominican Republic. These new areas of interest 
included forced mass deportations, the perpetuation of Haitian workers‘ status as 
―illegals‖ and "persons in transit," and the consequent denial of access to citizenship to 
Haitians and Dominicans of Haitian descent. Many complaints and reports, however, 
also included some reviews and/or criticisms of the working conditions of sugar 
braceros and the living conditions of the thousands of Haitians and Dominicans of 
Haitian descent who continued to reside in the bateyes and work for the sugar industry. 
 
Finally, it should be added that these "new" allegations were also brought to 
international bodies, both within the UN System, and the Inter-American System of 
Human Rights within the Organization of American States (OAS). Specifically, 
allegations were brought to the ??????American Commission on Human Rights, which 
ruled in 1991 and 1999 against collective expulsions, and the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights (IACHR), whose jurisdiction the Dominican Republic recognized on 
March 25,?1999. Starting in the late nineties, several local human rights organizations, 
including the Human Rights Clinic of American Universities, began to submit complaints 
to the Inter-American Commission for the thousands of cases of deportation of Haitians90 
and the denial of the right to Dominican citizenship. In 2005, the Court ruled against the 
Dominican Republic in the historic case of Yean v. Bosico for breaching the right to 
equality before the law and the right to nationality of the victims in their capacity as 
Dominicans of Haitian descent (IACHR, 2005). 
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Anti-Slavery Society for the Protection of Human Rights: “Migrant Workers in the 
Dominican Republic,” 1979 
 
In 1979, the first international human rights organization, the Anti-Slavery Society for the 
Protection of Human Rights, based in London, presented a report to the UN Working 
Group on Contemporary Forms of Slavery. This document, entitled ―Migrant Workers in 
the Dominican Republic,‖ was one of the reports that served as the basis for a wave of 
international reports on Haitian workers and started the international discussion about 
forced labor in the Dominican Republic (Plant, 1987:73). 
 
The report acknowledged that Haitian migrants were compelled to leave their country of 
origin to "escape unemployment rates of up to 65 percent." The report deplored the 
coercive mechanisms of recruitment for the sugar industry and the "sale" of migrants to 
the ingenios by the Haitian government: 
"[O]nce at the border they are stuck in trucks or in collection areas where they 
hope to be hired either by Dominican landowners, whether by representatives of 
the three main producers-the State Sugar Council, the Vicini family, or Gulf and 
Western, a transnational American company. In transit, the only meal offered to 
the migrants is sugar cane juice or brown sugar. At the collection points, workers 
are sold for 10 pesos (11 dollars) each and trucked to the plantations of their 
buyers." 
 
The report also criticized the deplorable conditions in the bateyes of the state-run CEA. 
In particular the report listed:  
- The payment system of paying workers according to the weight of the cane they 
harvested, which allowed for deceptive practices since illiterate workers could not 
verify the accuracy of the weighing receipts  
- Biweekly exchanges of vales (coupons) for cash, which encouraged borrowing 
and generated the need to cash in vales for food at bodegas for a loss of ten 
percent of their value  
- The violations of freedom of association in the 12 CEA mills, and 
- The absence of social security, overcrowding, malnutrition, and poor sanitation 
(lack of electricity, drinking water, latrines, etc.). 
-  
The Anti-Slavery Society concluded that Haitian laborers were kept in a condition of 
"abject submission on behalf of the accumulation of profit, both private and public, 
thanks to foreign aid used to maintain and equip a large police force."91 They also noted 
that such a situation was possible for the same reasons that made the trans-Atlantic 
slave trade possible: the abuse of the profit motive, coupled with ignorance and apathy 
on the part of consumers. 
 
 
Maurice Lemoine: “Bitter Sugar,” 1981     
 
In 1981, French journalist Maurice Lemoine published "Sucre Amer: Esclaves 
aujourd'hui dans les Caraïbes" ("Bitter Sugar: There are slaves in the Caribbean"). The 
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book describes the adventures facing Estimé Mondestin, a Congo who decides to work 
on the sugar plantations, but is deceived by false promises. He recounts in detail the 
recruitment in Croix-de-Bouquets, Haiti, the "prisons" that the sugar bateyes became 
once workers arrived after being trafficked there, and the discrimination to which they 
were subjected once in the Dominican Republic. In addition, Lemoine sprinkles the text 
with historical details about Haitian history, relations between the two countries, and the 
prejudices the Dominicans held against the Haitians. 
 
Lemoine described the violence and fear that marked the recruitments, "Croix-des-
Bouquets, hit by a crowd of Haitians adrift, was about to explode, the batey 
conscriptions had not even started and four workers had died when a wall collapsed. 
Since the beginning of his ‗recruitment‘, Mondestin had many problems. First, he 
became the target of a Tonton Macoute who had struck him without the slightest 
provocation. He should have been careful. The National Security Volunteers (VSN) 
(official name of the ‗Tontons Macoutes,‘ the Duvalier regime's police) seemed very 
excited. Shouldering rifles, machine guns in hand, machetes strapped to their belts, 
they made for an impressive sight in their blue cloth uniforms. Mondestin received the 
blow without flinching. Like everyone else, he feared them. Lackeys, torturers, 
mercenaries, thugs, they were the law and order in Haiti since its creation by Francois 
‗Papa Doc‘ Duvalier (p. 27)." 
 
He also recounted in detail the extreme difficulty of the work in the bateyes and sugar 
cane fields: 
"The foreman pounded on the door. It was four o'clock. Let‘s go! Let‘s go! To the 
cane fields! When the workers took too long to wake up, he would knock down 
the door. Arise, Kongos, Jean Claude sold you to me! And the workers would rise 
grumbling. They no longer knew how long they had been there. They departed 
into the chilly dawn like zombies. The foreman did not cut the cane. The workers 
were put to work immediately; they cut on an empty stomach. They could not do 
otherwise. They stopped at noon to rest a little if there were no foremen or 
overseers to be seen. 
To drink the cane juice, the workers squeezed the cane out of sight of the 
Dominicans. They could spend three or four days drinking only juice from the 
cane. Then, thousands of machetes gave rhythm to the monotonous hours. They 
smashed their shoulders on the cane in the stifling heat that gave them no 
respite until the evening. The Dominicans watched, mounted on their horses. 
There were always two or three overseers, with the eyes of inquisitors, their 
speech dry and humorless as they patrolled the field. The Kongos were not 
allowed to talk or tell stories to kill the time. They slept hungry, woke up hungry 
and worked all day with their hunger. If they stopped for a moment the overseers 
would yell at them. A worker found sitting in exhaustion, his face distorted from 
the pain, would not be excused. They were beaten. The chiefs said they were not 
going to stop wasting the money they paid for them. You do not want to work, 
you band of bums! But we will get our money‘s worth! [...] "(p.181). 
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One of the striking aspects of the book was that it reproduced in full detail the contract 
between the government of Haiti and the Dominican CEA in 1978-79 and the harvests 
from 1979 to 1980, after years during which these conditions were hidden. The contract 
called for the recruitment of 15,000 agricultural workers "to fulfill the needs of the sugar 
plantations of the Dominican State" and for payment to the Haitian government the sum 
of US $1,225,000 in order to cover the costs of recruitment and "transportation from the 
recruitment centers to Malpasse" (Article 10). 
 
Lemoine‘s publication and the previously mentioned report by the Anti-Slavery Society 
were the principal documents relied on for complaints filed with the ILO. These 
complaints, in turn, led the agency to form and send a Commission of Inquiry into the 
Dominican Republic, as detailed below, to assess the working conditions of the sugar 
industry. 
 
 
ILO Commission of Inquiry Report, 1983 
 
As a result of the complaints submitted to the ILO against the Dominican Republic, in 
1981, the ILO sent a Commission of Inquiry to both Haiti and the Dominican Republic in 
January of 1983. In their summary, the Commission identified the "subhuman" 
conditions in which the laborers lived and worked in what should be classified as 
"slavery." 
 
The second step of the Commission was to determine whether both countries had failed 
to comply with ILO Conventions on Forced Labor (No. 29 and 105), on Freedom of 
Association (No. 87 and 98), and the Convention on Protection of Wages (No. 95). The 
Commission was also supposed to make appropriate recommendations.  
 
The Commission carefully analyzed a wide range of materials, including annual 
intergovernmental agreements from 1979 to 1983. The Commission also received 
testimony from parties who testified in preliminary hearings in Geneva and gathered 
information from government authorities, organizations, and individuals in the 
Dominican Republic and Haiti.92 Labor officials, immigration officials, and 
representatives of the ingenios denied the allegations of illegally trafficking migrants and 
forcing them to work on plantations. The CEA argued that such mistreatment could 
have occurred, but that it was not perpetrated purposefully by the institution. 
 
On June 17, 1983, the Commission published a 200 page report in which it found that 
both Haiti and the Dominican Republic had failed to comply with the Convention on the 
Abolition of Forced Labor (No. 105) and the Convention on Forced Labor (No. 29). 
Specifically, the contractual terms of the existing agreement between the Dominican 
government and the Duvalier regime, which outlined the forcible recruitment of Haitians 
and the practices used to keep them working in the sugar plantations, were found to be 
in violation of international conventions on forced labor. 
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It should be emphasized that in determining the violations of the conventions cited, the 
Commission distinguished between different types of workers depending on whether 
they were recruited under inter-governmental contracts, whether they entered illegally 
on their own, and whether they were resident agricultural workers. For the workers 
recruited by the Haitian government, the Commission denounced the annual contracts 
which required them to remain in their designated villages for the six-to-seven month 
harvest and which required them to surrender their personal documents to the 
overseers.  
 
The Commission also recognized that many workers sought employment voluntarily and 
that the number of workers offering their services exceeded the quota of workers to be 
recruited. Although the workers had complaints about the working conditions and 
treatment, they explained that they "had sought this job because living conditions were 
even worse in Haiti." The Commission pointed out that the workers did not receive a 
copy of the employment contract and "without exception none of the interviewed 
workers on the plantations had been informed about the conditions under which they 
would be working." They had only been informed that "the conditions would be good." 
The Commission found that if the workers could terminate the employment relationship, 
then the violations would not have been so egregious, but workers trying to leave the 
plantations before the end of the harvest were forced to return to work by the overseers 
despite express prohibition of this behavior by Convention No. 105, which bans any 
form of forced or compulsory labor employed as a "measure of labor discipline" (Article 
1.c). Violations of this provision also negatively affected "illegal" workers who were 
recruited outside the parameters of the contracts, as it was questionable whether the 
work was voluntary and whether they could leave these plantations. 
 
In the case of workers residing permanently in the bateyes, the Commission found that 
the Dominican Republic had also breached the Convention on Forced Labor since the 
workers could not leave the plantation in search of other work, as they risked 
deportation if they left the vicinity of the batey. In addition, workers residing in other 
parts of the country were often arrested and forced to work on plantations. 
 
The Commission also determined that the DR was in contravention with the Convention 
on Wages for several reasons: the income of workers (wages plus incentives) were 
"substantially below the minimum wage in the agricultural sector"; there were no real 
guarantees to prevent fraud in the weighing of cane; the practice of "enforced idleness" 
in which workers remained idle and unpaid for days because of the "operational 
requirements" of the mills; and the large deductions made from workers‘ wages. 
 
In Chapter V of the Report, the Commission listed the recommendations to the 
Dominican government in order to correct the violations indicated: 
First, the Commission recommended that the Dominican government enact 
measures that would enable the establishment of a stable workforce, design 
mechanisms for better and more productive farming, implement complementary 
systems of labor on sugar plantations that would involve other crops, and 
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designate arable land for workers to supplement their income and ensure their 
survival outside of the harvest season. 
 
As conditions for the recruitment of Haitian workers for the harvest, the Commission 
stated that intergovernmental hiring arrangements must include provisions requiring 
that: 
 the two nations publish their agreements, including the conditions of recruitment 
and any additional clauses; 
 the Haitian government record in their governmental accounts and make public 
all fees paid by the Dominican Republic for the recruitment of workers, and that 
these costs correspond to the actual cost of recruitment and transportation; and 
 the Dominican Republic prohibits authorities and CEA officials involved in the 
recruitment of workers from receiving additional payments for this purpose. 
 
With regard to freedom of movement both nations must: 
 Take appropriate measures to provide clear information to workers about working 
conditions and ensure that these workers are not transferred to other jobs without 
their consent and without being fully informed about the terms of the contract. 
The Commission also required the delivery of individual contracts for workers in 
Creole, or at least a written statement of working conditions, indicating among 
other things, the terms of remuneration and the nature of the employment 
relationship; 
 Stop the practice of withholding personal identity documents (passports) by the 
CEA or the Haitian Embassy; 
 Eliminate the use of security forces to locate plantation workers recruited outside 
the inter-governmental agreement; 
 Ensure that public administrations and private mills do not take action involving 
the confinement of workers on sugar plantations. 
 
The Commission noted that it was not legitimate for a state to leave workers in an illegal 
status, when their labor was necessary for the functioning of the economy, especially 
when the state was their employer. To correct this situation, the Commission 
recommended that: 
 The Dominican government should formally approve the stay of workers seeking 
employment in the sugarcane harvest, to be implemented by the Dominican 
governmental office which coordinates and supervises the recruitment of 
workers. This office should also provide a medical examination and an official 
document that will ensure the legality of their stay in the Dominican Republic. 
 The Dominican Republic should establish and promote a program to regulate the 
status of Haitians who have lived and worked in the Dominican Republic for a 
period of time, according to criteria and conditions deemed appropriate. 
 The Dominican Republic should ensure strict adherence to military and police 
regulations and prevent any arbitrary and oppressive conduct towards Haitian 
residents. 
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With regard to ensuring the protection for the fair payment of wages, the Commission 
stressed the need for legislative reforms that include direct payment to workers in cash 
and the prohibition of payment vouchers. The Commission stated that employers should 
also be banned from interfering with the freedom of workers to freely dispose of their 
wages, and should be obligated to inform their workers about established policies 
covering pay and deductions. Finally, the Commission urged the implementation of 
inspections by the Ministry of Labor "as an effective instrument to ensure compliance 
with labor standards and the rights of workers in sugar plantations." 
 
 
Ramon Antonio Veras Publications, 1983 and 1985 
 
The lawyer, Ramon A. Veras, wrote articles, presented papers, and published two 
works in which he denounced the ―slavery‖ of Haitian workers in the Dominican 
Republic. His first work "Haitian Migration and Slavery" (1983), referred to the living 
conditions of Haitian workers in the sugar industry and the recruitment mechanisms 
implemented at the private and government levels, which allowed these workers to 
labor in conditions "akin to a new form of slavery, in different areas of the Dominican 
national economy" (Veras, 1985:105). The second paper, more extensive than the first, 
was entitled "Caribbean Migration and the Haitian Chapter" and covered topics such as 
the protection of migrant workers by the ILO from discriminatory practices and an 
analysis of various migration flows from the Dominican Republic and Puerto Rico, as 
well as Haitian immigration into the Dominican Republic. 
 
On this last point, the author analyzed the annual contracts for transportation, living, and 
working conditions of Haitian workers and criticized that the employers had never 
complied with the terms of these agreements, which stipulated that workers would enjoy 
"all the benefits of Dominican law, to include Social Security, health care, social work, 
weekly rest, bonuses, etc. " He reported: 
"Immigrants living in huts or cramped shacks, with dirt floors, without electricity or 
safe drinking water [...], the laborers are forced to work 14 hours a day and only 
receive payment in the sum of RD 3.50. 
The laborers are victims in the weighing of the cane. The bracero does not know 
how heavy the wagon is when he drops off the cane he has cut. And the 
measured weight, which is the fruit of their hard work, is usually "fixed" so that it 
weighs less, thus cheating the bracero even further. 
The laborers do not receive medical attention [...] The lack of economic means 
condemns the Haitian braceros to starve. When in the field cutting cane, if they 
have money, they eat what they can buy with what little they earn: they drink 
cane juice with lemon and eat bread. 
The health of the laborers is strongly affected not only by the limited supply of 
food, but also by the nature of the work they do [...]. 
With all these injustices, the Haitian cane cutters in the Dominican Republic 
cannot protest, and the protests are silenced by the ‗tontons macoutes.‘ These 
men are agents of the bateyes who come from Haiti to play the dual role of 
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vigilantes and silencers of the protests of the braceros and who spy on Haitian 
political exiles living in the Dominican Republic.‖ 
 
For all these reasons, the author concludes: "The life led by Haitian workers in the 
Dominican Republic is one of real slavery. There is no possible definition to describe the 
living conditions of these laborers.‖ He added that there was no difference between 
workers who came through the intergovernmental contracts and those already residing 
in the Dominican Republic illegally (Veras, 1985: 29, 30). 
 
 
Roger Plant, “Sugar and Modern Slavery,” 1987 
 
In 1987, Roger Plant published ―Sugar and Modern Slavery: A Tale of Two Countries‖ in 
London, with the support of the Anti-Slavery Society. In 1982 he had been hired by the 
United Nations to investigate the situation of sugar braceros in the Dominican Republic, 
following reports suggesting that their working conditions were "analogous to slavery," 
and filed his report before the UN‘s Working Group on Slavery. 
 
―Sugar and Modern Slavery‖ describes the historical growth of the sugar industry and 
analyzes relevant policies of the time. Chapter 6, entitled ―Haitian Forced Labor in the 
Dominican Republic from 1976-1986,‖ details the findings obtained by the author in his 
interviews with hundreds of sugar braceros and recounts the events that had taken 
place beginning in the early 1980s as a result of international claims against the 
country. In general, the author explains that the Dominican press, in particular El 
Nacional de Ahora and the Listín Diario, strongly rejected the term "slavery" even when 
they recognized that the conditions were unacceptable. In a few cases, they also 
contested the forcible arrests, the sale of laborers, and the continued exploitation of 
these workers (p. 73). 
 
Describing the situation in 1986, Roger Plant stated that forced recruitment was being 
used "whenever there is a significant deficit of Haitian labor in particular regions," and 
went on to assert: "The bateyes are like concentration camps in which workers are not 
free to leave" (p. 80). 
 
This is why, said Plant, despite the changes announced by the government and 
marginal wage increases, the situation was "as bad as ever."93 At the beginning of the 
1985-1986 harvest, the Dominican government announced that it would not ―import‖ 
braceros, as the situation did not permit the CEA to fund the cost of the 
intergovernmental agreements, given that in Haiti they had sparked national protests 
that culminated in the fall of the Duvalier regime. In order to fill the labor shortage, the 
Dominican government tried, without much success, to promote measures such as the 
―Dominicanization‖ of the harvest. However, according to the author, allegations of   
massive forced recruitment and repatriation at the hands of the Dominican army 
continued, even in the Dominican press (p. 79). 
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In particular, Plant highlighted that in Haiti, opponents of the Duvalier regime began to 
consider the labor recruitment of Haitians for the Dominican sugar sector as an "affront 
to national dignity." The author noted that until 1986 there had been only sporadic 
criticism of the inter-governmental agreement due to the control of the media by the 
Duvalier dictatorship, which ensured that criticism was stifled. The last few months of 
the regime experienced a surge of criticism of the situation of Haitian workers in the 
Dominican Republic by the opposition, who ranked high on its agenda the issue of the 
"slavery of Haitians" in Dominican cane fields (pp. 87-88). 
  
According to Plant, in late February 1986, the Dominican government made public 
announcements that illegal Haitians in the country that did not show up for the cane 
harvest would be repatriated; although no deportations actually occurred. Only some 
Haitians agreed to work in the harvest, lured by the promise that the wage per ton would 
be increased to RD $3.00. According to official figures, in mid-March there was a deficit 
of 10,000 tons of sugarcane and the harvest of 1986 ended up being the lowest of the 
decade (pp. 89). 
 
 
Americas Watch / Human Rights Watch: Reports on Forced Labor, 1989-1992 
 
Between 1989 and 1992, the monitoring organization Human Rights Watch and its 
Division for Latin America and the Caribbean, Americas Watch,94 reported human rights 
violations against the Haitian cane cutters in various reports and publications.95 
Two of these reports focused exclusively on the issue of forced labor in the sugar sector 
and were published in collaboration with the National Coalition for Haitian Refugees and 
Caribbean Rights. The first report, ―Harvesting Oppression: Forced Labor in the 
Dominican Sugar Industry,‖ was published in 1990, followed by ―Half Measures, 
Reform, Forced Labor and the Dominican Sugar Industry‖ in 1991, which addressed 
various initiatives launched by the Dominican government to improve working 
conditions. Both documents were made after the dispatch of a fact-finding mission that 
conducted interviews with dozens of workers in five CEA ingenios and at some border 
points.96 The fact finders concluded that the use of coercive recruitment and forced 
labor persisted in the sugar industry, specifically in the CEA ingenios, in clear violation 
of internationally recognized labor standards.  
 
According to the report, "the continuing use of forced labor begins with the abusive 
recruitment policies practiced by recruiters, who are hired by the CEA in conjunction 
with the Dominican armed forces, and ends with the imprisonment of braceros on the 
sugar plantations. The use of buscones and deceptive practices to obtain these Haitian 
workers is a recurrent element in the operations of the CEA [...]."  
 
Both reports included testimony from dozens of workers who supported these 
conclusions, and the various indicators discussed. Some of these indicators are 
summarized below. 
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Recruitment: Use of force and deceptive practices: 
 Use of force in the recruitment of cane cutters, which continued to be "not only 
tolerated but encouraged by the Dominican government." Dominican armed 
forces continued the practice of arresting Haitians on the border (or near it) to 
gather them and send them against their will to the CEA plantations. 
 Deceptive recruitment systems. Given the need of the CEA to attract enough 
workers despite the poor conditions of work and life, the buscones had a "strong 
incentive" to lie to induce workers to cross the border and would then leave them 
in the hands of the military or ―CEA managers." Most of the workers interviewed 
by the delegation had been offered specific jobs (harvesting tomatoes or rice) or 
were promised a "good job" and that they could "make good money." 
 
Restrictions on freedom of movement: 
 The report notes that "most of the workers interviewed knew they could not leave 
the plantation until the end of the harvest because they had:  
o asked permission to leave and were denied, or  
o believed that if they attempted to leave, they would be arrested. 
  Those who tried to leave were physically abused or threatened with physical 
violence. Those who escaped were often later arrested by the guardacampestres 
(guards employed by the CEA). 
 
Confiscation of personal property of employees: 
 The confiscation of identity documents and personal property (especially 
clothing), was used as a mechanism to keep workers on the plantations. 
 
Living and working conditions: 
 The report highlighted the continued use of payment vouchers that could only be 
exchanged for cash every two weeks (in the meantime, many workers used their 
vouchers in the CEA stores, where their vouchers were worth ten percent less 
than their actual value). 
 With a payment per ton of approximately USD 1.44, the new workers earned less 
than a dollar per day (an average of USD 0.87), which was only enough for one 
meal. 
 Lack of medical care and overcrowding (4 to 6 workers lived in a small dark room 
no larger than 8 x 10 feet). The absence of proper kitchens, latrines, electricity, 
and water showed that the living conditions had not visibly improved compared to 
previous years. 
 
Child labor: 
 The Human Rights Watch research team found six children less than 14 years of 
age working and concluded that "tolerance to forced recruitment of minors is one 
of the most disturbing elements of the practices used by the CEA." 
 
 
 
 
  P a g e  | 118 
ILO: Report by the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and 
Recommendations (CEACR), 1991. 
 
In 1991, the CEACR was assigned the task of evaluating the measures taken by the 
government of the Dominican Republic to comply with ILO Conventions. The CEACR 
also sought to follow up on the recommendations made by the ILO in 1983. While it 
noted some improvements, it also noted many areas in which exploitation continued. 
 
The CEACR highlighted some advances made by the Dominican government, such as 
the regularization of the migration status of some Haitian citizens through Decree No. 
417-90; a reduction in the number of raids and the incidence of forced recruitment; the 
establishment of hiring points on the border;97 the creation of labor inspection 
delegations; and the demilitarization of the bateyes.  
 
Nevertheless, the CEACR criticized that the majority of workers continued to arrive on 
sugar plantations through intermediaries, known as buscones, who used deceit to 
induce them to work in the sugar industry. The CEACR reported that the CEA paid 
these buscones and that their recruitment practices could not be considered as ―part of 
a free labor relationship. The CEACR also noted that working hours continued to be 
excessive and that payment mechanisms did not guarantee that workers would receive 
the minimum wage for an eight hour workday. In addition, workers were paid in 
vouchers, which they exchanged for cash or food with high interest rates. The 
Commission reported that although there had been some improvements in the systems 
for weighing sugarcane cut by workers, both workers and workers‘ organizations 
continued to complain of fraud in the weighing of sugarcane. Finally, the Commission 
reported that workers were not covered by social security, even when deductions for 
social security were made from their pay and workers did not receive pensions, or 
received pensions so small that they could not live off of them.  
 
In its recommendations, the CEACR insisted that a labor law reform was needed to 
guarantee that braceros‘ rights to the fair payment of their wages were protected, as 
stipulated by ILO Convention 95, which had also been recommended by the ILO in 
1983. In particular, the Commission noted that it was necessary to ensure that workers 
were not paid with vouchers that cash payments be made directly to workers, that 
workers‘ right to wages not be impeded, and that workers be informed of their 
conditions of employment and wage deductions. Finally, the Commission recommended 
the continuation of programs to provide workers with low-priced food (such as the 
INESPRE and Central Romana programs), as well as programs to distribute parcels of 
land to families of sugarcane workers, so that they could plant crops on them (pp. 315 
ss.). 
 
 
National Coalition for Haitian Rights (NCHR): “Beyond the Bateyes.” 1996. 
 
A report of the National Coalition for Haitian Rights (NCHR) was written by Patrick 
Gavigan, after an NCHR mission was sent to the Dominican Republic to evaluate the 
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immigration status of Haitians and individuals of Haitian descent born in the Dominican 
Republic. The report found a number of issues that plagued Haitian migrants and their 
descendents, including issues facing those working in the sugar industry.  
 
The report noted that the crisis facing the CEA sugar plantations caused the CEA to de-
prioritize labor issues. Gavigan noted the absence of improvements in labor conditions 
since the Americas Watch/Human Rights Watch report of 1995. The NCHR report also 
noted that the mission confirmed the persistence of forced recruitment by CEA 
buscones and the armed forced, although forced military recruitment had been 
significantly reduced after the 1991 military coup in Haiti.  
 
The NCHR also reported forced labor during the 1996 harvest, stating that, ―it appears 
that the Army is using round-ups to obtain forced labor for the 1996 sugar cane harvest. 
A Dominican human rights NGO, the Dominican Human Rights Committee, issued a 
statement in January 1996 claiming that hundreds of Haitians had been detained by the 
army and transported to cut cane. The report stated that a group of 500 Haitians 
collected over several days had been transported in 13 minibuses from Santo Domingo 
to various bateyes pertaining to the Ozama sugar mill, noting that many of the Haitians 
had been rounded-up while working on construction sites near the capital.‖ They also 
cited examples of forced recruitment of Haitian adults and children in the Dominican 
Republic and Haiti for work in the sugar sector, which came from multiple sources, 
including press articles, NGO reports, and interviews carried out in the Dominican 
Republic (pp. 32-3). 
 
 
Anti-Slavery International: “Forced Labor on Sugar Cane Plantations in the 
Dominican Republic.” 1998. 
 
In May 1998, Anti-Slavery International submitted a document entitled, ―Forced Labor 
on Sugar Cane Plantations in the Dominican Republic‖ to the UN Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. This document alleged that the Dominican 
Republic was in violation of ILO Convention 29, as well as the UN Supplementary 
Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices 
Similar to Slavery of 1956.  
 
Anti-Slavery International recognized that the new Dominican Labor Code of 1992 had 
resulted in a ―significant reduction in the numbers of children working on the sugar cane 
plantations and that trade unions had been allowed to recruit on the estates.‖ Despite 
these advances, Anti-Slavery International asserted that recruitment mechanisms and 
working conditions on the State sugar plantations continued to be in contravention with 
ILO Convention 29 and the UN Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, 
the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery. Specifically, the 
organization reported the persistence of a military presence on the bateyes, which led to 
the illegal detention of braceros;  cases of physical and sexual violence against 
braceros and their family members; the continued payment of braceros with vouchers 
despite an express prohibition in the Labor Code; the non-payment of braceros during 
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their first three months of work; fraud in the weighing of sugarcane; and withholdings of 
payments to cover a return trip to Haiti, which workers did not actually receive at the 
end of the harvest.  
 
Anti-Slavery International demanded, among other things, the elimination of military 
posts in the bateyes, that recruitment be carried out locally by unions and not by 
buscones, the provision of written employment contracts and information about working 
conditions to workers, weekly cash payments to workers, and the implementation of an 
inspections system for the weighing of sugarcane. 
 
 
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. “Report on the Human Rights 
Situation in the Dominican Republic.” 1999. 
 
In 1999, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights carried out an on-site visit to 
the Dominican Republic, followed by the publication of a report entitled ―Report on the 
Human Rights Situation in the Dominican Republic.‖  Chapter IX of the Report, entitled 
―Situation of Haitian Migrant Workers and their Families in the Dominican Republic,‖ 
analyzed the issues facing Haitian migrant workers. The report stated that, ―the working 
and living conditions in the bateyes are extremely difficult.‖ The Commission urged the 
Dominican government to ―adopt measures aimed at improving and regularizing the 
situation of undocumented Haitian workers by distributing work permits and residency 
cards; and to legalize the situation of their children, in cases that proceed pursuant to 
the principle of jus soli, in keeping with Article 11 of the Constitution.‖ The report also 
highlighted complaints made by organizations such as el Movimiento de Mujeres 
Dominico-Haitianas (MUDHA) and el Comité Dominicano de Derechos Humanos that 
workers continued to be paid with vouchers in some areas and that workers‘ freedom of 
movement continued to be restricted, including through ―the presence of armed guards 
in the cane fields, who oversee the migrant laborers to ensure they not flee the 
plantations"98 (CIDH, 1999). 
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Appendix 6: Focus Group Interview Guide 
 
I. Contratación 
-Contratación. ¿Contratan a todo el que llegue? ¿Quién? ¿Cómo les asignan los 
barracones o casas? 
-Entrega de Carnet de Migración (Año, lugar y qué costo tiene o ha tenido) 
-Retención de documentos: Verificar si a ellos o a algunos de sus compañeros les 
han retenido algún documento de identificación personal. 
 
II. Asuntos Migratorios 
-Buscón (para quién trabajaba, qué les ofrecía, cuánto pagaron) 
-Autoridades dominicanas y haitianas (presencia, problemas, acercamiento) 
- Han podido ir a Haití y regresar con el Carnet de migración. Qué necesitan para poder 
regresar a Haití? 
 
III. Derechos laborales 
-¿Conocen sus derechos? 
-¿Tienen contrato laboral? 
-Sobre representante sindicato en Bateyes CR (¿lo conocen? ¿Qué hace?) ¿Qué hace 
el sindicato? (¿cobro?) 
-Bonificación (Parámetros. ¿Conocen carácter legal?) 
-A los que llegan por primera vez: ¿Volverían a trabajar en la caña? (¿Porque?) 
-Accidentes o Enfermedad  
-¿Cuánto les descuentan por el seguro? 
-Prefieren ir a Ingenio Público o Privado. 
 
IV. Aspectos cotidianos 
-Compra de comida!.. (¿cómo pagan? ¿Cuándo pagan? - (¿cómo funciona el 
sistema?... Identificar relación con ajustero u otro). 
-¿Cuánto les descuentan por la vivienda? 
-¿Les hacen otros descuentos? 
 
VI. Terminación del vinculo laboral 
-¿Qué hacen cuando termina la zafra? ¿Se quedan? ¿Porqué se quedan? 
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Appendix 7: Questionnaire 
 
            
 
PROVINCIA………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
MUNICIPIO…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
 
NOMBRE DEL BATEY________________________________________________ 
 
EMPLEADOR _______________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Buenos días! Mi nombre es __________.  Gracias por su atención. Trabajo para una ONG y estamos 
haciendo un estudio sobre vida y trabajo en el batey. ¿Puedo hacerle unas preguntas durante unos 
minutos?. Las informaciones que usted me dé son confidenciales (no se divulgará ninguna información 
personal). 
 
 
RESULTADO DE LA ENTREVISTA 
 
Entrevista 
Completa............................................. 
Entrevista 
Incompleta……………………………… 
Entrevista 
rechazada……………………………… 
Otro___________________________ 
(Especifique) 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
4 
 
 
 
 
DÍA 
 
MES 
 
AÑO 
 
RESULTADO 
 
 
 
 
  
HORA FINAL 
                        
HORA DE INICIO 
                                      
 
ENCUESTADOR/A 
 
 
 
SUPERVISOR(A) 
 
CRITICO(A) 
 
DIGITADOR(A) 
 
 
 EL/LA ENCUESTADOR/A NO LLENA AQUI 
SECCION: I – INFORMACIÓN PERSONAL y FAMILIAR 
No. Preguntas y filtros Categorías de codificación Pasar 
a 
P101 
SEXO Hombre 
Mujer 
1 
2 
 
P102 
¿Cuál es su edad en 
este momento? 
EDAD 
P103 
¿Habla español? Si 
Regular/Sólo un poco 
No 
No sabe/no responde 
1 
2 
3 
96 
 
  
   
2 0 1 0 
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P104 
¿Sabe leer y escribir? Sí 
Regular/Sólo un poco  
No 
No sabe/no responde 
1 
2 
2 
96 
 
 
 
P 106 
 
P105 
 
¿En qué idioma/s? (Puede 
marcar más de una 
respuesta) 
Kreyol 
Francés 
Español 
Inglés 
No sabe/No responde 
1 
2 
3 
4 
96 
 
 
P106 
¿Cuál es su nivel escolar?  Llegó hasta la Primaria 
Llegó hasta secundaria 
Bachiller 
Nunca fue a la escuela 
Otro(especificar)_______________________________ 
No sabe 
1 
2 
3 
4 
6 
96 
 
 
 
 
P107 
¿Cuál es su estado 
civil? 
 
 
En pareja (unión libre)  
Casado 
Soltero 
Separado 
Divorciado 
Viudo 
No sabe/no responde 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
96 
 
 
 
 
P109 
P108 
¿Su esposa/o o pareja 
es haitiana/o o 
dominicano/a? 
Dominicana 
Haitiana 
No sabe/No responde 
1 
2 
96 
 
P109 
¿Cuántos Hijos/as tiene 
en total? 
                                               
                                                No. de hijos…………………. 
                  No tiene hijos………………….…………………..1 
No sabe/no responde……….…………………..96 
  
P110 
¿Vive con algún 
miembro de su familia 
en RD?: mujer, hijos, 
papá, mamá, hermanos, 
etc. 
Si 
No 
No sabe/no responde 
1 
2 
96 
 
 
P112 
P111 
Señale los miembros de 
su familia con quienes 
vive (Marcar TODOS) 
Mujer 
Hijos/as 
Papá 
Mamá 
Hermanos/as 
Primos/as; Tíos/as; Sobrinos/as 
Otro (especifique)__________________________ 
No sabe/No responde 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
96 
 
P112 
¿Tiene Familia en 
Haití? 
Sí 
No 
No sabe/No responde 
1 
2 
96 
 
 
 
P114 
P111 
¿Les manda dinero? Sí 
Anteriormente les enviaba pero ya no 
Nunca les ha enviado dinero 
1 
2 
3 
 
 
P113 
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No sabe/No responde 96 
P112 
¿Más o menos cuánto 
dinero les manda y con 
qué frecuencia?  
 
Mensual (RD$_____________)  
Cada varios meses (RD$_______________)  
Una vez al año (RD$_________________) 
Cada varios años (RD$_______________) 
Otro 
(especifique_____________________________________) 
No sabe/No responde 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
96 
 
 
 
P114 
P113 
¿Por qué no les envía 
dinero? 
No tiene contacto con ellos 
No tiene dinero para mandarles (no puede ahorrar) 
No tiene cómo mandarles dinero 
No le permiten mandar dinero (señalar 
quién)_________________________ 
No sabe/No responde 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
 
P114 
¿Qué hizo luego del 
terremoto que hubo en 
Haití el 12 de enero de 
este año? 
Contactó a su familia/amigos pero pudo hacer nada porque 
no tenía dinero 
Intentó contactar a su familia/amigos pero no contactarlos 
Le mandó dinero a su familia en Haití 
Fue a Haití a llevarle dinero y/o ayuda a su familia y se 
regreso a RD 
Se trajo a su familia a RD 
Nada, porque no tiene familia/amigos en Haití 
Otra 
(especifique)___________________________________ 
No sabe/No responde 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
96 
 
SECCION II. RESIDENCIA Y ACTIVIDAD MIGRATORIA 
P201 
¿En qué país nació 
usted? 
En Rep. Dom. (indicar Provincia y 
sección)___________________________ 
En Haití  
No sabe no responde 
1 
2 
96 
P204 
P202 
(Si nació en Haití) ¿De 
qué departamento 
proviene? 
Norte 
Nordeste (Fort Liberté, Ouanaminthe) 
Noroeste (Port de Paix) 
Centro (Hinche, Belladere) 
Oeste (Puerto Principe, Fond Parisien)  
Artibonite (Gonaives) 
Sur (Les Cayes) 
Sudeste (Jakmel, Belle-Anse, Morigot, Ansapit) 
Grand’Anse 
Nippes 
Otro 
(especificar)______________________________________ 
No sabe/No responde 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
96 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
P203 
¿Tiene algún 
documento de 
identificación personal 
de Haití? (Especificar 
CUAL) 
Acta de Nacimiento 
Cédula (Carte d’Identité) 
Pasaporte 
Otro (especificar)________________________________ 
No  
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
 
 
 
P206 
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 No sabe/No responde 96 
P204 
-Si nació en RD 
(Verificar P201)-¿De 
donde son o eran sus 
padres? 
Madre y Padre haitianos 
Madre dominicana y padre haitiano 
Madre haitiana y padre dominicano 
Madre y padre dominicanos 
No sabe/ No responde 
1 
2 
3 
4 
96 
 
P205 
-Si nació en RD-¿Tiene 
algún documento de 
identificación personal 
de RD? (Especificar) 
Acta de Nacimiento 
Cédula de Identidad 
Pasaporte 
Otro (especificar)________________________________ 
No 
No sabe/No responde 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
96 
 
 
 
P206 
¿Dónde vive cuando no 
está trabajando en la 
caña, durante el tiempo 
muerto?  
 
En Haití 
En el mismo batey 
En RD, en otra provincia/comunidad(especificar)_____-
__________________ 
Otro 
(especifique)____________________________________ 
No sabe/No responde 
1 
2   
3 
4 
96 
 
 
 
P208 
 
 
P207 
SI VIVE EN HAITÍ, EN 
EL TIEMPO MUERTO 
¿Cuánto tiempo tiene 
viniendo a RD? 
Menos de 1 año 
Menos de 2 años 
2-5 años 
6-9 años 
10-20 años 
Más de 20 años 
No sabe/No responde  
1 
2 
3        
4 
5 
6 
96 
 
 
 
P209 
P208 
¿Cuánto tiempo tiene 
viviendo en RD? 
 
Nació en RD 
Menos de 1 año 
Menos de 2 años 
2-5 años 
6-9 años 
10-20 años 
Más de 20 años 
No sabe/No responde 
1 
2 
3        
4 
5 
6 
7 
96 
 
 
 
 
 
P209 
¿Cuánto tiempo tiene 
viniendo a ESTE batey 
o viviendo en él?  
Nació en el batey 
Menos de 1 año(señalar 
MES)________________________ 
Menos de 2 años 
2-5 años 
6-9 años 
10-20 años 
Más de 20 años 
No sabe/No responde  
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
5 
96 
P401 
 
 
 
 
 
 
P210 
¿Por qué llegó a ESTE 
Batey?  
NO LEER 
RESPUESTAS 
Le ofrecieron buenas condiciones de trabajo 
El buscón lo dejó en el batey 
El amigo/conductor lo dejó en el batey 
Tenía familiares/amigos en el batey 
Había vivido anteriormente en el batey 
Otro (especificar)_______________________________ 
No sabe/No responde 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
96 
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P211 
¿Cuándo fue la última 
vez que estuvo en 
Haití? 
 
Nunca ha ido a Haití 
Desde que vino a RD, nunca ha regresado a Haití 
Menos de 1 año 
Menos de 2 años 
2-5 años 
6-9 años 
10 – 20 
Más de 20 años 
Otro 
(especifique)____________________________________ 
No sabe/No responde 
1   
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
96 
P401 
 
P213 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
P301 
P212 
Esa vez, ¿Por qué 
regresó a Haití? 
Porque terminó la zafra o el trabajo que realizaba (para 
regresar a su casa) 
Porque no encontraba trabajo en RD 
Para visitar/ llevar dinero a su familia 
Fue deportado por migración 
Otro(especifique)__________________________________
_____________ 
No sabe/no responde 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
96 
 
 
 
 
 
P301 
 
P213 
¿Por qué nunca ha 
regresado? 
 
No tiene dinero 
No tiene contacto con su familia en Haití 
No tiene familia en Haití  
No le permiten regresar (detalle 
quién)______________________________ 
Otro(especifique)__________________________________
_____________ 
No sabe/no responde 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
96 
 
SECCION III. TRAYECTO HAITÍ-RD 
LEER: POR FAVOR RESPONDA A LAS SIGUIENTES PREGUNTAS SOBRE EL ÚLTIMO RECORRIDO 
QUE HIZO DESDE HAITÍ HACIA RD 
P301 
¿Cuándo fue la última vez que vino a 
RD desde Haití? 
Encuestador: Debe coincidir con 
P211 
Menos de un año (SEÑALAR MES)__________ 
Menos de 2 años 
2-5 años 
6-9 años 
10-20 años 
Más de 20 años 
No sabe/No responde 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
96 
 
P302 
¿Por cuál punto de la frontera cruzó 
para llegar RD? 
Independencia (Jimaní/El Aguacate/Puerto 
Escondido) 
Pedernales (El Manguito/Ansapit) 
Dajabón 
Elías Piña 
Barahona 
Otro 
(especificar)______________________________ 
No sabe/No responde 
1 
 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
 
96 
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P303 
¿Por qué medio de transporte cruzó la 
frontera? 
 
A pie 
Motoconcho  
Guagua  
Camión 
Otro(especificar)__________________________ 
No sabe/No responde 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
96 
 
P304 
¿Cuántas personas cruzaron la 
frontera con usted?  
 
                                  NO. DE PERSONAS 
 
No sabe/No responde………………….96 
  
P305 
¿Quién o quienes le ayudaron a 
cruzar o le permitió el paso? (NO 
LEER. Puede marcar más de una 
respuesta) 
Buscón dominicano 
Buscón haitiano 
Policía dominicano 
Policía haitiano 
Militar dominicano 
Agente de migración dominicano 
Nadie/Ninguno 
Otro(especificar)__________________________ 
No sabe/No responde 
1       2 
1       2 
1       2 
1       2 
1       2 
1       2 
1       2 
1       2 
1       2 
 
 
 
 
 
P
3
0
8 
 
P306 
(SI CRUZÓ CON BUSCÓN), ¿Cómo 
contactó al buscón? 
 
A través de un amigo/familiar 
Lo conocía desde antes  
El buscón lo contactó a usted para ofrecerle 
trabajo 
Otro(especificar)__________________________ 
No sabe/No responde 
1 
2 
3 
 
4 
96 
 
P307 
(SI CRUZÓ A TRAVÉS DE BUSCÓN) 
¿Sabe para quién trabajaba el 
buscón? 
Sí (ESPECIFICAR _______________________) 
No 
No sabe/No responde 
1 
2 
96 
 
P308 
Después de cruzar la frontera, ¿cómo 
se transportó? 
En viaje 
En camión (con buscón) 
En guagua (con buscón) 
En motoconcho 
En guagua (compromiso) 
Otro 
(especifique)_____________________________ 
No sabe/No responde 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
 
96 
 
 
 
P 
3 
1 
0 
P309 
(SI CRUZÓ A TRAVÉS DE BUSCÓN) 
¿Dónde lo dejó el buscón o la guagua 
(si vino en viaje) 
En el batey en el que vive ahora 
En batey del CEA  
En Ingenio del CEA 
En Batey del CR 
En Batey de CAEI 
En Ingenio de CAEI 
En Batey Ingenio Barahona  
En Santo Domingo 
Otra 
(especifique)_____________________________
______ 
No sabe/No responde 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
96 
 
P310 ¿Cuánto dinero tuvo que pagar  
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en total?                                                   RD$ 
 
                                                  No tuvo que pagar…….1        
                                                                                                    P316                
                                                  No sabe/No responde..96 
P311 
¿A quién o quienes le tuvo que 
pagar? (Puede marcar varias 
opciones) 
Buscón dominicano 
Buscón haitiano 
Policía dominicano 
Policía haitiano 
Militar dominicano 
Militar haitiano  
Agente de migración dominicano 
Otro(especificar)__________________________ 
No sabe/No responde 
1       2 
1       2 
1       2 
1       2 
1       2 
1       2 
1       2 
1       2 
1       2 
 
P312 
¿Cómo consiguió el dinero?  
 
Prestamista 
Se lo prestó un familiar/amigo 
Pagó con su propio dinero 
Otro (especificar) _________________________ 
No sabe/No responde 
1 
2 
3 
4 
96 
 
 
P316 
P313 
¿Le cobraron intereses por el 
dinero? 
 
Sí 
No 
No sabe/No responde 
1 
2 
3 
 
 
P315 
P314 
¿Cuánto pagó o va a tener que 
pagar de interés? 
 
 
                                                                                   
% 
                                      No sabe/No responde.… 
 
 
96 
 
P315 
¿Todavía debe ese dinero?  Sí 
No 
No sabe/No responde 
1 
2 
3 
 
P316 
¿Qué situaciones encontró  
durante su viaje de entrada a 
RD?  
NO LEER RESPUESTAS 
No encontró ninguna dificultad o problema 
Las autoridades dominicanas le pidieron papeles 
Las autoridades dominicanas lo obligaron a 
pagarles  
Las autoridades dominicanas lo despojaron de 
sus bienes 
Las autoridades dominicanas lo detuvieron o lo 
deportaron 
Las autoridades dominicanas lo agredieron 
físicamente 
Asaltantes le robaron sus pertenencias 
 Otro (especifique)________________________ 
No sabe/No responde 
1 
2 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
8 
96 
 
SECCION IV. TRABAJO EN LA CAÑA 
P401 
¿Cuánto tiempo tiene cortando caña en RD?: Menos de 1 año 
Menos de 2 años 
2-5 años 
6-9 años 
10-20 años 
Más de 20 años  
No sabe/No responde 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
96 
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P402 
¿Qué hacía antes de empezar a cortar caña 
en RD?  
Trabajaba en Haití  
Trabajaba en la Construcción en RD 
Trabajaba en cosecha 
café/arroz/tomate, etc. en RD 
Trabajaba en su conuco o en conuco de 
familiar 
Trabajo informal (Vendedor ambulante, 
etc.) 
 No tenía trabajo 
Otro (especificar) _________________ 
No sabe/No responde 
1 
2 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
7 
96 
 
 
 
 
 
 
P404 
 
 
 
 
 
P403 
¿Qué trabajo hacía en Haití? Asalariado (operario, obrero, 
construcción, taller, etc.) 
Trabajaba en agricultura 
Trabajaba en su conuco o en conuco de 
familiar 
Trabajo informal (Vendedor ambulante, 
etc.) 
 No tenía trabajo 
Otro (especificar) __________________ 
No sabe/No responde 
1 
 
2 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
6 
96 
 
P404 
¿Trabaja para un ingenio o un colono?  
 
Ingenio   
Colono 
Otro 
(especifique)______________________ 
No sabe/No responde 
1 
2 
3 
 
96 
 
P405 
¿Desde hace cuánto tiempo trabaja para este 
ingenio/colono? 
 
Menos de 1 año 
Menos de 2 años 
2-5 años 
6-9 años 
10-20 años 
Más de 20 años  
No sabe/No responde 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
96 
 
P406 
¿El ingenio/colono le entregó una ficha o 
número al empezar a trabajar? 
 
Sí 
No  
No sabe/No responde 
1 
2 
96 
 
P407 
¿El ingenio/colono le entregó un Carnet de 
Migración (canetización)? 
EN CASO POSITIVO, PEDIR QUE SE LO MUESTRE (SI ES 
POSIBLE) Y ANOTAR AÑO DE EXPEDICION  
Sí 
AÑO DE EXPEDICIÓN_______________ 
No 
No sabe/No responde 
1 
 
2 
96 
 
P408 
¿Cuál es su trabajo principal en la caña 
durante la zafra? (SELECCIONAR UNA SÓLA 
OPCIÓN) 
 
Picador 
Carretero 
Vagonero 
Desyerbe/Cultivo (Cerclé) 
Otro (especifique) 
___________________________ 
No sabe/No responde 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
 
96 
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P409 
Regularmente, ¿a qué hora comienza su 
jornada de trabajo y a qué hora termina? 
 
 
 
 
 
No sabe/No responde……96 
Hora de entrada   
Hora de salida  
 
  
P410 
¿Cuántos días a la semana trabaja?   
                         DIAS 
 
No sabe/No responde……96 
  
P411 
¿Cómo le pagan a usted? 
 
Por toneladas 
Por jornada/día trabajado 
Otro (especificar) 
___________________________ 
No sabe/No responde 
1 
2 
3 
 
96 
P 
4 
1 
3 
P412 
SI LE PAGAN POR TONELADA, ¿Está 
conforme con el pesaje de la caña? 
 
Sí  
No 
(especificar)_______________________ 
No están pesando la caña 
No sabe/No responde 
1 
2 
 
3 
96 
 
P413 
¿Cuántos pesos le pagan por tonelada/por 
jornada? 
 
               RD$ 
 
No sabe/No responde……… 
 
 
 
96 
 
P414 
¿Cada cuanto tiempo le pagan?  
 
Semanal 
Quincenal 
Mensual 
  No sabe/ no responde 
1 
2 
3 
96 
 
P415 
¿De cuánto fue su último pago?  
                RD$ 
 
No sabe/No responde……… 
 
 
 
96 
 
P416 
¿Le pagan a tiempo? Sí, siempre 
A veces 
No 
No sabe/No responde 
1 
2 
3 
96 
P418 
 
 
 
P418 
P417 
¿Por qué razón? 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
P418 
¿Le hacen descuentan de su salario sus 
herramientas de trabajo (Machete, lima, 
lentes, mocha etc.)? 
Sí 
No 
No sabe/No responde 
1 
2 
96 
 
P419 
En su trabajo, usted cuenta con (LEER. 
Marcar más de una opción): 
Transporte para ir al corte 
Agua en el corte 
Almuerzo en el corte 
Seguro Médico 
Bonificación (Bono) 
Vacaciones 
Un día libre cada semana 
Ninguna de las anteriores 
1       2 
1       2 
1       2 
1       2 
1       2 
1       2 
1       2 
1       2 
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No sabe/no responde 1       2 
P420 
¿Usted se ha enfermado o ha tenido 
algún accidente de trabajo durante la 
zafra? ¿alguna vez,varias veces, 
ninguna? 
 
Sólo alguna vez 
Varias veces 
Ninguna 
No sabe/No responde 
1 
2 
3 
96 
 
P422 
P421 
Cuando Ud. se ha enfermado o 
accidentado, ¿Qué ha hecho? (PUEDE 
MARCAR MÁS DE UNA RESPUESTA) 
Curandero del Batey 
Consultorio/clínica PÚBLICA 
Consultorio/clínica del SEGURO 
Consultorio/clínica del INGENIO 
Compro alguna medicina 
Nada 
Otros (especificar)___________________ 
1      2 
1      2 
1      2 
1      2 
1      2 
1      2 
1      2 
 
P422 
¿Se siente conforme con la manera en 
que su supervisor lo trata a usted y a sus 
compañeros?  
Sí 
Más o menos conforme 
No 
No sabe/No responde 
1 
2 
3 
96 
P425 
 
 
 
P423 
¿Por qué no está conforme?  
(NO LEER) 
 
Le habla mal 
Le agrede físicamente (detallar________) 
Le amenaza 
Es violento 
Otro (especificar)___________________ 
No sabe/No responde 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
96 
 
P425 
 
 
 
P425 
P424 
¿Con qué lo ha amenazado?  
 
Con no pagarle 
Con pagarle menos de lo que le toca 
Con despedirlo 
Con obligarle a trabajar más horas 
Con denunciarlo a Migración 
Con no contratarlo la zafra que viene 
Otro (especifique) 
_______________________ 
No sabe/ no responde 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
96 
 
P425 
¿Qué le gustaría que cambiara de las condiciones de trabajo en la caña? 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
P426 
¿En el tiempo que tiene trabajando para ese empleador, considera que las cosas han cambiado? (Si o No, 
y ¿Por qué?) 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
SECCION V. LIBERTAD DE MOVIMIENTO 
P501 
¿Usted ha faltado uno o varios días al corte en 
esta zafra (porque no ha podido ir o no ha 
querido)? 
Sí 
No  
Otro (especifique)___________________ 
No sabe/No responde 
1 
2 
3 
96 
 
P502 
¿Qué pasa si usted falta uno o varios días al 
corte? 
 
El supervisor (mayordomo, etc.) le llama 
la atención 
El supervisor le pone algún tipo de castigo 
Nada, el supervisor no le da problema 
Otro 
(especifique)_______________________
1 
2 
3 
4 
96 
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____ 
No sabe/No responde 
P503 
¿Usted puede salir cuando quiere del batey?  
 
Sí 
No  
Otro 
(especifique)_______________________ 
No sabe/No responde 
1 
2 
3 
 
96 
 
P504 
¿Usted puede dejar el trabajo y no volver, 
aunque no haya terminado zafra?  
 
Si 
  No  
No sabe/No responde 
1 
2 
96 
P506 
 
P506 
P505 
¿Por qué no puede? 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
  
P506 
SÓLO SI TIENE MÁS DE UN AÑO 
CORTANDO CAÑA (Si P401 NO ES 1)  
Generalmente, ¿Qué hace cuando termina la 
zafra? (en el tiempo muerto)  
 
Se queda en el batey 
Se va del batey pero se queda en RD 
Vuelve a Haití unas cuantas 
semanas/meses y luego regresa a RD 
Vuelve a Haití hasta que empiece la zafra 
otra vez 
Otro (especificar)___________________ 
No aplica 
No sabe/No responde 
1 
2 
 
3 
4 
 
5 
6 
96 
 
 
 
 
P508 
P507 
SÓLO SI TIENE MÁS DE UN AÑO 
CORTANDO CAÑA (Si P401 NO ES 1)  
¿Por qué se queda en el Batey?  (PUEDE 
MARCAR VARIAS RESPUESTAS) 
 
Tiene a su familia en el Batey 
Trabaja en la siembra/desyerbe 
Trabaja en un conuco cerca del batey 
No tiene dinero para ir a otro lugar 
El supervisor no lo deja ir 
El supervisor/jefe tiene sus papeles 
y/documentos personales 
Otra (especificar): ___________________ 
No sabe/No responde 
1      2 
1      2 
1      2 
1      2 
1      2 
 
1      2 
1      2 
1      2 
 
P508 
¿Qué piensa hacer cuando termine ESTA 
zafra? 
 
Quedarse en el batey  
Trabajar en otro sector económico en RD 
(especificar)_______________________
_ 
Regresar a Haití 
Otro (especificar)___________________ 
No sabe/No responde 
1 
2 
 
4 
5 
 
96 
 
 
 
P601 
P509 
SI SE QUEDA EN EL BATEY, ¿Por qué se 
queda? 
Tiene a su familia en el Batey 
Trabaja en la siembra/desyerbe 
Trabaja en un conuco cerca del batey 
No tiene dinero para ir a otro lugar 
El supervisor no lo deja ir 
El supervisor/jefe tiene sus papeles 
y/documentos personales 
Otra (especificar):___________________ 
No sabe/No responde 
1      2 
1      2 
1      2 
1      2 
1      2 
 
1      2 
1      2 
1      2 
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SECCION VI. FACILIDADES y ASPECTOS COTIDIANOS 
P601 
¿Qué tipo de vivienda le facilita su empleador? 
(LEER) 
 
Cuarto en Barracón con otros 
trabajadores 
Cuarto en barracón con su familia 
Vivienda en casa con otros trabajadores 
Vivienda en casa sólo con su familia 
Vivienda en casa compartiendo con otra 
familia 
Otros (especificar)___________________ 
No sabe/No responde 
1 
 
2 
3 
4 
5 
 
6 
96 
 
P602 
¿Con cuántas personas comparte su cuarto o 
habitación? 
 
 
                                        No. Personas 
No sabe/No responde…96  
  
P603 
¿Además de la vivienda, que otras facilidades 
le da su empleador a los trabajadores y sus 
familiares en el batey? (MARCAR MÁS DE 
UNA RESPUESTA) 
Colchón 
Luz eléctrica 
Agua Potable 
Sanitario 
Baño 
Escuela para los niños 
Alfabetización y/o formación técnica 
Fiestas/celebraciones para los 
trabajadores 
Otro (especificar)___________________ 
1      2 
1      2 
1      2 
1      2 
1      2 
1      2 
1      2 
1      2 
1      2 
1      2 
 
 
P604 
¿A usted le cobran o le hacen descuentos de 
su salario por la vivienda y las facilidades 
mencionadas? 
SÍ 
No  
No sabe/No responde 
1 
2 
3 
 
P605 
¿Cómo compra su comida? (PUEDE MARCAR 
VARIAS) 
 
Con dinero en efectivo 
Con tickets 
Crédito (coge “fiado”) 
Otro (especifique)___________________ 
No sabe/No responde 
1 
2 
3 
4 
96 
 
P606 
Usted oye, lee, ve o usa  
(LEER): 
Televisión 
Radio 
Internet 
Teléfono publico 
Periódico 
Revistas 
Ninguno 
Otro 
(especifique)_______________________ 
No sabe/No responde 
1      2 
1      2 
1      2 
1      2 
1      2 
1      2 
1      2 
1      2 
1      2 
1      2 
 
P607 
¿Cómo se comunica con sus familiares y 
amigos tanto en RD como en Haití?  
 
Celular propio 
Celular prestado 
Celular alquilado 
Teléfono público 
Internet 
Ninguno 
Otro(especifique)___________________ 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
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P608 
¿Qué hace en su tiempo libre? (MARCAR MÁS 
DE UNA RESPUESTA) 
Va a la iglesia 
Comparte con familia 
Comparte con amigos dominicanos 
Comparte con amigos haitianos 
Va a otro pueblo o batey a visitar a familia 
o amigos 
Juega dominó 
Va a una disco terraza 
Otra 
(especifique)_______________________ 
No sabe/No responde 
1      2 
1      2 
1      2 
1      2 
1      2 
1      2 
1      2 
1      2 
1      2 
1      2 
1      2 
 
…Muchas Gracias!! 
SECCIÓN VII. OBSERVACIONES Y COMENTARIOS FINALES (SÓLO PARA EL/LA ENCUESTADOR/A) 
P701 
Señalar idioma en el que hizo la entrevista Español 
Kreyol 
Español y kreyol 
1 
2 
3 
 
P702 
¿El trabajador podía desenvolverse 
cómodamente en español?  
Sí 
No 
1 
2 
 
P703 
¿Hay señales visibles que indican que el 
trabajador no puede irse libremente de los 
bateyes (alambres de púa, cerraduras, 
supervisores/guardias armados, etc.)? 
Sí 
(especificar)_______________________ 
No 
1 
 
2 
 
P704 
 
¿El trabajador demostró alguna señal de 
ansiedad, miedo o intimidación en su lenguaje 
corporal o gestos?  
Sí 
No 
1 
2 
 
P705 
¿Tuvo alguna dificultad/obstáculo para hacer la 
entrevista? ¿Había otras personas presentes o 
tan cerca que podían escuchar? ¿Quiénes?  
Sí 
(especificar)_______________________ 
No 
1 
 
2 
 
P706 
Observaciones y/o Comentarios: 
________________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  P a g e  | 135 
Appendix 8: Presence of ILO Indicators of Forced Labor 
 
As discussed in the Methodology section, Verité analyzed its findings with respect to the 
indicators of forced labor presented in the ILO‘s 2011 publication, Hard to See, Harder 
to Count: Survey Guidelines to Estimate Forced Labour of Adults and Children. A chart 
of these indicators follows.  
 
  Present 
      In
d
ic
a
to
rs
 o
f u
n
fre
e
 re
c
ru
itm
e
n
t o
f a
d
u
lts
 
Strong Indicators of 
Involuntariness 
 
Tradition, birth 
(birth/descent into 
'slave' or bonded 
status) 
Coercive recruitment 
(abduction, 
confinement during the 
recruitment process) 
Workers recruited by the state-run CEA under the ―quota‖ 
system were recruited, smuggled across the border, and 
transported by buscones tied to the CEA and complicit 
migration and military authorities, who were legally 
authorized to do so. The workers were confined during 
transport, during which they had to sleep in the open and 
were provided with little or no food for up to a week.  
Sale of the worker  
Recruitment linked to 
debt (advance or loan) 
Workers surveyed reported that they had to take out loans to 
pay smuggling fees to buscones or bus drivers. Although the 
workers were not indebted to the buscones or their 
employers, they did have to take out loans from friends, 
family members, and money lenders who sometimes 
charged high interest rates. 
Deception about the 
nature of the work 
Medium Indicators of 
Involuntariness 
 
Deceptive recruitment 
(regarding working 
conditions, content, or 
legality of employment 
contract, housing and 
living conditions, legal 
documentation or 
acquisition of legal 
migrant status, job 
location or employer, 
wages/earnings) 
Workers surveyed showed low levels of awareness about 
the conditions of their employment, especially surrounding 
working conditions, payments, deductions, and benefits. 
While researchers did not find evidence of outright 
deception, they did find that workers were not informed by 
recruiters or their employers of their conditions of 
employment, either verbally or in written form. In addition, 
many workers who had been working in the sugar sector for 
years still registered low levels of awareness about their 
conditions of employment. 
Deceptive recruitment 
through promises of 
marriage 
Strong Indicators of 
Menace of Penalty 
 
Denunciation to Workers recruited by the state-run CEA under the ―quota‖ 
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authorities system were recruited, smuggled across the border, and 
transported by buscones tied to the CEA and complicit 
migration and military authorities, who were legally 
authorized to do so. These workers were transported by 
clearly marked migration agents and soldiers, which could 
easily create the impression that they could be deported if 
they complained or tried to escape. 
Confiscation of identity 
papers or travel 
documents 
The CEA produced carnets for workers but retained them 
and never provided them to workers. Some workers reported 
that pictures of them were taken for the carnets during the 
time that they were being transported, but that they never 
received the carnets. 
Sexual violence 
Physical violence 
Other forms of 
punishment 
Removal of rights or 
privileges (including 
promotion) 
Religious retribution 
Withholding of assets 
(cash or other) 
Threats against family 
members 
Medium Indicators of 
Menace of Penalty 
 
Exclusion from future 
employment 
Exclusion from 
community and social 
life 
Financial penalties 
Informing family, 
community, or public 
about worker's current 
situation (blackmail)  
 In
d
ic
a
to
rs
 o
f w
o
rk
 a
n
d
 life
 
u
n
d
e
r d
u
re
s
s
 o
f a
d
u
lts
 
Strong indicators of 
involuntariness 
 
Forced overtime (beyond 
legal limits) 
Although workers were not explicitly forced to work overtime, 
the vast majority of workers surveyed worked overtime in 
order to make enough money to survive. Researchers judged 
that the piece rate system in which workers received small 
amounts of money per ton of sugarcane harvested, along 
with possible fraud in the weighing of sugarcane, deductions, 
and high interest rates for cashing in vouchers before 
payday, resulted in extremely low wages that caused workers 
to work overtime. 
Forced to work on call 
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(day and night) 
Limited freedom of 
movement and 
communication 
Degrading living 
conditions 
Most workers lived on employer-provided housing. Many of 
these workers lacked access to health care, electricity, 
drinking water, toilets, and adequate food.  
  
Medium indicators of 
involuntariness 
Forced engagement in 
illegal activities 
Forced to work for 
employer's private home 
or family 
Induced addiction to 
illegal substances 
Induced or inflated 
indebtedness (by 
falsification of accounts, 
inflated prices for 
goods/services 
purchased, reduced 
value of goods/services 
produced, excessive 
interest rates on loans, 
etc.) 
Some workers had to buy food on credit from food stores that 
charged inflated prices for the food. In order to obtain this 
credit, workers presented these stores with ―vouchers,‖ which 
are employer-provided receipts that indicate the amount that 
workers are to be paid on the next payday. If workers 
exchange these vouchers at the stores for money or food 
before payday, they only receive 80-90 percent of the value 
of the voucher. However, when the food stores cash these 
vouchers in with employers on payday, they receive the full 
value of the vouchers (which have workers names or ID 
numbers on them). This indicates that employers are 
knowledgeable about the voucher system, which they benefit 
from, because workers become indebted to the food stores 
and are unable to pay their debt off sometimes even after the 
end of the harvest season, causing them to stay on the 
bateyes and work more hours.  
Multiple dependency on 
employer (jobs for 
relatives, housing, etc.) 
The vast majority of workers lived in employer-provided 
housing. Many workers interviewed reported that they could 
be thrown out of this housing if they left their jobs. 
Pre-existence of 
dependency relationship 
with employer 
Being under the 
influence of employer or 
people related to 
employer for non-work 
life.  
Strong indicators of 
penalty (or menace of 
penalty) 
 
Denunciation to 
authorities 
In the Dominican Republic, migrant workers in the sugar 
sector must legally be provided with ―temporary worker 
cards‖ (carnets). These carnets tie them to a certain 
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employer and a certain geographical area and are only valid 
for six months, while many migrant workers reside on the 
bateyes year-round. Migrant workers who lack a valid carnet, 
change employers, or are found outside of the authorized 
area are subject to deportation. The law gives employers the 
power to provide workers with these carnets and to deport 
workers whose carnets have expired. This system ties 
workers to a specific employer and geographic area and 
creates an inherent menace of penalty of deportation for 
migrant workers who leave their employers or areas of 
employment.  
Confiscation of identity 
papers or travel 
documents 
Only a small number of workers were actually provided with 
these carnets in practice, although employers were legally 
obligated to provide workers with the carnets and had the 
capacity to do so. There were cases in which employers, 
especially the CEA, produced the carnets, but retained them 
and never provided them to workers. Although the carnets 
provide workers with very limited freedom of movement, the 
retention of these documents presents further constraints on 
workers‘ freedom of movement and a greater threat of 
deportation. 
Confiscation of mobile 
phones 
Further deterioration in 
working conditions 
Isolation 
Locked in workplace or 
living quarters 
Sexual violence 
Physical violence A few workers interviewed showed signs of intimidation and a 
few workers interviewed reported threats or acts of violence 
carried out by supervisors. 
Other forms of 
punishment (deprivation 
of food, water, sleep, 
etc.) 
Violence against worker 
in front of other worker 
Removal or rights or 
privileges (including 
promotion) 
Religious retribution 
Constant surveillance A few workers interviewed reported that they were under 
surveillance. Some workers brought in under the ―quota‖ 
system by the CEA were under constant surveillance by 
guards who would not let them leave the bateyes, at least 
during the first few weeks of the harvest, causing some of 
these workers to have to escape at night, leaving all of their 
belongings behind. 
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Withholding of assets 
(cash or other) 
Withholding of wages 
Threats against family 
members 
Medium indicators of 
penalty (or menace of 
penalty) 
 
Dismissal One CAC worker interviewed reported that a foreman had 
fired him for complaining that "he did not get paid much." 
Exclusion from future 
employment 
Some workers interviewed reported that if they missed work, 
they would be prohibited from harvesting sugarcane the 
following day. A supervisor reported that workers who 
complained would have their ID number erased and would 
not be able to return to work. 
Exclusion from 
community and social life 
Extra work for breaching 
labor discipline 
Financial penalties A few CAEI workers reported threats that if they complained 
about their working conditions, their worker ID numbers 
would be cancelled and they would not be paid for the work 
that they carried out. 
Informing family, 
community or public 
about worker's current 
situation (blackmail) In
d
ic
a
to
rs
 o
f im
p
o
s
s
ib
ility
 o
f le
a
v
in
g
 e
m
p
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y
e
r fo
r 
a
d
u
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Strong indicators of 
involuntariness 
 
Reduced freedom to 
terminate labor contract 
after training or other 
benefit paid by employer 
Some CEA workers recruited through the ―quota‖ system 
reported that they were under constant surveillance and were 
not allowed to leave, at least during the first few weeks of the 
harvest season. Workers reported that workers who were 
recruited under the ―quota‖ system were less free to leave 
than other workers, because supervisors said that the CEA 
had paid fees to transport the workers from Haiti to the 
bateyes. 
No freedom to resign in 
accordance with legal 
requirements 
Forced to stay longer 
than agreed while waiting 
for wages due 
Forced to work for 
indeterminate period to 
repay outstanding debt 
or wage advance 
Due to workers‘ low wages and debt to food stores, some 
workers were not able to pay off these debts until the end of 
the harvest season, and a small number of workers were not 
able to pay off their debts by the end of the harvest. Workers 
thus had to stay on at the bateyes throughout the harvest 
cutting sugarcane or during downtime at planting or carrying 
other activities to try to pay off their debts. 
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Strong indicators of 
penalty (or menace of 
penalty) 
 
Denunciation to 
authorities 
The law governing the carnet system creates the inherent 
menace of penalty of deportation for workers who leave their 
jobs or geographical areas of employment or whose cards 
expire. It also gives employers the power to issue the carnets 
and to deport workers whose carnets have expired. 
?onfiscation of identify 
paper or travel 
documents 
?mposition of worse 
working conditions 
Locked in work or living 
quarters 
Sexual violence 
Physical violence 
Other forms of 
punishment (deprivation 
of food, water, sleep, 
etc.) 
Removal of rights or 
benefits (including 
promotion) 
Religious retribution 
Under constant 
surveillance 
Some workers interviewed, especially CEA workers, reported 
that they were under constant surveillance. CEA workers 
brought into the Dominican Republic through the ―quota 
system‖ were reportedly constantly watched by guards and 
were not allowed to leave the bateyes, at least during the first 
few weeks of the harvest. 
Violence imposed on 
other workers in front of 
all workers 
Withholding of assets 
(cash or other) 
Withholding of wages 
Threats against family 
members (violence or 
loss of jobs) 
Medium indicators of 
penalty or menace or 
penalty 
 
Dismissal 
Exclusion from future 
employment 
Exclusion from 
community and social life 
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Extra work for breaching 
discipline 
Financial penalties  
Informing family, 
community or public 
about worker's current 
situation (blackmail) 
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Appendix 9: Table of Indicators 
 
WORKER DEMOGRAPHICS 
Age and nationality 
Workers‘ age? 15-20: 74 
21-34: 372 
35-54: 187 
55-69: 87 
70 and older: 20 
15-20: 10% 
21-34: 50% 
35-54: 25% 
55-69: 12% 
70 and older: 3% 
Where workers born? Haiti: 677 
Dominican Republic: 63 
Haiti: 91% 
Dominican Republic: 9% 
Personal identity documents 
Had identification 
documents? 
All workers: 427 
Workers born in Haiti: 386 
Workers born in the DR: 41 
All workers: 58% 
Workers born in Haiti:  57% 
Workers born in the DR: 
65% 
Family situation 
Civil status? Single: 352 
Married/in committed 
relationship: 259 
Separated: 69 
Single: 48% 
Married/in committed 
relationship: 35% 
Separated: 9% 
Had children? Yes: 430 
No: 310 
Yes: 58% 
No: 42% 
Number of children? 1-2:  252 
3: 59 
4:37 
5 or more: 78 
1-2:  34% 
3: 8% 
4: 5% 
5 or more: 11% 
Lived in DR with family 
member? 
Yes: 347 
No: 393 
Yes: 47% 
No: 53% 
Level of education, literacy, and mastery of Spanish 
 Attended school? Yes: 362 
No: 378  
Yes: 49% 
No: 51% 
Could read and write? Yes: 275  
No: 355 
Yes: 37% 
No: 48% 
Could speak Spanish? Fluent: 176  
With difficulty: 207  
None: 352  
Fluent: 24% 
With difficulty: 28% 
None: 48% 
Place of origin and employment in Haiti (of Haitian-born workers) 
Department in which they 
were born? 
Southeast Department: 367 
Western Department: 122  
Northern Departments: 95  
Southeast Department: 
54% 
Western Department: 18% 
Northern, Northeastern, 
Northwestern Departments: 
14% 
Type of employment? Agriculture: 502  Agriculture: 74% 
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Salaried work: 77  Salaried work: 11% 
Links with Haiti 
Had family in Haiti? Yes: 718  
No: 22  
Yes: 97% 
No: 3% 
Sent money to family in 
Haiti? 
Yes: 377  
No:  363  
Yes: 51% 
No: 49% 
In contact with family in 
Haiti? 
Yes: 651  
No: 89 
Yes: 88% 
No: 12% 
Last year of entry into the Dominican Republic (of Haitian-born workers) 
Last year entered DR? 2009-2010: 170 
2005-2008: 215 
2001-2004: 92 
2000 or before: 197 
2009-2010: 25% 
2005-2008: 32% 
2001-2004: 14% 
2000 or before: 29% 
Point of entry into the Dominican Republic (of Haitian-born workers) 
Where entered DR? Independencia Province: 
427  
Pedernales Province: 150  
Dajabón Province: 49  
Elías Piña Province: 20  
Independencia Province: 
63% 
Pedernales Province: 22% 
Dajabón Province: 7% 
Elías Piña Province: 3% 
Transportation over the border into the Dominican Republic (of Haitian-born 
workers) 
Mode of transportation into 
DR? 
By foot: 290 (43% 
By bus: 301 (44% 
By taxi: 49 (seven% 
By truck: 28  
By foot: 43% 
By bus: 44% 
By taxi: 7% 
By truck: 4% 
Who helped to cross 
border? 
Buscon: 364  
Haitian buscon: 308 
Dominican buscon: 49 
Dominican authority: 48  
Haitian authority: 8 
Buscon: 54% 
Haitian buscon: 46% 
Dominican buscon: 7% 
Dominican authority: 7% 
Haitian authority: 1% 
Transportation within the Dominican Republic  
Buscon brought them to 
specific batey? 
Yes: 78  
No: 662  
Yes: 11% 
No: 89% 
Mode of transportation to 
final destination? 
Paid buscón: 351  
Compromiso: 207 
Viaje: 74 
Paid buscón: 47%  
Compromiso: 28% 
Viaje: 10% 
Living situation in the Dominican Republic 
Residing in DR? Yes: 577  
No: 163   
Yes: 78% 
No: 22% 
Time residing in DR? Less than 2 years: 29 
2-5 years: 146 
5-9 years: 84 
10 years or more: 249 
Less than 2 years: 4% 
2-5 years: 20% 
5-9 years: 11% 
10 years or more: 34% 
Where live in DR after the 
harvest?  
On the batey: 496 workers  
Stayed in another province 
in DR: 71  
On the batey: 67% 
Stayed in another province 
in DR: 10% 
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Number of consecutive 
years in batey? 
2-5 years: 229  
6-9 years: 227  
10 years or more: 66  
Born on batey: 39  
2-5 years: 31% 
6-9 years: 31% 
10 years or more: 9% 
Born on batey: 5% 
Number of years working 
for same employer? 
Less than 1 year: 148  
1-2 years: 50  
2-5 years: 239  
More than 5 years: 298  
Less than 1 year: 20% 
1-2 years: 7% 
2-5 years: 32% 
More than 5 years: 40% 
Been back to Haiti? Yes: 359  
No: 381  
Yes: 49%  
No: 51% 
New and seasonal migrants 
Living in DR for less than 1 
year? 
Yes: 103  
No: 637 
Yes: 14% 
No: 86% 
Return to Haiti during the 
dead season? 
Yes: 115  
No: 635 
Yes: 16% 
No: 84% 
What planned to do after 
harvest? 
Return to Haiti: 175  
Work in another sector in 
DR: 92  
Remain on batey: 459  
Return to Haiti: 24% 
Work in another sector in 
DR: 12% 
Remain on batey: 62% 
PRESENCE OF INDICATORS OF FORCED LABOR 
Lack of Consent 
Physical confinement in the work location  
Living in employer-owned 
housing? 
Yes: 734  
No: 6 
Yes: 99% 
No: 1% 
Lived in employer-owned 
housing during dead 
season? 
Yes: 496  
No: 244 
Yes: 67% 
No: 33% 
Were given carnet by 
employer? 
Yes: 157  
No: 583 
Yes: 21% 
No: 79% 
Were issued a (valid) 
carnet in 2010? 
Yes: 53 
No: 687  
Yes: 7% 
No: 93% 
Induced indebtedness 
Who workers made 
payment to for trip to DR? 
Buscon: 437  
Bus driver: 159  
Dominican authorities: 34  
Buscon: 59%  
Bus driver: 21%  
Dominican authorities: 5%  
Cost of last trip to 
workplace in DR? 
Less than DOP 1,000: 111  
DOP 1,000-5,000: 450  
Over DOP 5,000: 59  
Less than DOP 1,000: 15%  
DOP 1,000-5,000: 61% 
Over DOP 5,000: 8%  
How paid for last trip to 
DR? 
Own money: 600  
Borrowed money: 77  
Own money: 81%  
Borrowed money: 10%  
Who they borrowed money 
from? 
Money lender: 31  
Family member: 46  
Money lender: 4%  
Family member: 6%  
Paid interest? Yes: 35  
No: 42  
Yes: 5%  
No: 6%  
Still owed money? Yes: 46  
No: 31 
Yes: 6% 
No: 4% 
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Bought food on credit at 
least part of time? 
Yes: 332  
No: 408 
Yes: 45% 
No: 55% 
Bought food with vouchers? Yes: 56  
No: 684 
Yes: 8% 
No: 92% 
Satisfied with weighing and 
payment system? 
Satisfied: 462 workers  
Not satisfied: 102  
Cane not weighed properly: 
162  
Satisfied: 62% 
Not satisfied: 14% 
Cane not weighed properly: 
22% 
Deception or false promises about types and terms of work 
Why did they go to a 
specific batey? 
There was work there: 482  
Family member lived there: 
106  
Buscon brought them there: 
78  
There was work there: 65% 
Family member lived there: 
14% 
Buscon brought them there: 
11% 
Did they know who buscón 
worked for? 
Yes: 71  
No: 669 
Yes: 10% 
No: 90% 
Received ID card? Yes: 570  
No: 170 
Yes: 77% 
No: 23% 
Knew how much paid per 
ton of sugarcane? 
Yes: 694  
No: 46  
Yes: 94% 
No: 6% 
Deductions for social 
security, housing, meals, or 
union fees? 
Yes: 359  
No: 381 
Yes: 49% 
No: 51% 
Deductions for tools and 
equipment needed for jobs? 
Yes: 460  
No: 280 
Yes: 62% 
No: 38% 
Retention of identity documents or other valuable personal possessions 
Were given carnet by 
employer? 
Yes: 157  
No: 583 
Yes: 21% 
No: 79% 
Were issued a (valid) 
carnet in 2010? 
Yes: 53 
No: 687  
Yes: 7% 
No: 93% 
Menace of Penalty (presence or threat) 
Physical violence against worker or family or close associates 
Showed signs of fear, 
anxiety, or intimidation? 
Yes: 8   
No: 732 
Yes: 1% 
No: 99% 
Could not leave because 
supervisor violent or 
threatening? 
Yes: 7   
No: 733 
Yes: 1% 
No: 99% 
Surveillance? Yes: 7   
No: 733 
Yes: <1% 
No: >99% 
Denunciation to authorities (police, immigration, etc.) and deportation 
Were given carnet by 
employer? 
Yes: 157  
No: 583 
Yes: 21% 
No: 79% 
Were issued a (valid) 
carnet in 2010? 
Yes: 53 
No: 687  
Yes: 7% 
No: 93% 
Exclusion from future employment 
Penalized for missing work Yes: 28  Yes: 4% 
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(with not being able to work 
next day)? 
No: 712 No: 96% 
―Code‖ erased (and not 
able to return to work)? 
Yes: 9  
No: 731 
Yes: 1% 
No: 99% 
Deprivation of food, shelter or other necessities 
Living in employer-owned 
housing? 
Yes: 734  
No: 6 
Yes: 99% 
No: 1% 
Lived in employer-owned 
housing during dead 
season? 
Yes: 496  
No: 244 
Yes: 67% 
No: 33% 
Penalized for missing work 
(with being removed from 
batey)? 
Yes: 20  
No: 720 
Yes: 3%  
No: 97% 
Penalized for leaving jobs 
(with being removed from 
batey)? 
Yes: 25  
No: 715 
Yes: 3%  
No: 97% 
Feared leaving jobs 
because would not make 
enough to buy food? 
Yes: 19  
No: 721 
Yes: 3%  
No: 97% 
OTHER ISSUES OF CONCERN 
Working hours 
Worked 12 hours per day? Yes: 518  
No: 222 
Yes: 70% 
No: 30% 
Worked 7 days per week? Yes: 651  
No: 89 
Yes: 88% 
No: 12% 
Payment 
Paid on time almost all the 
time? 
Yes: 699  
No: 41  
Yes: 94% 
No: 6% 
How paid? Piece rate: 703  
Daily wage: 30  
Piece rate: 95% 
Daily wage: 4% 
Satisfied with weighing and 
payment system? 
Satisfied: 462 workers  
Not satisfied: 102  
Cane not weighed properly: 
162  
Satisfied: 62% 
Not satisfied: 14% 
Cane not weighed properly: 
22% 
How often paid? Weekly: 647  
Bi-weekly: 93  
Weekly: 87% 
Bi-weekly: 13% 
Weekly earnings of workers 
paid weekly? 
DOP 500 or less: 65  
DOP 501-1,000: 276 
DOP 1,001-2,000: 256 
More than DOP 2,000: 23  
DOP 500 or less: 10% 
DOP 501-1,000: 43% 
DOP 1,001-2,000: 40% 
More than DOP 2,000: 4% 
Weekly earnings of workers 
paid bi-weekly? 
DOP 500 or less: 8 
DOP 501-1,000: 14  
DOP 1,001-2,000: 48  
DOP 2,001-DOP 3,000: 14  
DOP 500 or less: 9% 
DOP 501-1,000: 15% 
DOP 1,001-2,000: 52% 
DOP 2,001-DOP 3,000: 
15% 
Voucher system 
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Bought food with vouchers? Yes: 56  
No: 684 
Yes: 8% 
No: 92% 
Deductions 
Deductions for social 
security, housing, meals, or 
union fees? 
Yes: 359  
No: 381 
Yes: 49% 
No: 51% 
Deductions for tools and 
equipment needed for jobs? 
Yes: 460  
No: 280 
Yes: 62% 
No: 38% 
Benefits/Health and safety 
Attended literacy or 
technical training program? 
Yes: 10  
No: 730 
Yes: 1% 
No: 99% 
Got sick or injured during 
employment? 
Yes: 345  
No: 395 
Yes: 47% 
No: 53% 
Where (sick/injured 
workers) received 
treatment? 
Doctor or hospital at 
ingenio: 114  
Hospital del seguro: 128  
Public hospital: 54  
Doctor or hospital at 
ingenio: 33% 
Hospital del seguro: 37% 
Public hospital: 16% 
Living Conditions 
Provided with housing? Yes: 734 
No: 6 
Yes: 99% 
No: 1% 
Provided with mattress? Yes: 118 
No: 622 
Yes: 16 % 
No: 84% 
Access to electricity? Yes: 92 
No: 648 
Yes: 12% 
No: 88% 
Access to potable water?  Yes: 297 
No: 443 
Yes: 40% 
No: 60% 
Access to sanitary 
services? 
Yes: 364 
No: 376 
Yes: 49% 
No: 51% 
Food 
Provided with food? Yes: 47 
No: 693 
Yes: 6% 
No: 94% 
Provided with water? Yes: 242 
No: 498 
Yes: 33% 
No: 67% 
Transport 
Provided with transport? Yes: 564 
No: 163 
Yes: 76% 
No: 22% 
Worker satisfaction 
Thought working conditions 
improved in past few 
years? 
Yes: 685  
No: 55 
Yes: 93% 
No: 7% 
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 This process is not always done the same day as the cane is cut. 
 
11
 Since it generates a daily loss of sugar up to two percent per day. 
 
12
 The residue from this process can be used as fuel or fertilizer. 
 
13
 The origin of the word comes from the Taino ―batey‖ used to describe Aboriginal ball game and where it was played (Báez 
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